A Critical Examination of Nyāya

(An Investigation into Acceptability of the Conceptual Framework, Unaltered Continuity and identity through its Two Strands-Prācīna and Navya)

M.P. Marathe

As is well-known, foundations of the *Nyāya*-tradition were laid down by the famous *Nyāya-Sūtras* compiled by Gautamācārya, and later on a full-fledged growth is explicitly seen in the tradition starting from Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya's *Tattvacintāmaṇī,* though the seeds of it seem to have been sown by Udayanācārya. This is how the entire-tradition falls, as is well-known, into two-main segments known as the *Prācīna-Nyāya* and the *Navya-Nyāya.*

It is argued that it is continuation of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* in more elaborated, enlarged and proliferated form, having the same umbilical-cord running through both the traditions, and the same-veins and arteries of the methodological and technical-considerations. However, a critical examination can be undertaken to investigate the tenability of the above-mentioned argument.

Although both the *Prācīna-Nyāya* as-well-as the *Navya-Nyāya* can be said to be interested in 'reconstruction', just from-this it does-not follow that each-one of them was interested in the 'same-kind of reconstruction'. On the one hand there is no complete-cleavage between the *Prācīna* and the *Navya-Nyāya,* nonetheless there is an important-shift on the other; and this shift makes the *Navya-Nyāya* to bear its own name so-properly and appropriately.

978-81-8315-309-6
1st Edition 2017
Pages- 352
₹ 1000.00


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A Critical Examination of *Nyāya:*

(An Investigation into Acceptability of the Conceptual Framework, Unaltered Continuity and Identity through its Two Strands–*Prācīna* and *Navya*)

By

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NEW BHARATIYA BOOK CORPORATION
DELHI **(INDIA)**

Published by :
New Bhartiya Book Corporation
208, 2nd Floor, Prakashdeep Building,
4735/22, Ansari Road, Daryaganj,
New Delhi-110002
Phone : 011-23280214, 011-23280209, Mo. : 09811640919
E-mail : deepak.nbbc@yahoo.in

First Edition : 2017

Edited by
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Pune-411030
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© Publisher

ISBN : 978-81-8315-309-6

Printed by :
Jain Amar Printing Press
New Delhi

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Acknowledgement

Starting from my under-graduate days I was interested in Indian traditions and especially logic, as Dr. S. V. Pandit use to teach and cultivate interest in me when I was doing my graduation in the *Tattva-jnāna Vidyāpiṭha*, Thane. Due to the impact and influence of Dr. Pandit diligent and analytic mind was formed. When I joined the University of Pune for my Post-graduation that interest was refined by my teachers, to name the few Dr. S.V. Bokil. Dr. P.R. Damale, Dr. D.D. Vadekar, Dr. S.R. Kawale, Dr. V.S. Naravane. I started taking keen interest due to their influence and insistence in various domains of inquiry related to Indian Philosophy. When I started my teaching-carrier, various courses in Logic in S. P. College in 1967 and continued it after joining the Department of Philosophy in 1971 my interest was further deepened and seriously developed in various branched of Logic – both Indian and Western. As a result it presentations in various Seminars held on National level at various places and in Summer Institute held at the Department, I delivered series of lectures on Logic. Similarly I had a chance to listen to various scholars in it. Later on I got a chance to undertake the present Research-work as Post-Doctoral Research Project, for typing of which University of Pune provided a small research-grant (1974 -75); and for which I am thankful to the authorities concerned of the Department and the University.

I am thankful especially to Prof. Dr. S.S. Barlingay, Dr. R. Sundar Rajan and *Nyāya-Pandit* Kurundakar Shastri from the Department. I have profited immensely from the discussions with them and also suggestions from my

colleagues and friends in the Department as-well-as other universities in India. I am aware of various short-comings, lacunae and need of further clarifications, modifications and, perhaps, even over-hauling alteration. I would be grateful to the readers, if they oblige me with their invaluable suggestions.

I am thankful to the staff of the Jayakar Library, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Library and S.P. College Library for the kind help extended to me during my research of the project. I am thankful to Shri S.B. Bhave for neat tying of the work.

Dr. M.P. Marathe

Acknowledgement by the Editor

I am thankful to Prof. Dr. Marathe for entrusting the responsibility of publishing this work, before his sad demise. As per my limited knowledge, I have made some changes which he suggested. Although in the introduction he has emphatically made it clear that no specific reference to a particular work at any place in the text is mentioned, yet as an example at least one reference seems to be profitable as an evidence. Hence, at some places at least I have given some references easily available to me. And added relevant references required with a bibliography and indices essential for converting a research project-work into a book-form. At some places I have converted complicated clauses in sentences into simple-form for facilitating better-comprehension of the prospective-readers. For the publication of the work in short span of time, on the occasion of his second death anniversary, I am thankful to Mr. Deepak Jain, New Bharatiya Book Corporation, Delhi.

Prof. Dr. Mangala R. Chinchore

Introduction

Two Strands in the *Nyāya* Tradition

Ever since Gautamācārya compiled the famous *Nyāya-Sūtras*[1], the *Nyāya*-tradition came to be diversified, deepened and enriched at the hands of later-thinkers, scholars and commentators. This happened in a pretty-long course of time. Yet, the entire-tradition falls, as-is well-known, into two-main segments–known as the *Prācīna-Nyāya* and the *Navya-Nyāya*. Roughly-speaking, the latter-phase of the tradition began in its explicit and obvious-form since Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya wrote the monumental-work called *Tattvacintāmaṇī*[2] . But the seeds of the tradition seem to have been sown by Udayanācārya, the author of the celebrated-works called *Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātpryaṭīkā-Pariśuddhi*[3] , *Kusumāñjali, Kiraṇāvali, Ātma-tattva-viveka* as-also of *Lakṣaṇāvali*. He can be said to be the 'Father of *Navya-Nyāya* tradition', with the same-aptness and propriety with which Leibniz is said to be the 'Father of Modern Logic'.

The *Nyāya* tradition, thus, comprises of two main-segments. It is held by some[4] that it is the same-tradition that is more elaborated, enlarged and proliferated. It is also maintained that not-only the same umbilical-cord runs through both the traditions, and the same-veins and arteries of the methodological and technical-considerations throb in them; but-also that the tradition of the *Navya-Nyāya* is the most proper-fulfillment and completion of the approach, the method and the investigation taken-up by the *Prācīna-Nyāya*.

It has also been argued[5] that the line on-which the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition developed as a matter of fact, the issues it raised, the technical-artifact it created, the *schema* it developed and nurtured, and the innumerable and yet important-details and nuances it brought to the intellectual-horizons were all those which were envisioned by the inexhaustible -richness and the wealth of the philosophical-acumen and erudition of the pioneers and predecessors of the entire-tradition. That is, what is intended to be said is that the general-line on-which the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition developed, the philosophical-problems it posed, and the way it solved them, as-also the techniques and technicalities it either newly-introduced or refined were the ones which the *Prācīna-Nyāya* tradition wanted to usher-in and develop.

The case, nevertheless, is neither so-strong nor smooth as this argument, even *prima-facie*, intends to present. This is not just because a dominent, endeared and attractive-view is intended to be controverted. It is rather because so-many facts and a correct-mode of understanding go against the celebrated-view. This is not of-course to say that the tradition of the *Navya-Nyāya* has nothing whatsoever to do either with the *Nyāya*-tradition in-general or with the *Prācīna-Nyāya* tradition in-particular. It is also not intended to hold that it is merely a courtesy of nomenclature that the tradition of the *Navya-Nyāya* is said to be falling-within the main-stream of the *Nyāya*-tradition. Far from it. What is, however, intended to be argued is that neither the transition from the *Prācīna-Nyāya* to the *Navya-Nyāya* must have been so-smooth as it has been attempted to make-out, nor was the same-bunch of problems that engaged the attention and concentration of the upholders and defenders of both the traditions. It is also very difficult, if-not impossible, to maintain that the line on-which the *Navya-Nyāya* did develop as a matter of fact was the one which was envisaged, either in out-line or in greater-details by Gautamācārya or

Vātsyāyana, or even by both of them. There indeed are statements-made and arguments-advanced by the later-*Naiyāyikas* that such in-fact was the case. But this kind of evidence, we hold, is mono-directional; and various-reasons might have prompted the later-*Naiyāyikas* to marshal arguments of that kind in-support of their contentions. The chief-reason, according to us, that must have led them to advocate such a thesis seems to be that they wanted to impress-upon their readers the view that the transition-from the tradition of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* to that of the *Navya-Nyāya* was not only smooth one, but it is the same-line of thinking on which both the traditions-flourished. Their aim, thus, seems to be to make-out a case that the issues they came to tackle were a legacy of their predecessors, and hence no-part of their intellectual-endeavor is foreign to the original-insights of the founders. Such an argument is certainly attractive. The attractiveness of the argument very-skillfully brings-out two-things: paying as handsome a tribute to the predecessors as possible, and avoiding the charge of deviation and consequent-heresy. But attractiveness of an argument is not commensurate either with its persuasive-force, or with its tenability. For, if it were really the case that either Gautamācārya or Vātsyāyana, or both of them had the vista and the sketch of the development of the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition, at-least rudimentarily, in their heads and if the general-approach, the conceptual-framework and the categorial-topology along-with problems-handled by the upholders of the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition were really the one as were anticipated by the progenitors of the tradition, there was no-reason why they themselves should have shyed to provide at-least cursory-hints and elementary-indications about them. It would be travesty of confusion and misjudgment of facts to hold that although these and allied-considerations were present before their minds'-eye it was the immaturity of the general intellectual-atmosphere, and

the non-availability of the refined-conceptual and categorial-equipment that either prevented or marred the prospects of clearly-expressing what they had anticipated. For, if they could supply some of the prominent missing-links, introduce some considerations *ab-novo*, refine the ones already-existent, there is no-reason to hold that some notions, concepts and problems were, with whatever vagueness and crudity, that is charitably and without violence to their scholarship, present in their intellectual-equipment; and yet they did-not or could-not present them. To hold this is not tantamount to saying that either one of them or both of them were philosophical-pigmies, or intellectual-dwarfs. It is neither to be-little their scholarship, nor to doubt their erudition and expertise. It is rather to hold, and we believe we are not far-too-wrong in either holding or propagating this view, that in-spite of the fact that both the segments of the *Nyāya*-tradition are principally and centrally-concerned with the investigation-into *Padārthas;* yet it is neither the same-consideration nor the same-context and domain of consideration that prompted or might have prompted both these segments to undertake the kind of investigation they did undertake.

Let us make ourselves fairly-clear on the issue. Let us not merely state the fact that both the traditions talk-principally and, perhaps exclusively, of *Padārthas*, misleading us beyond a warranted-limit and extent. It is true that they do this. It is also true that whereas the tradition of *Prācīna-Nyāya* talks of sixteen-*Padārthas*[6]; the tradition of *Navya-Nyāya* talks of only the seven[7]. But this (numerical) difference is merely superficial and not so-deep-rooted as it apparently-seems. Presuming that the sixteen-*Padārthas* the *Prācīna-Nyāya* talks-of are quite well-known, let us inquire-into the general-context of their consideration. If one is to consider coolly and critically each-one of the *Padārtha* that the *Prācīna-Nyāya* talks-of, starting-from *Pramāṇa* to *Nigrahasthāna*, then

it will be evident that each-one of them is the one that figures or in-principle is likely to figure in a situation of dialogue and conversation; *Vāda* as it was then-called. Philosophy, prominently and even perhaps essentially, is a process of continuous-argumentation – arguments, counter-arguments, counter-counter-arguments so-on and so-forth. That is, dialogue and conversation has an important-role to play in philosophy, and the upholders of the school and the tradition of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* had unmistakably seen the point and its importance[8]. The *Padārthas* Gautamācārya or Vātsyāyana are talking-about are those issues/concepts which figure in such a kind of conversational or dialogical-situation. The nature of some object/thing is proposed to be considered. One has to adduce and present the evidence one can gather and muster on the basis of which that there is, at-least *prima-facie*, such an object with such-and-such a nature; could at-least tentatively be accepted. There should be some initial-points of argument – methodological or otherwise – between (at-least) the two-parties of conversation. On the basis of the available-evidence, one-party puts-forward a generalisation, citing example, both to add persuasive-force to the argument and also to make sure that one is talking-about an object/thing at-least the kind of which is known or recognised. The other-party expresses doubt about it. This means, either that it is 'an invitation-for an additional-evidence in-support of the contention', or-else it is a 'demand-for the removal of weak-links in explanation and justification'. The discussion proceeds. Sometimes either one of the parties or occasionally both of them resort to misleading and fallacious-arguments, but finally with the kind-counsel and proper-control of an arbitrator, an agreed-conclusion is arrived-at. This is roughly the situation and domain, which engages attention of the upholders of the tradition of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*.

The problem they are raising is: what principal issues, concepts and techniques are philosophically-significant in

such a situation? What is, if at-all, an interconnection between or among them? How after-all does a philosophical-issue happen to be resolved, if-not dissolved altogether, through conversation? Each-one of the link, no-matter whether each-one of them is equally-prominent, intriguing and weighty, is called *Padārtha*. It is for the very simple-reason that an expression on the plane of language used to signify it signifies that link, the nature and importance of which is intended to be made clear by the works of Gautamācārya and Vātsyāyana.

There is, thus, an attempt at reconstruction – but reconstruction neither of the world or of human-knowledge; nor even of the language through which we are in a position to communicate-significantly and successfully; but-rather of a dialogical or conversational-situation. This kind of reconstruction, although philosophically-considered an important-reconstruction, is not of the kind of any-one of the other above-mentioned reconstructions. It also cannot be maintained that philosophers, who wanted to undertake and discuss the problems concerning the reconstruction of the dialogical-situation, had anticipated, could anticipate or should have anticipated the nature and problems which philosophers interested in the other (kind of) reconstructions should and are required to encounter and face. Not-only something of this kind, we hold, was not done nor was it necessary to have been done. To hold that such was not the case, as-also that such must-not have been the case, is like saying that one who intends to explain how to play one (kind of) game, must know and should have explained how to play another (kind of) game as-well. Even-if he did-not have that actually, he could be said to be anticipating either the way the other-games are played or are explained the way they are played. Obviously, an assumption of this kind would be untenable and unwarrantable too.

What we are merely and minimally trying to maintain is that although both the *Prācīna-Nyāya* as-well-as the *Navya-Nyāya* can be said to be interested in the problem of 'reconstruction', as we shall maintain in the sequel, just from-this it does-not follow that each-one of them was interested in the 'same-kind of reconstruction'. It also does-not follow that each-one of them wanted to undertake the respective-reconstruction in the 'same' or at-least in a 'similar way'. What can be said, at the most, is that whether we are talking-about the *Prācīna-Nyāya* or the *Navya-Nyāya* the principal-issue is that of reconstruction, though neither of the 'same (kind of) reconstruction' nor of the 'same-way' of undertaking it. It could, perhaps, be said that 'similarity of problems' and 'the forms of handling them' might have contributed a pragmatic or heuristic-impetus as-well-as ease of raising and handling them at the hands of upholders of the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition. But subsumption of the problems and reconstruction undertaken by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* under those at the hands of the *Navya-Nyāya* or *vice-versa* would be as misleading and unwarrantable as subsuming the Laws of Classical Mechanics under those of Electro-Magnetism or *vice-versa*. 'Similarity of form' and 'similarity of problems' is a very weak-argument warranting subsumption and deduction. But more of it later.

Thus, the principal-concern in the *Nyāya*-tradition is that of reconstruction. Yet the fact remains that the two prominent-traditions of the *Nyāya* do-not want to undertake the 'same (kind of) reconstruction'. The issue of 'reconstruction' is the thread that runs through both the traditions. But mere and exclusive-attention to and concentration-upon this, would be both insufficient and misleading. It is insufficient, because just or perhaps exclusive, if-not over, concentration on this will force us to lose lot of heat and warmth from the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition. If, on the contrary, we telescope all the issues and problems into the

philosophical-fold of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*, then, perhaps, it will turn-out to be so over-puffed that it will appear both philosophically-crude and aesthetically-inelegant. But it is also misleading, because looked at through the same-prism the *Prācīna-Nyāya* will come to emit such philosophical-spectra which it does-not and even need-not emit. It is this which we need to grasp-clearly. Once we have grasped this point clearly, we shall come to understand that much of the heat in the above-mentioned anticipation-argument, as we would like to call it, is lost or happen to be lost. But once such heat is lost, we shall also come to catch the point that although there is no complete-cleavage between the *Prācīna* and the *Navya-Nyāya*, yet there is an important-shift; and it is this shift that makes the *Navya-Nyāya* to bear its own name so-properly and appropriately. And once this is grasped and understood, the entire attempt of reducing the *Prācīna-Nyāya* to the *Navya-Nyāya* turns-out to be misleading, unjust and unwarranted.

Outline of the Proposed-Study

The fundamental-point, therefore, from which the investigation is proposed to be undertaken in the following-pages, will start as we move from the *Prācīna-Nyāya* to the *Navya-Nyāya* we notice a principal-shift – shift not-only about which reconstruction/s are to be undertaken but how to undertake them. But having started-from this point, it will require us to pose and attempt to answer one important problem. That problem is: granting that the *Navya-Nyāya* embraces an important-shift in its perspective, what were or might have been the prominent-considerations that necessitated or might have necessitated such a shift? Along with this question, we shall also raise and attempt to answer another equally important-question: granting that various Schools of Indian Philosophy flourished almost-simultaneously, why did the *Nyāya*-tradition gave-up its own-

scheme of *Padārthas* and came to take-over the scheme of *Padārthas*-advocated and championed by the *Vaiśeṣikas*; although with some modifications? Why could they not either form a philosophical-alliance with any other school, or imbibe and absorb the philosophical-frame presented by the upholders of any other school? Discussion of this issue will engage our attention in the first part of the present investigation.

After having dealt with this problem in the first-part, the important-point that is proposed to be taken-up for-consideration is a critical-examination of the theory of the *Navya-Nyāya* in the second-part. Regarding the *Navya-Nyāya* techniques and frame, two fundamentally-different approaches could be considered. First, would be the one that is given to elaborate-presentation and explanation of the theory, and various techniques-developed within the fold of the tradition. It would demand elaboration of the general-frame, explication of the techniques, technicalities and nuances, exposition of methodological-considerations envisaged and attempted to be put-forward by the upholders of the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition. This is certainly an important-consideration to be taken-up for a detailed-discussion. This kind of study would develop and elaborate what we would like to call, an 'insider's-approach' to the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. Understanding the importance of such an endeavor and granting the philosophical-significance of it, is certainly commendable. Taking into consideration, further, the dearth of works of this kind, we too very honestly and sincerely hold that anybody who has sufficient-training and the necessary-equipment should undertake such a work with as much-seriousness as one is able to muster for the cause. There is no comprehensive-work extant that explains the general methodological-frame of the *Navya-Nyāya*, along with the prominent-techniques developed and perfected by it. A work of this kind would be explanatory and exegetical

in kind, and such a kind of work, in contemporary-language and idioms, very badly needs to be undertaken. There can be no doubt about this.

But secondly, we hold, there is another, at-least equally-important, if-not more-important, consideration that can be taken-up for elaborate-discussion about the *Navya-Nyāya* methodology in-particular, and about any methodology in-general. This kind of consideration is an attempt to undertake, with as much impartiality as one can and needs to command, a critical-examination of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory in-general and of some of the techniques-developed by it in-particular. This kind of study will develop what we may call an 'outsider's-approach' to the *Navya-Nyāya* theory and methodology. Instead of embarking-upon a detailed-exposition of it and the explanation of the important-techniques developed within its fold, such a kind of study will presuppose at-least a rudimentary-background of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory and methodology on the part of the readers. This approach is developed not in order to embarrass the beginners. It is rather developed to expose the sophomores and specialists to some of the critical-considerations that can and need to be given a serious-attention to, provided we are not to look-at the *Navya-Nyāya* theory and methodology from the attitude of gullibility, blindfoldedness and uncritical-acceptance. It is meant to foster an attitude of critical-consideration, and critical-examination. An attempt of this kind that is intended to be made in the following-pages is not be taken as either derogatory to the achievement of the *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers, nor denunciatory of their theory and methodology. It is rather an investigation undertaken with an attitude of a dispassionate-seeker of the truth and honest critical-inquirer, with a view to assess and judge the real-worth of the entire *Navya-Nyāya* endeavor; to get a clearer-perspective of its aims and achievements.

The first kind of investigation ('insiders-approach') is not postponed, because it is less-important, or because it is not important at-all. On the contrary, being convinced of its propriety and urgent-necessity, the present-author proposes to undertake such an investigation at some later-time, provided the lacuna is not already filled-by the erudition and scholarship of a more competent-hand by that time. But presently we want to concentrate-upon the second kind of investigation ('outsiders approach'), without any commitment as to which one of them is more fundamental and important; believing that both ('insiders approach' and 'outsiders approach') these investigations are important to say the-least. This is in-so-far-as the identification and choice of the problem and also the area of investigation is concerned.

In the second part of the present-work, there will be nine-chapters followed by a general-epilogue (i.e. tenth chapter). Each-one of these chapters is addressed to the discussion of an important-issue regarding the *Navya-Nyāya* theory.

In the first chapter, entitled "Critical Examination of the Navya-*Nyāya* Theory", we shall argue that the kind of frame that the *Navya-Nyāya* envisages and attempts to present or create certain ontological-embarrassments which, other things remaining the same, it is unable to surmount.

In the second chapter, entitled "A Critical Appraisal of *Navya-Nyāya* Theory", we shall maintain that such ontological-embarrassments in the *Navya-Nyāya* arise, principally because it subscribes to a particular-kind of methodology.

However, in the next (i.e. third) chapter, entitled "Language as a Clue to Philosophical Inquiry", we shall endeavor to show that the kind of methodology that the *Navya-Nyāya* develops is based-upon and derives its inspiration-from some of the clues that it receives from language.

In the fourth chapter, entitled "Restatement of the *Navya-Nyāya* Theory", we shall attempt to restate the *Navya-Nyāya* theory in modern-language, with the intention of being able to pose and attempt to answer certain important-questions about it.

In the fifth chapter entitled "Context of Discovery, Explanation and Justification", an attempt is made to raise a question and respond to: whether *Navya-Nyāya* theory makes distinction-between various kinds of contexts of inquiries, viz. that of discovery, explanation and justification.

In the next (i.e. sixth) chapter, entitled "Priority: Ontological, Epistemological, Logical and Temporal", we shall attempt to ask and answer the question: whether the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is in a position to honour and maintain, without confusing between-or-among them, the distinctions between different-kinds of priorities.

We shall then, in the seventh chapter, entitled "Transparency or Opacity of *Navya-Nyāya* Theory", attempt to raise and answer the question: whether and how-far is the *Navya-Nyāya* theory – either transparent or opaque. That is, we shall propose to inquire: whether the *Navya-Nyāya* theory can, at-least in-principle, make an allowance for conceptual-change; provided such a change is demanded by occasion and justified by circumstances.

In the pen-ultimate (i.e. eighth) chapter, entitled "Consistency and/or Completeness of *Navya-Nyāya* Theory", we shall ask: whether and how-far the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is able to withstand the issues of consistency and completeness, which any theory worth the name should be able to honour. We shall also ask and attempt to answer the question in this connection: whether and how-far the *Navya-Nyāya* theory can respect and honour at-least the 'Simple Theory of Types'.

Lastly, in the ninth chapter entitled "Reconstruction and Realism", we shall consider some of the important-issues regarding the nature and relation-between realism and reconstruction, the chief-problem in which the *Navya-Nyāya* is interested in.

At the end of the discussion of these points, there will follow an "epilogue" (i.e. tenth chapter), in which the general-argument will be concluded.

These points are attempted to be raised on the basis of whatever little-knowledge of the *Nyāya*-theory and methodology the author has. While raising these points no particular-work, whether it is a *Vāda-grantha* or a *Prakaraṇa-grantha* is principally and exclusively concentrated-upon. This is done, firstly because nothing of the kind is expected to be done. The work is not expected to be exegetical and explanatory. There is, therefore, no special-purpose in relying on a particular-work. Moreover, in-so-far-as the *Navya-Nyāya* theory and methodology as a whole is expected to be critically-considered, concentration on a particular work or another would turn-out to be one-sided and misleading. What is proposed to be critically-examined is the general-methodological and theoretical common-thread that runs through the various-treatises that are available. But, secondly, for the kind of work that is proposed to be done, concentration on any particular-text or author is both redundant and unnecessary.

NOTES

1. *Nyāya-Sūtras* of Gautama with *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana; Swami Dwarikadas Shastri; Bauddha Bharati; Varanasi ;(1st ed.); 1973.
2. *Tattvacintāmaṇī* of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya; Kāmākhyanātha, Pt. Tarkavāgiśa (ed.); (Part-I&II); Bibliotheca Indica Series; The Asiatic Society of Bengal; Calcutta;1988.
3. *Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātpryaṭīkā-Pariśuddhi* and the works of Udayanācārya; *A History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools);* Vidyabhushan, Satishacandra; Motilal Banarsidass; Delhi; 1978; Pp.141-47.

4. For example Ganganatha Jha, Surendranath Dasgupta, Candradhara Sharma, Vidyabhushana S.C. etc.
5. For example see introduction to *Tarka-Saṁgraha* edited by Athalye and Bodas, and the above-mentioned scholars in note no.4.
6. *Prameya, Pramāṇa, Saṁśaya, Prayojana, Dṛṣṭānta, Siddhānta, Avayava, Tarka, Nirṇaya, Vāda, Jalpa, Vitaṇḍā, Hetvābhāsa, Chala, Jātī* and *Nigrahasthāna* are the Sixteen-*Padārthas* mentioned in the *Nyāya-Sutras* and advocated by the followers of *Prācīna-Nyāya.*
7. Although in the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* six *Padārthas* are mentioned, later *Vaiśeṣikas* uphold seven *Padārthas* which are borrowed and accepted by the later *Naiyāyikas.* They are: *Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya, Samavāya, Viśeṣa* and *Abhāva. Abhāva* is added by Udayana in *Lakṣaṇāvalī* and *Nyāya-Kandalī* too as a separate *Padārtha.*
8. This is not to hold that for a philosophical-dialogue to take place, the philosophical-discussion must be presented strictly in the form of a dialogue. Nor is it intended to convey that both the parties to the dialogue must be physically present. If they are, that is good. But even if they are not neither philosophy nor conversation, at least the spirit of it, are likely to evaporate from the intellectual consideration. An author, for example, can anticipate the kind of argument a *Pūvapakṣin* (a philosophical-opponent) might have presented, were he present on the scene. But it is not supplying the missing-party physically but its argument/s that is essential for the format and nucleus of the dialogical-situation. Once that is done, dialogue is restored. Consider, for example, Śaṁkara's commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras. Brahma-Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa with *Śāṁkara-Bhāṣya;* Motilal Banarsidass; Delhi; 1964.

About the Book

As is well-know foundations of the *Nyāya*-tradition were laid down by the famous *Nyāya-Sūtras* compiled by Gautamācārya, and later on a full-fledged growth is explicitly seen in the tradition starting from Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya's *Tattvacintāmaṇī*, though the seeds of it seem to have been sown by Udayanācārya. This is how the entire-tradition falls, as is well-known, into two-main segments –known as the *Prācīna-Nyāya* and the *Navya-Nyāya*.

It is argued by the *Navya-Nyāya* scholars that it is continuation of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* in more elaborated, enlarged and proliferated form, having the same umbilical-cord running through both the traditions, and the same-veins and arteries of the methodological and technical-considerations. It is further held that the line on-which the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition developed as a matter of fact, the issues it raised, the technical-artifact it created, the *schema* it developed and nurtured, and the innumerable and yet important-details and nuances it brought to the foreground were all those which were envisioned by the inexhaustible-richness and the wealth of the philosophical-acumen and erudition of the pioneers and predecessors of the entire-tradition.

However, a critical examination can be undertaken to investigate the tenability of the above-mentioned argument. Is it due to paying a praise-worthy tribute to the predecessors and avoiding the charge of deviation and consequent-heresy, needs to be inquired. The transition from the *Prācīna-Nyāya* to the *Navya-Nyāya* is it so-smooth as it has been attempted to make-out, or the same-bunch of problems that engaged the attention and concentration of the upholders and defenders of both the traditions were the same? It is also very difficult to maintain that the line on-which the *Navya-Nyāya* did develop as a matter of fact was the one which was envisaged by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* or is there a continuation of the same-line of thinking on which both the traditions-flourished? In-spite of the fact that both the segments of the *Nyāya*-tradition are principally and centrally-concerned with the investigation-into

PART – I :

Transition to The *Navya-Nyāya*

Prefatory Remarks

We pointed-out in the introduction that it is not-merely a matter of nomenclatural-concession, and adoption of a convenient-terminology and label that both the factions of the *Nyāya*, viz. the *Prācīna* and the *Navya-Nyāya*, are said to fall-within the general-tradition of *Nyāya*. But, at the same-time, we also pointed-out that the transition-from the *Prācīna* to the *Navya-Nyāya* must-not have been so-smooth and frictionless as has been said to have occurred. We argued that both these factions are interested in undertaking an inquiry and investigation into the nature and structure of *Padārthas*. It is also the case that each-one of the faction wants to undertake a reconstruction. But, similarity of interest of this kind, we argued, will not be sufficient to maintain that the problems with which both the factions were confronted, the reconstructions they wanted to embark-upon and the general methodological-frame within which these reconstructions were attempted to be undertaken were the same. Instead of going by such an easy-road, since there are difficulties with which this approach is blocked, we want to argue that although *Naiyāyikas* retain their interest in the investigation into the nature, structure and relation of *Padārthas;* and although there is also persistence about reconstruction, there must have been certain very-predominant and overwhelming-conditions which must have necessitated and almost inevitably-forced on *Naiyāyikas* the transition-from the *Prācīna* to the *Navya-Nyāya*. For, other

things remaining the same, no-one is inclined to allow a predominant-shift in one's approach, theory, methodology, techniques and perspective along with the important-themes and problems discussed so-easily unless it becomes methodologically-impossible for one to retain the old-perspective and methodology on the one-hand, and yet concede newer-problems and their importance as also attempt their solution on the other. We generally are reluctant to change, unless change has been trusted and forced on us. Similar must have been the case even with the upholders of the *Nyāya*-tradition. They must have modified, changed and shifted their approach and methodology so-conspicuously, in which the older-methodological contours become so dim-and-hazy that one may even *prima-facie* come to doubt whether both these perspectives can really be said to have been subscribed to by the same-tradition, under very heavy-pressure – methodological and otherwise. The circumstances which might have necessitated this will have to be reconstructed and the pressures which might have exerted tremendous-influence in such a shift, as also guided and channelised the course of such a shift will have to be sifted carefully. This is a formidable-task. But we propose, in what follows, to undertake such a reconstruction of the circumstances, and consider some of the plausible and important-hints in that direction. The investigation of this kind is beset with intriguing-difficulties, primarily because the necessary-evidence required for the purpose is very difficult to locate and find-out. Further, even if one gets some hints in the requisite-direction, they raise a formidable-difficulty about their authenticity and reliability. In such circumstances, the attempt we propose to make should be considered to be conjectural rather-than final and conclusive. The effort of this kind is proposed to be made expressly, because it is thought better to make such an effort, although on a conjectural and tentative-plane; rather-than making no

attempt at-all and leaving the entire-problem completely-undiscussed as has been done traditionally.

Five Factors that Might Have Influenced the Transition

We believe and hold that we are not far-too wrong in so-believing, that in-all five-factors must have necessitated the transition-from the *Prācīna* to the *Navya-Nyāya*. This is not, of course, to say that each-one of the factors must have exerted the same-influence and weight-on such a transition. Some of these factors might have weighed more as compared with others. But, we trust that they must have created the necessary-pressure jointly-and-severally, as a result of which the transition must have been inevitable and unavoidable. These factors seem to be : (i) the inherent-weaknesses in the frame and methodology of the theory of the advocates of the school of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*, (ii) the confrontation of the *Nyāya* tradition with Buddhism, (iii) the consideration of the *Vaiśeṣika*-ontology, along-with their Atomistic-theory; and their interest too in the issue of reconstruction, (iv) the concentration on the 'do-verbs or transitive-verbs' in language as contrasted with 'be or intransitive-verbs', and the consequent 'activistic' and even 'anthropocentric-approach' to ontology, and (v) the general reconstruction-interest of the *Nyāya*-tradition, along-with its endeavor to adopt what is called the 'name-theory of meaning'. We shall consider these factors and the impact they must have made on the issue of the transition in the same sequential-order in which we have mentioned them here.

(i) Inherent-Weaknesses in the *Prācīna-Nyāya*

Coming first to the inherent-weaknesses in the *Prācīna-Nyāya*. As we maintained in the introduction the major and perhaps the exclusive-interest of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* had been that of 'reconstructing the conversational or dialogical-situation', in such a way that every important-link in the entire situation is brought-out and explained. What,

according to it, a significant-expression denotes is either a full-fledged link in such conversational-situation, or a thread that is either directly or indirectly related with any-one or more of such-links. Although within its range we do embark-upon and undertake reconstruction, we do not necessarily come to undertake a reconstruction either of the world, or of human-knowledge, or even of the language through which we are in a position to communicate-meaningfully and significantly. Moreover, we do not also come to advocate and defend anything by way of our ontological-commitment. That is, we do not come to specify what kind of things we accept to inhabit this-world. Issues of these kinds are not prominently-raised by the upholders of the school of *Prācīna-Nyāya*, not-because they are not important issues. Far from it. They did not raise such issues, we conjecture, mainly because anyone who wants to discuss the issue of the reconstruction of the conversational-situation, and develop the methodology and frame resorting to which and with the help of which the way philosophical-controversies and discussions are undertaken and issues settled could be clarified and explained. They need-not raise these sorts of issues – as a matter of fact or it is even needless to raise problems of these kinds. When such philosophical-discussions are undertaken or are proposed to be undertaken, it suffices that the concerned-parties subscribe to and accept certain agreed-method of proceeding with the discussion. The issues of what things one is ultimately prepared to allow to inhabit the world, how would one reconstruct human-knowledge in general etc. are both beside the point and redundant to be concentrated-upon. Peripherally and passingly such issues may be cursorily made a reference to; but that is more a matter of concession rather-than necessity. When, on the contrary, issues precisely and exclusively of this kind are attempted to be raised, discussed and debated, and perhaps satisfactorily-resolved, then this cannot be done

with the help of that theory and methodology which concentrates on the conversational-situation and its reconstruction. When a certain thing or its nature is being discussed, or when the thesis one maintains about things are being debated; it suffices to know how does one know that kind of thing or its characteristic etc. being there, whether one is arguing correctly and cogently, what are the pit-falls which should have been avoided and the final-resolution of the issue arrived-at. But the consideration of larger and important issues of ontological-commitment and various-types of reconstructions one can attempt to undertake, their models etc. are the issues which fall-outside the gambit and domain of the earlier sort of issues. Issues of both the kinds are obviously philosophical. But for that reason they are not the same-issues. Nor does it follow that the one, who has developed the methodology and the necessary-equipment to raise and resolve the issues of the first-kind, must also have made a necessary and significant-contribution with regard to the issues of the second-kind. That there was this limitation and weakness in the theory and methodology of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*, *Naiyāyikas* did not come to understand till they come to confront with Buddhists, especially with that dominant *Mahāyāna*-school of Buddhism, which is overwhelmingly 'nominalistic' in approach. The central-thesis of this school of Indian Philosophical Thought was pioneered, it seems and this seems also to be the generally agreed-view, by Nāgārjuna. But the scholarship and erudition of writers, like Ratnakīrti, Aśvaghoṣa, Diñnāga, Dharmakīrti etc. enriched, variegated and deepened the thesis and its implications. Study of and confrontation with the writings of these authors, along-with an objective-consideration of their own theory and methodology, must have made *Nyāya*-philosophers aware of the fact that their theory essentially does not have the necessary-apparatus and the requisite-tools in terms of which what kind of entities

they take to be inhabiting this world could be clearly-specified, if-not also explained and justified. But it is not noticed till the *Naiyāyikas* came to locate and grasp weaknesses and lacunae in their theory and methodology that they might have felt the necessity of modifying and changing it. But they would not have been in a position either to locate or attempt to rectify-shortcomings of their theory, were they not to be confronted-with Buddhists and especially with *Mahāyāna*-Buddhists. It is their confrontation with Buddhists that made the weaknesses in the theory of *Prācīna-Nyāya* conspicuous and obvious. How and why this should have happened is an interesting and important question, and it is to the consideration of the second-factor that necessitated transition-from the *Prācīna* to the *Navya-Nyāya* that we now turn.

(ii) Confrontation of the *Nyāya* with Buddhism

In-spite-of reluctance, hesitation and even utter-refusal on the part of *Naiyāyikas* to acknowledge and accept the impact and influence of the Buddhist problems, terminology and techniques on their own, it would be travesty of confusion and misstatement of fact to deny this. The *Nyāya* denial springs more from their misplaced-claim of originality and innovative as-well-as renovative-spirit, rather-than from their commitment to be as-close-as possible to the facts. It would indeed be philosophically-interesting and intellectually-worthwhile as-also rewarding to investigate which considerations *Naiyāyikas* borrowed from which Buddhist thinker or writer, and introducing which modifications and refinements on it, if at-all, it was imbibed and absorbed within the fold of the *Nyāya* theory and methodology. The present study does not allow discussion of this issue. Leaving this aside, therefore, let us come to the discussion of the problem: what impact and influence did Buddhism exercise on the *Nyāya*, as a result of which a shift-

from the *Prācīna* to the *Navya-Nyāya* arose as a matter of fact? The fundamental-point of controversy-between the *Nyāya* and the Buddhist thinkers centers either around the 'realist and empiricist issue' or on the 'realist and nominalist issue'. Although each-one of these issues can be independently raised and discussed, yet in an important-way they bear-upon each-other; and sharpen or help sharpening the edges of the controversy – we need hardly, nevertheless, to dwell on the point here. It is in this context that the questions like what is one to take the world to be inhabited by, what are to be taken as primitive-components of human-knowledge, and how is one to reconstruct the edifice of human-knowledge, how is one to draw a line of demarcation-between cognitive-issues on the one-hand and explanatory and justificatory-issues on the-other etc. gather their eminence and importance. Here not-only issues pertaining to ontological-commitment and reconstruction are in order, but-also issues concerning-preference of one ontological-commitment to another as-also of preference of one-mode of reconstruction to another are important. The basic-difference between the adherents of the schools of *Nyāya* and Buddhism boil down to two main-areas: 'extreme Platonistic-realism' of the *Nyāya* and 'moderate, if not extreme, empiricism' of Buddhism; and secondly 'Platonistic-realism' of the *Nyāya* and 'nominalism' of Buddhism. These issues cannot be resolved or at-least attempted to be resolved unless-and-until each-one side specifies, as unambiguously as possible, its ontological-commitments, methodology and equipments; as also the reasons of preference of one of them over the other. Consider, for instance, an acute-controversy between Buddhists and *Naiyāyikas* over the nature and status of universals (*Jātis*). As in this kind of discussion and controversy *Nyāya* thinkers are required to specify their ontological-commitment and since the theory of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* does not have provision to do so, they would not even be in a position to have a

meaningful and significant-dialogue with Buddhists; unless they give-up their traditional-stance and take-over a new-frame. Such a shift must fulfill two-conditions: it must enable them to specify their ontological-commitment, and it must also enable them to develop a different and newer but specific-approach to reconstruction, at-least of the world and human-knowledge, if-not of human-language as-well. For, such a meaningful-dialogue with Buddhists, what is wanted is not-merely a reconstruction of a dialogical or conversational-situation without specifying what kind of world and view of human-knowledge about it one adopts, but-rather a serious attempt at reconstructing these – leaving aside the problem of the reconstruction of dialogical-situation as philosophically less-interesting one.

However it may be asked: why should the *Naiyāyikas* take the Buddhists so-seriously? Why can't they ignore them? The answer to anyone of these questions is not so-simple, as it *prima-facie* may seem. For, what is meant by saying not taking Buddhists seriously or ignoring them, i.e. their contention, altogether? It is not merely a question of arbitrary-choice and selection to decide whether *Naiyāyikas* should pay attention to the contention of Buddhists. For with the refusal of *Naiyāyikas* to consider what Buddhists have to say they would also be required to give-up their inclination towards the issues of reconstruction and involvement in methodological-considerations. That is, unless *Naiyāyikas* make it quite-apparent and obvious that at-least some of the problems in which Buddhists are or rather were interested also engaged their attention, and unless they propose an alternative-proposal of resolving such problems, there would not have been any dialogue-between the *Naiyāyikas* and the Buddhists. Moreover, ignoring the thesis of Buddhists, whatever be its worth, and not intending to controvert it in whichever possible manner would not-only have be-spoken for the philosophical-poverty on the part of *Naiyāyikas* but

would also have indicated the methodological-supremacy of the so-called heretical-schools of Indian Philosophical Thought in-general and of Buddhism in-particular. But dialogue with Buddhists demanded interest and involvement in reconstruction and commitment, as-also in the development of an appropriate-theory and methodology. If they are to retain both of them, then their attempt of reconstruction and the methodology they develop has to be proposed as an alternative to the one which Buddhists propose. Now it is a fact that *Naiyāyikas* not-only say this but also hold that their methodology is superior to that of the Buddhists, and the blue-print of reconstruction that they propose is superior and much-more preferable to the one proposed by the Buddhists. Whether and how-far they are right in this claim of theirs is another interesting-question to undertake investigation-into. Such a kind of investigation, too, obviously falls-outside the scope of the present-work.

The point which we are presently interested in arguing, however, is that it is out of the fact that the *Nyāya*-thinkers came to consider the contention of the Buddhist-thinkers that forced them or seems to have forced them to accept and advocate a fundamental-shift both in their methodology and ontological-commitment. Were they not to do this, it would have been methodologically-impossible for them to enter-into a meaningful-dialogue with Buddhists. And if were they not to enter-into such a dialogue with Buddhists, the *Nyāya*-school would have hardly been ever-counted, even in-principle, as a formidable-alternative to the thesis, *prima-facie* at-least, proposed by the Buddhists. Thus, the fact that the *Nyāya*-thinkers shifted their perspective, changed their ontological-commitment – or rather substituted or created one in place of an utter-absence of it earlier, and – modified their methodology was neither a matter of methodological-concession nor a matter of an arbitrary-selection and choice; but-rather a question of philosophical life-or-death. (It is

extremely doubtful whether the advocates of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* did uphold any specific ontological-commitment. It is equally doubtful whether the problem of reconstruction of the world, human-know edge or even of the language of significant-communication had occurred to them. But granting that they had rudimentarily and however hazy-and-dim insights-into problems of those sorts, it would never have been possible for them to open a philosophically-significant controversy with Buddhists. The problem of proposing an alternative-scheme of reconstruction is far-too removed from them.) In-spite-of the fact that the *Nyāya*-thinkers claim that they have controverted and overthrown the contention of the Buddhist-thinkers, we must accept it with a pinch-of-salt. This is because howsoever tall the claim of a Platonistic-realist, the question remains whether methodologically and logically he would be right and justified in entertaining and championing the claim that he has satisfactorily-rebutted the contention and thesis of a 'nominalist' and an 'empiricist'. The question is analogous to the one, viz. would a logicist be right and justified in saying that he has successfully-controverted and rebutted the contention and the thesis either of a 'formalist' or 'intuitionist'-logician? Merely casting a wider-net is not a solution of the problem. For, in attempting to solve one kind of problem, we may create ten others; and hence an attempt may prove to be alarmingly-frustrating.

This is not to suggest, of course, that the *Nyāya* in-general and the *Navya-Nyāya* in-particular is comparable to 'Logicism' in all aspects. Nor is it intended to be maintained that Buddhism in-general and *Mahāyāna*-Buddhism along-with its nominalistic-emphasis in-particular, is comparable either to 'Formalism' or 'Intuitionism', What we moderately, however, want to assert is that the entire issue of ontological-commitment, and the methodology and techniques that came to be developed at the hands of the *Navya-Naiyāyikas* spring

basically out of the impact of Buddhism on the *Nyāya*, as-also out of the confrontation of *Nyāya* with Buddhism. This is not again to say that this was the only motivating-factor; but it was or must have been, it seems almost certainly, a dominant-factor howsoever shy, reluctant *Nyāya*-thinkers may be to accept and whole-heartedly acknowledge it. If *Naiyāyikas* were able to open-up a meaningful and fruitful philosophical-dialogue with anybody interested in ontological, epistemological and even logical and linguistic-issues, they were required to erect the whole-background and edifice standing-on which they could deem of combating and, perhaps, controverting the positions advocated and attempted to be defended by the advocates of the other schools. They were required to have a philosophical-fort fortified by theoretical-structures and methodological-embankments from which they could direct the guns-and-shells of criticism-against any other rival philosophical-camp, notably that of Buddhists. It was this which was lacking-explicitly in the theory and methodology of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*. But it was precisely this lacuna which had to be removed, the impetus for which was provided by the contact of *Naiyāyikas* with the works of Buddhists in which formidable-arguments are marshaled-against the pit-falls and weaknesses of the methodology of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*.

In such a situation, there were only two-alternatives: either to supply this missing-link or to neglect such a kind of inquiry altogether. The first out of these was challenging, while the latter was philosophically-suicidal. It is no-wonder, therefore, that the *Nyāya*-thinkers chose to go by the first-alternative. But this decision, this challenge and even demand as created and impressed upon them by the contact of *Naiyāyikas* with the works of Buddhists, however sloth and reluctant they may be in accepting this and howsoever uncompressing they may be in denying this. One gets explicit and obvious glimpses of this contact through the elaborate

and detailed-references one finds in the works of Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Diñnāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara respectively in the writings of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Udayana and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa etc., who in one-form or the other attempted to expound and explain the views enshrined in the *Nyāya-Sūtras*. Merely on the basis of the consideration of historical-priority of Gautama to Nāgārjuna and others, one will not be able to hold and justify the thesis that the entire crop-and-blossom of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory and methodology arose independently of the impetus, impact and enrichment provided by the Buddhist-scholarship for the cause. This kind of impact is quite easily and obviously discernible, if one studies the works of the *Nyāya*-writers, who flourished after Gautama and prior to Gaṅgeśa on the one-hand and the works of the Buddhist-writers starting from Nāgārjuna, Aśvaghoṣa and Diñnāga to Dharmakīrti and others, who flourished during the same-period. We need hardly to debate this point any further here.

(iii) The *Vaiśeṣika* Scheme of *Padārthas*

It seems, nevertheless, there was a third-factor, too, that must have created a considerable-impact on the *Nyāya*-thinkers in-particular, and on the *Nyāya*-theory and methodology in-general. *Vaiśeṣikas* had a scheme of *Padārthas* developed by Kaṇāda in the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* and elaborately-explained by Praśastapāda in his famous-commentary on them. There are of course number of considerations, which came later-on to be added and appended to the original-scheme at the hands of *Naiyāyikas*: Two-principal such considerations being *Abhāva*, as an additional and independent *Padārtha*, and enlargement of the number of *Guṇas*, from seventeen to twenty-four. The scheme of *Padārthas* created and propounded by the *Vaiśeṣika*-writers was certainly important, and was also directed at the issue of reconstruction. But they were mainly and, perhaps, solely

interested in the reconstruction of the ontological-world. They had also a methodological-approach towards such a kind of reconstruction, viz. their 'Atomism'. Both these considerations must have created a considerable-impact on the *Nyāya*-writers and thinkers. This impact created a leaning of *Naiyāyikas* towards the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas*. This kind of leaning and beginning of the final taking-over of the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* by *Naiyāyikas* wholesalely was pioneered, perhaps, by Udayanācārya through his two celebrated-works, viz. *Dravya-kiraṇāvali* and *Lakṣaṇāvali*. What are called as the *Nyāya-Prakaraṇa-Granthas*, too, contributed tremendously in this direction, the final-bloom, however, of this taking-over of the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* by *Naiyāyikas*, we find in the comprehensive-treatise of Gaṅgeśa's called *Tattva-cintāmaṇī*. We shall consider this point in further details in the second-section of this part (of the present work). Suffice it for the present to understand that whereas the contact with Buddhist-works must have impressed on *Nyāya*-thinkers, the necessity of the creation of the frame of a theory and methodology through which reconstruction and ontological-commitments could be handled, if-not better-handled, their contact with the works of *Vaiśeṣikas* supplied them necessary raw-material and elementary know-how of doing this. In different-terms, whereas the encounters with Buddhists profoundly-impressed on *Nyāya*-thinkers the necessity of laying the track; their communion, initially at-least, with *Vaiśeṣikas* provided them with the terrain, contour-map and some technical know-how of laying such a track. The whole-problem as to why-and-how *Nyāya*-thinkers came to take-over the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* is intriguing and yet fascinating. We shall consider some glimpses of the problem later-on. As *Nyāya*-thinkers and writers are sloth to acknowledge and accept their indebtedness to the Buddhist-thinkers and writers, so-too, they are uncharitable in not-

acknowledging their indebtedness to the *Vaiśeṣikas*. Perhaps, what makes them hold that whatever they say, uphold and advocate is the flower bloomed in their garden; is some kind of unwarranted-sense of originality. There is nothing of-course wrong in accepting something from somebody, even in academic-discussions. But what provokes or is likely to have provoked an attitude of indignation, is the absence of its acknowledgement. More of this, however, later.

Apart from the fact that *Vaiśeṣikas* had their own scheme of *Padārthas* more congenial and helpful for the consideration of the issues of ontological-reconstruction and commitment, the fact of its being amenable to the commonsensical-treatment also must have made a considerable-impact on *Naiyāyikas*. This point, too, we shall consider in greater-details later.

(iv) Continued-Interest in Reconstruction

Apart from the three above-mentioned factors, we hold, the two-other factors must have also contributed in their own-way to the transition-from the *Prācīna-Nyāya* to the *Navya-Nyāya*. One of them seems to be the continued-interest of the *Naiyāyikas* in the problem of reconstruction. No matter whether we are talking of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* or of the *Navya-Nyāya*, the *Nyāya*-tradition has kept on its interest in the problem of reconstruction; although not both in reconstruction as-well-as ontological-commitment. In fact, as we remarked-earlier, it is this interest in reconstruction which is the umbilical-cord to which the twin of the *Prācīna* as-well-as the *Navya-Nyāya* is tied. Such continued-interest in the problem of reconstruction has misled many persons, including *Naiyāyikas*, to hold that regarding the transition-from the *Prācīna* to the *Navya-Nyāya* there is just no problem, and the transition was very smooth. Some of them[1] go even to the extent of saying that it is the same-tradition, the prior and the posterior-phases of which are attempted to be

distinguished with the help of merely terms – *Prācīna* and *Navya-Nyāya*.

This view, according to our contention, is based-upon confusion and misunderstanding. The confusion, it seems to be based-upon, is to hold that the interest in reconstruction that both the factions of the *Nyāya* exhibit is the same. The misunderstanding appears to be based-on the view that the theory of the *Navya-Nyāya* and its methodology could well have been founded on that of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*. Both these suppositions are, however, far-from truth. Although continuity of the interest-in the problem of reconstruction brings both the factions of the *Nyāya* nearer and closer to each-other, yet no-sooner we discern the gamut, the texture, the geometry and the topology of the reconstruction than do we come to see in clearer-perspective the difference between the *Prācīna* and the *Navya-Nyāya*. This continuity of interest in the problem of reconstruction might have smoothened the transition-from the earlier to the later-phase of the *Nyāya*. For, the only question that it must have posed is: how to retain this interest on the one-hand, and how to widen-and-deepen the vistas of it on the-other? That is, the question must have been: on which foundation is such an edifice to be constructed, and how to construct it? These questions necessitated, as we shall see, certain presuppositions and commitments. But, more of them later. There we shall argue that whereas the *Prācīna-Nyāya* was interested in the issue of the reconstruction of the conversational or dialogical-situation in which philosophical-controversies are undertaken and resolved, without explicitly-raising the issue either of any particular-type of reconstruction or even of commitment, the *Navya-Nyāya* was interested in three different-reconstructions as also was engaged in the issue of ontological-commitment.

(v) Concentration on 'do' –verbs (Activism) and Cosmo-centricism

The prevalence and continuity of the reconstruction-issue marks, we think, the logical-geography of the theory and methodology advocated and developed by the *Navya-Nyāya*. This also marks and delineates the theoretical-boundaries of it. It must have been, no-doubt, a powerful-determiner not-only of the fact of transition but-also of the manner and mode of it. But along with this, it seems to us, another factor, not perhaps altogether utterly-unimportant as it may at-least *prima-facie* appears to, have contributed its mite towards the issue of transition. Along-with the leaning-towards the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas*, a preference came to be exhibited of certain topics over others; as they were incorporated in the scheme of *Padārthas* presented by the upholders of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*. Such preference not-only eliminated some of the *Padārthas* accepted by the *Prācīna-Nyāya*, and consequently all of them came to be reduced to those accepted by the *Vaiśeṣikas*, but it also tilted the balance in the direction of taking a particular-view about language. Perhaps such preference was influenced by the Jaina and Buddhist-writers, while the tilt-in the direction of a particular-view about language, we suspect, must have been contributed by the impact of the *Bhramanical*-writers, especially of the brand of *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*. It seems to us that out-of the two main-kinds of verbs that any language incorporates, namely 'be'-verbs or intransitive-verbs, and 'do'-verbs or transitive-verbs; the later *Nyāya*-tradition concentrates its attention more on the second-kind of verbs. This is not-at-all to say that *Navya-Naiyāyikas* neglect the importance and nature of the first-kind of verbs. But the fact remains that it is the second-kind of verbs that are more, if-not exclusively, amenable to activistic-interpretation, as we may call it, in preference to the passivistic-interpretation; no-matter whether it is cosmocentric or anthropocentric. This

preference, too, we hold and it does not seem totally unnatural to hold this, must have, howsoever remotely and meagerly, channelised and guided the route and the path of the transition we have been speaking of.

We have considered so-far, although briefly and in a very sketchy-way, the issue of the transition from the *Prācīna* to the *Navya-Nyāya*. We endeavored to maintain and point-out that number of factors must have caused, necessitated, shaped and channelised such a transition. We do not want, however, to give the impression that each-one of these factors must have been equally-influential. Nor do we wish to signify that each-one of these factors must have been important in executing and channelising the transition with equal-contiguity with the crux of the problem. Accepting the varying and unequal-importance of each-one of these factors, and even making the necessary-allowance for their differential-roles, it seems to us that these factors must have jointly and severally necessitated, shaped and executed the transition from the *Prācīna-Nyāya* to the *Navya-Nyāya*.

Further Problems

Nonetheless, inquiry-into the issue of the transition-from the *Prācīna* to the *Navyà-Nyāya* will not come to an end, it seems, just by the investigation-into these factors. It may even be possible that some other factors, too, might have contributed their mite. Our only plea is that at-least these factors are important and significant. Yet the inquiry-into the problem of transition cannot come to an end here, rather we need to probe-further by asking some further relevant-questions. For, the issue has to be considered in all its possible-ramifications, at-least in its central and important-ramifications. Otherwise our inquiry would turn-out to be haphazard, hackneyed and incomplete.

This being the case, we want, in the main, to undertake further inquiry-into two main-problems:(i) granting that

various schools of Indian Philosophical Thought flourished almost-simultaneously, they must have influenced one-another and acted and/or reacted with one-another. The question remains: how is it that the *Nyāya* came to imbibe and accept wholescalely the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas*? and (ii) granting that the predominant-consideration in the *Navya-Nyāya* is that of reconstruction, what different (kinds of) reconstructions were *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers interested-in, how did they come to fuse them with one-another, and how did they fit all of them in the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* which they accepted? It is to the investigation of these questions, in the same sequential-order in which we have posed them that we turn.

Commonsensism

The various schools of Indian Philosophical Thought did not arise in chronological-succession. In every time there were upholders of various-trends of philosophical-thought ready to enter into a dialogue with their counterparts. This is not, of course, to hold that the philosophical-thought and doctrines intra-trend-wise or inter-trend-wise did not mature and grow in course of time. But it is certainly a point of considerable-importance that the fact of simultaneously-flourishing of various-trends of the Indian Philosophical Thought contributed in an important-way to such a kind of growth and development. Now, the fact that various-schools of Indian Philosophical Thought flourished almost simultaneously[2] is too well-known and also accepted by scholars without dispute. Mere acknowledgement of this, however, will not suffice. For this kind of situation itself raises a question: if various-schools of Indian Philosophical Though flourished almost-simultaneously and if the *Prācīna-Nyāya* was required to borrow and absorb some additional-considerations, then why could it not borrow considerations put-forward by the other-schools rather-than those

propounded by the *Vaiśeṣikas*? A simple answer that can be given is that both the schools are 'commonsensical' in character. That is, in both the schools the major-emphasis is on 'common-sense'. It remains a fact that howsoever profound and complicated a philosophical-consideration turns-out to be, it cannot afford to depart so-much from commonsense that it comes to eliminate it altogether. The moment any philosophy comes to do that, the destination of superstition and mythology does not remain too-far. This is not to say that adherence to commonsense saves a philosopher altogether from such a danger-and-peril. But we do wish to maintain that complete-severance from commonsense would make any philosophy not-only too technical and even monadic that it would be not serviceable, and hence would not be worthy of any name. Merely saying, however, that the *Nyāya* as-well-as the *Vaiśeṣika*-considerations have been commonsensical alike, does not answer the question in entirety, viz. why did the *Nyāya* came to imbibe the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas*? For, the other philosophical-trends in Indian Thought also did not depart-from common-sense as radically or even, perhaps exclusively, as this answer wants to make-out. This is not to say that the *Nyāya* is not predominantly-commonsensical. It is also not to contend that in the *Vaiśeṣika*-consideration commonsensical-understanding had no part at-all to play. The only point we want to focus-attention on is that just saying this will not explain and answer the problem in a satisfactory-way. Our contention is not that commonsensism was not an important-consideration in smoothening of the transition from the *Prācīna-Nyāya* to the *Navya-Nyāya*. What we rather want to say is that maintaining just this would unnecessarily and unjustifiably over-simplify the issue.

Further Considerations

Hence along-with commonsensical-approach, it seems,

other considerations, too, must have at-least equally-weighed with the *Naiyāyikas*. It seems that two-considerations might have occupied their attention, apart-from commonsensical-understanding of facts they are prepared to acknowledge and accept. They are: (i) acceptance of certain ontology along-with the commitment to the kind of facts the *Navya-Nyāya* is prepared to give its credence and accord its acceptance, and (ii) continuity of the issue of reconstruction. Out of these, the latter was tried to be widened and deepened, and this consideration bore, in an important-way, on the former. The *Nyāya*-thinkers could not sever and segregate these two-considerations completely or even partially from each-other, and treat them independently of each-other. If it were merely a question of taking-over ontology, in-order-to remove this lacuna in the theory and methodology of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*, acceptance of the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* was not the only way of doing this. For, apart-from the *Vaiśeṣika*, *Cārvāka*, *Sāṁkhya* and *Vedānta* at least had something ontologically-significant to say. Buddhism, too, of-course has something very-important to contribute on this count. Hence the problem is: in-spite-of the fact that there were other schools of Indian Philosophical Thought, which had propounded a certain ontological-perspective and if to get-over the lacuna of an explicit ontological-frame in the *Prācīna-Nyāya* was one of the important-issue before *Navya-Naiyāyikas*, then why did they came to prefer the *Vaiśeṣika*-ontology to any-other similarly prevalent ontological-frame? The question cannot be decided on the basis of superficial-consideration. It brings forward many complicated-issues. It is to the consideration of some of them that we now propose to turn.

(a) Non-acceptance of the Buddhist-Ontology

Naiyāyikas could not straightly-accept Buddhist-ontology and methodology at-least for four important-reasons: (i) were they to do this, the very basis of their controversy with

Buddhists would have disappeared. But more-fundamentally, if *Naiyāyikas* were to accept Buddhist-contention they would have come to give-up their own stand and in doing this the very foundation of the 'realist-nominalist controversy' which they want to sustain, uphold and champion would have come to be demolished. (ii) Secondly, the entire issue of reconstruction along with ontological-commitment cannot be dealt with in-and-through Buddhist-theory and methodology, the way *Nyāya* wants to deal-with. This point will become clear as we proceed. (iii) Thirdly, the controversy between the *Nyāya* and Buddhism, not merely being confined to the 'realist-nominalist' issue but as it extends also to the 'realist-empiricist' issue, it would have been too-restrictive for the realistic-stance of the *Navya-Naiyāyikas* to circumscribe and delimit the gamut of their realism to that of empiricism of Buddhists. (iv) Fourthly, whereas the *Navya-Nyāya* endeavor is to show that constructional and reductional-processes are so-constituted that they are the two-halves or hemispheres of the entire-effort on our part to understand the nature of facts. Buddhism, it appears, on the other-hand, holds this is not so mainly because in the constructional-effort we may arrive-at what may be called logical-constructions which are incapable of being reduced to something which are parts of the furniture of the world. Thus, for Buddhism, complexes in the material-mode of speech and formal-mode of speech, or in the realms of 'matters of facts' and 'relations of ideas' are not of the same-kind; nor are they isomorphic with each-other. Hence, their analysis and explanation cannot precede either on-parallel or the same-line. In fact, according to it, it would be travesty of confusion to attempt to do so. The *Nyāya*-contention, as it will appear later, being exactly-contrary to this; it is no wonder that it could not accept the Buddhist-ontology as-well-as methodology. This is not in any way to suggest that it did not adopt any considerations

from the Buddhist-methodology, techniques, terminologies and nomenclature or lead to the modification of the considerations borrowed and accepted from Buddhism in such a way that they could be fitted easily into the realist-programme of reconstruction, which *Naiyāyikas* want so ardently and faithfully to undertake. Issues of this kind as well as kindred-issues must have prevented *Naiyāyikas* to wholescalely, out-rightly and explicitly accept the Buddhist-ontology and methodology. This is not of course to say that the *Nyāya*-contention has no impact of Buddhist-considerations on it. But our hunch is that this impact has always remained of accepting and imbibing those and only those considerations which could be fitted with its realistic and reconstructionistic-stance, approach and endeavor, and made conducive with and subservient to the realistic causal-explanation, *Naiyāyikas* want all-along to uphold and champion. It is perhaps the fact of their being so diametrically-opposed to each-other that prevented the upholders of the *Nyāya*-school to acknowledge and candidly-accept their indebtedness to Buddhism. But it was the contact of the *Nyāya* with Buddhism which widened the vistas of horizon and profoundly-deepened its reconstructionist-stand. The dogma is theirs, but it was occasioned by the contact of the *Nyāya* with Buddhism.

Traditional thinkers and writers may also like to bring-forward one more point in connection with the non-feasibility of the *Nyāya*-acceptance of Buddhist-theory and methodology. It may be argued that as one-trend, viz. the *Nyāya*, belonged to one-camp while the other to another, this kind of oppositional-approach must have prevented *Nyāya*-thinkers to imbibe and absorb the Buddhist-ontology. These camps are usually represented as orthodox and heretical, respectively. But, according to us, this point is neither ontologically-relevant nor is methodologically a sound one. When various schools of Indian Philosophical Thought

engaged themselves in philosophical-controversies, they obviously presumed that each-one of them is equally-honest and with similar concern engaged in the discovery and explanation of facts. It was on this acceptance alone that their dialogue could after-all proceed. The whole point, however, from the point of our present-inquiry, seems to us to be misplaced and considerations arising in terms of the 'Law of Parsimony' and general credence-demand that this point to be better left in the present-investigation. Moreover, it is interesting to note that in-spite-of the fact that Buddhists and *Naiyāyikas* owe their allegiance to such opposed-camps. This in itself did not deter the latter to borrow and absorb many of the technical, terminological and even methodological-considerations put-forward by the former. Nor did this fact in any-way mar the prospect of entering into a philosophical-dialogue with one-another, as also of critically-evaluating one another's views? This fact would bring-out how the above-mentioned argument is misplaced and beside the main point.

(b) Non-acceptance of the *Cārvāka*-Ontology

Although *Nyāya* could not form a philosophical-alliance with Buddhism and although it could not take-over the theory and methodology of it, it may be argued, similar was not the case with its acceptance of the theory and methodology of the *Cārvāka*, the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Vedānta*. This being the case, why the *Prācīna-Nyāya* could not adopt and imbibe the ontology of any one of them and bridge-up the ontological-lacuna in their theory? The point *prima-facie* seems to be attractive. But on a deeper-probe it will turn-out to be beset with many-problems. No-matter whether we are talking-about the *Cārvāka*, the *Sāṁkhya* or the *Vedānta*, each-one of them is cosmocentric in their perspective, as against the anthropocentric-perspective that the *Nyāya* wants to develop and uphold at-least to start with. It would be quite

interesting to investigate what might have led each-one of these schools to develop and propagate the kind of perspective it does. But our present-engagement in the particular enquiry forbids us to do this. Be that as it may. Moreover, each-one of them is not interested-in the problem of reconstruction as the *Nyāya* seems to be. Even if we take the case of *Cārvāka*, it's totally physicalistic-approach and its interest only in the physicalistic-reconstruction of the ontological-world along with the strong empiricist-bent, are strong-enough reasons to contend that they must have come in the way of the *Nyāya*-adoption of the *Cārvāka*-ontology. This is not to say that the *Cārvāka*-atomism did not infiltrate in the *Nyāya*. It did. Consider, for instance, the general-outline of the way both the *Cārvāka* and the *Nyāya* attempt to explain the nature of *Mahābhūtas* (atoms), viz. *Pṛthivī, Āp, Tejas* and *Vāyu*. But it did as an important-fragment of its theory, and not the only feature of it. This is significant. Actually empiricism, reconstructionism and at least some kind of realism have always, in one-form or the other, gone hand-in-hand with some or the other kind of Atomism. This is so no-matter whether we are talking-of the trends in Western or Indian Philosophical Thought. The *Nyāya*-programme is certainly not to undertake exclusively and solely a physicalistic-reconstruction. Rather, it wants to undertake a realistic-reconstruction – a reconstruction within realistic rather-than empiricist-programme. Hence, it is not-so-much the fact that the *Cārvāka* does not have ontology, or even that it is not interested in reconstruction of any kind that makes the *Nyāya* deviate-from it; but the fact that the ontological-frame it accepts and the ontological-commitment it warrants along-with the programme of reconstruction it proposes is too-restrictive and intolerably-narrow as compared with the one the *Nyāya* develops within its realistic-frame. That is why in-spite-of the fact that between the *Cārvāka* and the *Nyāya*, there are certain points which

are common and certain techniques which are alike, the *Nyāya*-trend could not wholly-and-exclusively take-over the *Cārvāka*-ontology. And the argument, however, in this context can plausibly be formulated and advanced, provided one keeps on understanding the difference-between the *Cārvāka* and the *Nyāya*-theory. It may be maintained that not-only the *Cārvāka* belongs to another-camp and does not accept *Īśvara* as-well-as *Ātmā*, but-also the fact that it offers mechanistic-ontological-reconstruction programme that might have come in the way of *Nyāya* subscribing to the *Cārvāka*-ontology. The first-half of this argument is both misleading and unwarranted; for, were it so, their views about the nature of *Pṛthivī* etc. should not have even partially-converged. Moreover, similar-consideration should have prevented them from imbibing considerable methodological and technical-considerations from Buddhism within the fold of its theory. The latter-half of the argument, however, is important. But it seems to be insufficient to explain non-acceptability of the *Cārvāka*-ontology by the *Nyāya*. The argument, moreover, leaves a considerable methodological-gap in our explanation of the phenomenon.

(c) Non-acceptance of the *Sāṃkhya*-Ontology

The case with *Sāṁkhya*, on the other-hand, is different. It is different not because it does not at-all accept any kind of ontology, but-rather because the two fundamental-bedrocks of it, apart-from the cosmocentric-perspective within which it develops its philosophical-thesis, are uncongenial to the theory of *Nyāya* and the methodology it intends to develop. First is the hemispherization-thesis, the *Sāṃkhya* is so-fond-of putting-forward and labouring-for its systematic-explanation and defence. This thesis it upholds no-matter on microcosmic-level or on the macrocosmic-level, accepting a kind of one-to-one correspondence between the hemispheres obtainable on both the planes. What we mean

is this: while on the plane of macrocosm or cosmos as-a-whole, the *Sāṃkhya* talks in terms of hemispherization between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa;* on the microcosmic-level or on the level of an organism it speaks of hemispherization-between physical and mental aspects, or between body and consciousness. Secondly, the logica1 and theoretical-chiasm within which the *Sāṁkhya* develops its thesis and perspective is unsuitable to the temperament at the hands of *Naiyāyikas,* who neither want to depart so-much from commonsense nor want to endorse and bridle their ontology and ontological-commitment within and through sheer methodological-considerations. The *Nyāya,* therefore, did not go by the side of the *Sāṁkhya,* not-because it does not have ontology. Nor did it abhor it, because it does not have either any ontological-commitment to uphold or any methodology with the help of which its ontology and ontological-commitment could be explained. Far from it. But, at the same-time two-important and contrary-considerations must have made *Naiyāyikas* repulsive of the *Sāṃkhya.* They are: (i) the fact that the *Sāṁkhya* does not explicitly subscribe-to and uphold the cause of the programme of reconstruction, the core and the shaft, perhaps, around which the important *Nyāya*-considerations revolve as-well-as derive their inspiration from. (ii) Secondly, *Sāṁkhya* does not, again, explicitly and wholeheartedly subscribe to and champion the cause of commonsense, one of the pivotal, if-not an exclusive, consideration for the *Nyāya.* There are other considerations as well, like the fact that the *Nyāya* subscribes to one-kind of theory of *Kāraṇa-Kārya-Saṁbandha;* while the *Sāṁkhya* upholds another. But these points of difference are not of paramount-significance from the point of view of our present inquiry. Suffice it to say, however, that the *Nyāya* deviation-from and abhorrence-of the *Sāṁkhya,* is not as arbitrary and unprincipled as it may seem *prima-facie* to be. It is the fundamental and profound-differences between them –

ontological, theoretical and methodological – that make their ways bifurcate and depart.

(d) Non-acceptance of the *Vedānta*-Ontology

When we come to consider the case of *Vedānta*, it is especially the *Śāṁkara-Vedānta* to which we want to delimit our inquiry as the later brands and varieties of the *Vedānta*, even historically, are developed later, the situation that we come to encounter is further interesting as well as intriguing. As was pointed out earlier, the *Vedānta* subscribes-to and upholds the cause of cosmocentric-perspective as-against the anthropocentric-perspective of the *Nyāya*. In the adoption of this perspective, the *Nyāya* is in-company-with the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*. What were the reasons which might have led these schools to adopt this perspective, and whether and how-far the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* wielded an influence-on the *Nyāya* are interesting-questions. But our present investigation does not allow us to investigate into them. It is important to note here, however, although in-passing, in-order-to save ourselves from coming to embrace confusion, that both these perspectives as they have been endeavored to be propounded by the *Vedānta* and the *Nyāya* respectively are objective. This is not, however, the principal and, perhaps, the only-reason why the *Nyāya* did not adopt the *Vedānta*-ontology. The, chief-consideration that seems to have impelled it to depart-from the *Vedānta*-ontology appears to be the fact that the foundation of the *Vedānta*-ontology is the acceptance of sub-spatio-temporal stuff, from-which various things and individuals normally-considered to be parts of the furniture of the world automatically arise; through the fact that such a stuff itself undergoes transformation – being dynamic – through its over-abundant vitality. This consideration is foreign and alien to that of the one *Nyāya* wants to uphold and propagate. The primary-reason being, it is molded within realistic-frame and modeled-after commonsensical-

perspective. More pertinently, however, there is also another fundamental-difference. Whereas the *Nyāya* is interested-in the problem of reconstruction, the *Vedānta* is not. The primary-concern of the latter being neither construction nor reduction, but an investigat on-into the nature of sub-spatio-temporal-stuff that infiltrates in anything that is part of the furniture of the world; and from-which all such things jointly-and-severally originate. Thus, it is not the fact either that the *Vedānta* does not have ontology, nor also the fact that it does not have methodology that makes the *Nyāya* deviate from the *Vedānta*; but-rather the consideration that the kind of ontology it has and the methodology it upholds are neither amenable to commonsense nor to the reconstruction-programme that are so central to the *Nyāya*-theory.

(e) Non-acceptance of the Other Schools of Indian Philosophical Thought

Whereas the *Nyāya* could not subscribe to the *Cārvāka*, the *Sāṃkhya* or the *Vedānta*-ontology for one reason or the other, it could not seek any light on this count from the *Yoga* or the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* or even from the *Vyākaraṇa* for that matter. This is because none of them is expressly and primarily engaged in ontological-problems. None of them is also exclusively-serious about reconstruction-issue. The realistic-reconstruction-programme and the ontological-commitment springing there from as-also the Common-sensism being taken to be commensurate with it that it wants to labour the cause of, could not obviously allow it either wholesalely to take-over the considerations put-forward by the upholders of these schools of Indian Philosophical Thought nor to form a significant philosophical-alliance with anyone of them.

It is again interesting to note that in-so-far-as the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* could be said to be upholding any ontological-

thesis, it is the one that is propagated and popularized by the *Nyāya*. Similarly, the tradition of *Vyākaraṇa* either subscribes to the *Vedānta* or the *Nyāya*-ontology, while the *Yoga*-tradition upholds the *Sāṁkhya*-ontology. The only-exception is that of Jainism. Regarding it, the following-points are noteworthy: (i) Jaina-*Nyāya* is almost entirely posterior to and modeled-after the consideration put-forward by the *Nyāya*-thinkers. (ii) In their Atomism the Jainas sometime go by the *Nyāya*-way, while some-other times the *Cārvāka*-way. Thus, there is a kind of ambivalence that is clearly noticeable. (iii) Jainas subscribe to a kind of hemispherization-theory as the *Sāṁkhyas* do – their hemispherization of the world being between living (*Jīva*) and non-living (*Ajīva*). Lastly, (iv) Jainas do not champion the cause of reconstruction-programme. These reasons might have prompted the *Naiyāyikas* to deviate even from the Jaina-ontology. There, Jainism is one of the heterodox-school, while the *Nyāya* is one of the orthodox-school; is a point too-naive to come in way of the *Nyāya* accepting any point from Jainism. Be that as it may. We need hardly to waste time on such issues.

It was out of such considerations and within such circumstances that the *Nyāya* might have been left, it seems, just with one-alternative, viz. taking-over the scheme of *Padārthas* propounded by the *Vaiśeṣikas;* were the *Naiyāyikas* to be able to combat with their philosophical opponent – Buddhists.

Taking-over of the *Vaiśeṣika*-Scheme of *Padārthas*

The taking-over of the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* at the hands of the *Nyāya*, nay utter replacement of the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* in place of their own, did not came about, however, all-of-a-sudden and with the decree of any council or organisation. The switch-over and the replacement was phased, gradual and well-planned. It must have been a result

of sufficient-brooding, and prolonged and honest-intellectual search and investigation; rather than a consequence engendered by an intellectual volcanic-eruption and rash academic-decision. Although it was prompted by helplessness and the inherent-lacuna of the theory and methodology of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*, the fact of replacement, nevertheless, did-not or must-not have come-about, we conjecture, out-of arbitrary-decision, hopeless-bewilderment and holocaust of intellectual-confusion. The consequence must have come-about, we believe, out-of sustained and prolonged-considerations. This is obvious from the kind of issues which are raised and proposed to be discussed in the works of various *Nyāya*-thinkers, like Udayana and Jayanta, on the one-hand; and those like Bhāsarvajña, Varadarāja, Keśava Miśra, Śaśadhara and Madhvācārya on the other-hand, who flourished in the *Prakaraṇa*-(*grantha*)-period of the development of the *Nyāya*-tradition in general. It is they who contributed to the cause of transition-from the *Prācīna-Nyāya* to the *Navya-Nyāya*, and prepared the necessary-background for the replacement of the scheme of *Padārthas*-accepted by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* by the one advocated by the *Vaiśeṣikas;* with two principle-additions and modifications, viz. addition of *Abhāva*, as an independent *Padārtha* and enlargement of the number of *Guṇas*, as from seventeen to twenty-four. It was these authors who, in one or the other way, fought-for the cause of replacement as a result of which we find in the celebrated-treatise of Gaṅgeśa called *Tattvacintāmaṇī* the flower and bloom of enterprise; such that starting-from him the *Padārthas* which *Naiyāyikas* came to accept, uphold and defend were the ones which were given by the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme. All the latter-treaties are said to fall-within the domain of the *Miśra*-(i.e. mixed) tradition of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. What is meant by it is the joint and mixed-tradition of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika*. It is also said that on account of this, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* (traditions) are *Samāna-taṅtra*

traditions, meaning thereby advocating the similar, perhaps the same-theory and methodology. But it seems to us that there is some, if-not considerable and violent, injustice that is done to the *Vaiśeṣika*-tradition in this contention.

Let us elaborate our contention in the last-sentence of the preceding-paragraph. We are, indeed, told by many prominent-thinkers and writers of the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition (this is how the tradition came to be known and designated since and beginning from the *Tattvacintāmaṇī* of Gaṅgeśa indicating a fundamental-shift in the theory and methodology, as compared-with those of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*) that the sixteen-*Padārthas* accepted by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* are reducible to those seven (*Padārthas*) accepted by *Vaiśeṣikas* in-general and *Navya-Naiyāyikas* in-particular. In this connection it is worth to note the following points: First, this was what *Naiyāyikas* have been saying. No *Vaiśeṣika* author, to the best of our knowledge, has said this nor has he maintained whether this contention of the *Nyāya* is acceptable to it (*Vaiśeṣika*-tradition). Secondly, we also do not know whether the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* was really designed to be put to the use and service to which it, as a matter of fact, came to be put at the hands of *Navya-Naiyāyikas*. We also do not know for certain, whether *Vaiśeṣikas* really wanted to chalk-out the programme of reconstruction and undertake the different-reconstructions which the *Navya-Nyāya* came to champion the cause-of. This point will become clear as we proceed. Suffice it to remark for the present that we do not have authentic-evidence from *Vaiśeṣikas*, whether the modifications-introduced by *Navya-Naiyāyikas* into the scheme of *Padārthas*, were accepted/acceptable to them (*Vaiśeṣikas*); and the line on which the scheme was developed along with the use/s to which it came to be put at the hands of *Navya-Naiyāyikas* was really the one that was intended by *Vaiśeṣikas*. That is, we do not know, for certain, that the fact of replacement of the scheme of *Padārthas*

accepted by the *Navya-Nyāya* from *Vaiśeṣikas* was the one that was intended and anticipated either by *Vaiśeṣikas* or by the *Prācīna-Nyāya*.

It may be argued, however, that although we do not have authentic-confirmation at the hands of *Vaiśeṣika*-writers of the fact of taking-over of their-scheme by *Naiyāyikas* and replacement of the *Nyāya*-scheme of *Padārthas* by the *Vaiśeṣika* one, there is denial and refusal either of this at their hands. This point may further be reinforced by saying that non-denial may be a sure-hint of affirmation and acceptance. But this *prima-facie* acceptable-argument has, it seems, two loop-holes. First, after Gaṅgeśa in-particular and *Navya-Nyāya* in general took-over the scheme of *Padārthas* propounded by the *Vaiśeṣikas*, no *Vaiśeṣika*-writer of repute flourished and upheld the cause of the *Vaiśeṣika*-tradition. Secondly, even if there were *Vaiśeṣika*-writers and even-if one had disputed on the *Nyāya* taking-over of the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas*, this fact in itself would not have been counted as a necessary and sufficient-evidence to show that such replacement was in the fitness of things; and also acceptable to *Vaiśeṣikas*. On the top of it, all it could not also go to show that this was something that was intended, anticipated and accepted by *Vaiśeṣikas*.

There seems to be, however, one important and significant-way of making-sense of the *Navya-Nyāya* contention, no-matter whether it is the one that is propounded by Gaṅgeśa or by someone-else, that the *Padārthas* which the *Prācīna-Nyāya* had accepted are reducible to those which the *Navya-Nyāya* accepts; and which in turn, as we have already seen, were accepted or taken-over by *Naiyāyikas* from *Vaiśeṣikas*. We have already pointed out that in spite of the fact that the *Prācīna-Nyāya* was interested in the problem of reconstruction, that is it was reconstruction of the conversational or dialogical-situation. It neither raised the

issue of ontological, epistemic or linguistic-reconstruction in-particular, nor that of ontological-commitment in-general. The *Navya-Nyāya*, on the contrary, was chiefly and even, perhaps exclusively, interested in these issues. Now in terms of the reconstruction of the dialogical or conversational-situation it is both impossible to raise any-one of these issues, as also it is equally-implausible to attempt a solution of them. Every reconstruction of these, however, can be undertaken in a conversational-situation. But reconstruction of such a situation would not be tantamount to any-one of these constructions, much-less all of them. Granting that any-one of these reconstructions can be, at-least in-principle, embarked-upon in conversational-situation; the prominent-issues that would arise would be peculiar to the kind of reconstruction-envisaged to be undertaken. Yet a general-frame and structure of any such reconstruction in a dialogical or otherwise situation could be outlined. Moreover, as will be evident-from what follows, since the *Navya-Nyāya* accepts certain relation-between or among these constructions, to present such a frame of any reconstruction was quite an easy job for it. The considerations which anybody will have to pay attention-to while undertaking anyone of these reconstructions or a combination of them, are reducible to the totality of such considerations on the one-hand; and are analysable in terms of structure and frame of reconstruction in general on the-other. Hence, over-and-above these considerations, there are no additional-considerations and whatever significant-considerations there (would) be about any-one of the reconstructions or combination or even totality of them, (they) are analysable-into those considerations which have already been or are attempted to be put-forward. Therefore, the *Padārthas* of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* were said to be reducible to those of the *Navya-Nyāya*, but not *vice-versa*. Ambiguous reconstruction-considerations were shown to be reducible, with certain modification and adjustment, to the

more-refined and articulate ones; and in accepting this to be the case not-only a point over the *Prācīna-Nyāya* was scored but-also that the general-interest in the problem of reconstruction was neither damaged nor foundered. It was rather enriched, refined and deepened. This way of methodological-understanding of the contention throws, it seems, more light on it and brings its contours in bolder-relief. The whole move and emphasis seems to be to analyse and explain weaker and amorphous-notion in terms-of a stronger and refined-one, the latter being a more-powerful methodological-weapon.

Be that as it may. It is needless for us to inquire further into the circumstances of the transition-from the *Prācīna-Nyāya* to the *Navya-Nyāya*. The *Nyāya*-thinkers accepted the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas*, not-only because it is akin to commonsense but-also because it does not jar with the realistic-frame they want to subscribe to. Such a scheme, moreover, is congenial to the reconstruction-progromme they are interested in. It not-only helps them to cover-up the lacuna of the non-acceptance of particular-ontology that was there in the theory of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*, but it also easies the tension of specifying and explicating their ontological-commitment. This scheme also has a programme and methodology of reconstruction – although it was perhaps intended to be restricted to the issue of the reconstruction of ontological-world. This kind of reconstruction *Naiyāyikas* certainly did not want to give-up. Actually the ontology and the programme of the reconstruction of ontological-world was the chief-gap in the theory of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*. In the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* they got a platform, standing on which they could expect the Buddhists to combat. It was on the basis of this platform and basis that they intended to propose, elaborate and defend alternative-ontology to the one proposed by the Buddhists. Being armed with the necessary and requisite-tool, they wanted to develop a

powerful-terminology, technique and methodology to combat the one proposed by the Buddhists. But this is not the only thing they intend to do. They have, it seems, a very ambitious reconstruction-programme to undertake.

Wide Reconstruction-Programme

Let us elaborate what we mean. It seems that the philosophers of the *Navya-Nyāya* school want to embark-upon at-least three principal-reconstructions, viz. reconstruction of ontological-world, reconstruction of human-knowledge and reconstruction of the language through which we are able to communicate. They do not want to undertake these reconstructions one after the other, but rather simultaneously. Even this, one may not object to. But they seem to hold not-only that any two-reconstructions of these are isomorphic with each-other, but-also that (any and) every-reconstruction of these can be undertaken on the same-lines. Hence, a shift-from one reconstruction to another, according to them, does-not and need-not necessarily entail a methodological- change. How-far and to what extent this is both acceptable and tenable is an important-problem, no-doubt. But detailed-inquiry into this here is both redundant and uncalled-for. *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers, moreover, also seem to uphold the view, perfectly in conformity-with their realistic-theory and commonsensical-methodology, that those out-of which we construct and those which we construct are (both) reals; and the words or expressions on the plane of language signify or designate such reals. This is the case no-matter whether one is talking-about ontological, epistemological or logical-reconstruction. In terms of the reconstruction of each-one of these kinds, we shall be operating with the domain of reals. But this is not-all. As the three-reconstructions are isomorphic with one-another, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to hold, the domains of the reals of any two-reconstructions of these are improper sub-

sets of each-other. Thus, the sets of reals which we are envisaged to get, as a result of these three different-reconstructions, are not such three different-sets that no member of the one is the member of the other and *vice-versa*. Rather, in the consideration of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers they turn-out to be co-extensive-sets. Hence, from whichever angle we start, we arrive at the same-world. The three different-sets of reals, thus considered, are not factually three-sets but are rather sets of the same-objects considered in the three different-kinds of investigations.

This being the case the things or objects which are there, which we know and which we name are one-and-the-same. Not just this, however. Our knowledge of things being isomorphic with things, the form of our knowledge unfolds the form of things. Similarly our language being isomorphic with our knowledge of things on one-hand, and the things of which we have knowledge on the-other, our language too is taken to be unfolding-unto us the nature not-only of our knowledge of things but-also that of things themselves. Along-with this fascinating-thesis it also seems to be envisaged to be maintained that the general-frame of the world, experience and language are so-interrelated with one-another that to probe and investigate-into anyone of them would open automatically the gates of the other. This is not-because such convention is arbitrarily to be accepted, but-because these frames too are isomorphic with one -another. Thus understood, language not-only becomes a mirror of the world, but it also becomes the photograph of the human-knowledge. We shall investigate-into some of the ramifications of these issues and their tenability into the second-part of our inquiry.

Generalisation of the *Vaiśeṣika* Scheme

Thus the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* is generalised with respect to three-inquiries – ontological, epistemological and

linguistic or logical. Similarly the *Vaiśeṣika*-methodology along-with its atomism, too, is generalised in such a way that within the encompassment of the same-technique, methodology and theory three-reconstructions can be envisaged to be undertaken (simultaneously) and their route explained in a single-breath and schema. This is the ambitious-programme the *Navya-Nyāya* intends, it seems, to undertake. The introduction of technical-terms, the technical-nuances brought-in along-with renovations and innovations in them, the rules-stipulated and applied with whatever possible-care and rigor are all directed at this. At the same-time all this is done with a view to accept, explicate and defend with as much insistence and perhaps uncompromising-contention, the realistic-frame – not a moderate but extreme realistic-frame – and to offer a formidable-opposition to the programme of the Buddhists, at-least *Mahāyāna* Buddhists, propose and endeavor to propose and accomplish. It is also to be used as a weapon, a tool to spell-out, explain and possibly-justify that kind of ontological-commitment which would be different, if not diametrically-opposed, from the one accepted by the Buddhists.

Problem Inviting Further-Consideration

Thus, the fact of the replacement of the scheme of *Padārthas* accepted by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* by the one of *Vaiśeṣikas* helped the *Nyāya*-thinkers to solve certain-problems. It also offered them a viable-alternative, which can and in-fact even came to be defended as a genuine-alternative to the Buddhist-theory. But just this fact itself posed various-issues: some philosophical, some epistemic while others methodological. *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers attempted to deal with them as-far-as the world-view or the world-hypothesis they had adopted could allow them to. Any one, who adopts the kind of view that the *Navya-Nyāya* adopts, other things remaining the same, will come to give the kind

of answers they have given to majority of the problems if-not to each one of them; provided such an issue is attempted to be posed within the vistas and limits of the world-hypothesis they have adopted, if is to be adopted. One will have to admit that on this count at-least the *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers have hardly left any problem-undiscussed and unconsidered. But such a widespread-network of scholarship and erudition is not the only one anyone will develop and everybody must subscribe to. The *Navya-Nyāya* stand was, it seems, that alternative to what they have been contending and upholding must lead to or is likely to lead to absurdity and ambiguity, if-not to total and utter, at-least systematic and methodological-frustration and loss. The presupposition seems to us to be a too bitter-pill to swallow. For, we genuinely and with sincerity and honesty hold that alternative-considerations can not-only be advanced and defended with at least equal-plausibility, but-also that the so-called *Navya-Nyāya* claim that it has successfully-overthrown and defeated; if-not every at-least a predominant alternative-consideration – viz. the ones put-forward by Buddhists – is uncharitable, ill-founded and incapable of being seriously and conclusively- defended. One may even be prepared to pardon and excuse this. But there is another claim that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers make and strain their every nerve to defend. It is the claim that anybody, who really wants to understand the relation between significant-expression and what they signify, will be in a position to do so provided one has studied the *Nyāya*, especially the *Navya-Nyāya*. Even making the extreme possible-allowance to the fact that the *Navya-Nyāya* methodology and techniques came to be used by the upholders of various other schools of Indian Philosophical Thought, it constrains anyone or is likely to constrain any-one, it seems, to accept this claim, much-less to justify it. Hence, it is not-merely the endeavour of the present-work to indicate and show that this claim is unsound

and unjustifiable; but-also to attempt to point out that apart from such misplaced-arrogance and dogmə with which the *Navya-Nyāya* theory and methodology came to be associated, it itself raises certain issues which it is not satisfactorily in a position to solve.

Thus, the whole attempt is to argue that such a claim is indefensible in spite of the very ingenious-arguments advanced and pieces of evidence-marshaled in-support of the contention. This is, however, one aspect of it. The other is also to show that the *Nyāya*-consideration in general and the *Navya-Nyāya* consideration in particular has been unable to deal with certain-problems. But any theory and methodological-programme that is unable to deal with such problems and issues hardly remains the only genuine-theory and methodological-programme. Much less than this. It cannot also be maintained and defended that it succeeds in putting-forward and explaining such a theory and methodology, which is a viable and formidable-alternative to the one proposed by the Buddhists, especially the *Mahāyāna*-Buddhists. It will be argued that it is not so-much in the fact that the *Navya-Nyāya* endeavor to oppose the contention of the *Mahāyāna*-Buddhists that it goes wrong and turns-out implausible, but in subscribing to the commonsense and extreme-realism as a formidable-alternative to the nominalistic-theory. But it will also be argued that short-comings of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory and methodology do not, unfortunately, end and conclude here. There are certain-weaknesses of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory and methodology which does not become transparent, unless we develop and uphold what may be called an 'outsider's approach'. Coming to deal with the *Navya-Nyāya* theory in this way, we shall argue that it is not-only confronted with certain-problems, but-also that it is unable to offer satisfactory-solutions to the very-problems which it poses.

Attempt of this kind, we accept without dispute, is difficult and even perhaps adventurous to embark-upon. But a critical-inquiry must begin somewhere, and it has to be ushered in sometime. The investigation is undertaken with a view to pose certain questions for discussion, and offer an opportunity of a genuine philosophical-dialogue.

NOTES

1. *Tarka-Saṁgraha* of Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa (with his *Dīpikā* and Govardhana's *Nyāya-Bodhinī*); Athalye, Y.V. and Bodas, M.R. (tr. into Eng. and ed.); Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute; Pune; (2nd ed.) 1974; Introduction; Pp. xvi-xxiii;
2. *A History of Indian Logic* (*Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools*); Vidyabhushan, Satishacandra; Motilal Banarsidass; Delhi; 1978; p.46.
   A History of Indian Philosophy; Vol.-I; Dasgupta, Surendranath; Motilal Banarsidass; Delhi; 1975; Pp. 62, 310-312.

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PART – II :

Critical Examination of the *Navya-Nyāya*

Chapter-1

Ontological-Embarrassments in the *Navya-Nyāya* Methodology

Preliminary Considerations

The fact that the *Navya-Nyāya* begins with the acceptance and taking-over of the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* is too well-known to need any special-mention. In the preceding part of the present investigation, we analysed the circumstance of such replacement of the *Padārthas* accepted by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* of those advocated by the *Vaiśeṣikas*. We also attempted to give a resume of the reasons, which might have contributed to and shaped such replacement. There might have also been some additional-reasons responsible for taking-over such a scheme of *Padārthas* advocated by the *Vaiśeṣikas*. The extant-literature, unfortunately, does not shed a detailed-light on the issue. The general-guideline, which we have been able to provide, it seems, suffices for our present purpose.

After the *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers accepted the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* and took it to be their own, they kept on explaining, elaborating and defending the scheme. This was done for many reasons, the principal, however, being the fact that it is the back-bone and bull-work of the comprehensive reconstruction-programme they were interested-in; and also perhaps as the fulcrum and foundation of the defence of the ontological-commitment they want to champion and uphold. Even to this one may not have an

objection, in so far as this does not breed any complications and lead to certain-difficulties. However, it is fundamental to understand that in such explanation, elaboration and defence of the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas* at the hands of *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers, there is an enormous-strain, which they did not, it seems, unfo tunately, clearly-see. The entire-strain and the difficulties, it seems, gave-rise to many-facets. Some of these difficulties we propose to probe into in this-part of our-investigation. The whole-inquiry is not intended to be encyclopaedic and complete. Rather, we propose to touch-upon, however cursorily, some important problems. Out of the totality of the facets of the main-strain, however, is that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory confuses between reals, which figure in empirical, ontological, epistemological and linguistic or logical-reconstructions. It comes to treat all these reals alike, and on the same-level. This chapter intends to argue that the reals, which each-one of these reconstructions presuppose, are different and need not necessarily be the same. That is, it proposes to put-forward the thesis that the sets of reals, which each-one of these reconstruction-demands, need not necessarily be co-extensive with one-another, as the *Navya-Nyāya* theory seems to be presupposing. In the 9th chapter of the present-part, we shall argue that it was confusion between the issues of ontological-reconstruction and that of ontological-commitment; which seems to have led *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers to advocate and uphold such a view. Be that as it may.

Presently we are interested in arguing that confusion among these reals is the corner-stone of the realism of the *Navya-Nyāya*. It will be argued that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory does not have the necessary-apparatus to segregate and demarcate the reals, which such different-reconstructions presuppose; and as far as such demarcation is concerned – at least absence of confusion among them – is in order. But it is precisely the lack of such apparatus, it will be argued, not

only leads *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers to confuse among these reals but also leads them to accept and subscribe to what may be called 'ontological-slum' or ontological-fertility. This not only presupposes a horrible-kind of Platonism, but also leads to some major ontological-embarrassments and insurmountable-puzzlements. On the basis of the consideration of each-one of the *Padārtha* accepted and the significance attached to it, it will be maintained that the *Navya-Nyāya* subscribes, or is rather forced to subscribe, to Platonism; not only with reference to *Padārthas* taken in-totality but also with reference to each-one of them collectively as well as distributively. It will also be maintained that we are required to adopt a proper-perspective to relieve ourselves from the strain of defending some of the confused-conclusions and theses, at the cost of clarity. Before undertaking such a detailed-consideration of each-one of the *Padārtha*, we shall first consider, to begin with, the different senses in which the term '*Padārtha*' is envisaged to be employed.

Significance of '*Padārtha*'

In the context of the significant-discourse, it is quite understandable for anybody to maintain that every expression that we use is significant. But merely saying this does not make much headway. For, the questions it raises are: 'Why is an expression significant?' And 'how is it significant?' Out of these two questions, the former is significant in one-way, the latter in another-way. One may maintain that an expression is significant, because it is informative-about an object/s that we know. This does not mean that there is only one-object, which we come to know every time through the employment of significant expression. Hence, it may be maintained that various significant-expressions are informative about different-objects of knowledge. But an expression is significant, it may

be argued, in so far as it is informative of an object of knowledge. And if a question is asked: 'What is *Padārtha*?' one-answer given is that a '*Padārtha* is anything that is or can, in-principle, be an object of knowledge[1]. It is argued from this point of view that the expression, which is informative of an object of knowledge, is significant. On this version, therefore, anything that is capable of being an object of knowledge is *Padārtha;* and an expression is significant, because it is informative about-such a *Padārtha* or an object of knowledge.

That an expression is significant could be made-out in quite another-way. It may be maintained that an expression is significant, because it exhibits certain 'form'. That a significant-expression has certain-'form' does not preclude it from being informative about something. What is, nevertheless, intended to be maintained is that an expression is significant, because it exhibits a particular-'form' and in exhibiting such a particular-'form' it turns-out to be informative about some particular-object in a particular-way. Now the object about which a significant-expression turns-out to be so informative may be taken as a *Padārtha,* and an expression which turns-out to be so informative in terms of exhibiting a particular-'form' is a significant-expression. This seems to be the general-purport of the contention that a *Padārtha* is that about which something can be said or expressed or communicated[2]. Thus, the stress is not merely on that an expression is expressive or communicative, but also on expression exhibiting a particular-form. Rather, on this view, a significant-expression is taken to be significant in so far as it signifies a particular-object through its having a particular-form; and independently of such a 'form' no significant-expression would be in a position to signify anything. It may also be held, as it is customary to hold, that what a significant-expression signifies or is expected to signify is something about which we can meaningfully-

communicate. Hence, when *Padārthatva* is understood in the sense of *Abhidheyatva,* what happens to be understood by *Padārtha* is anything that is communicable. It goes without saying that a significant-expression signifies such a communicable primarily, if not solely and exclusively, because it has a particular-'form'. We need hardly to debate this point here in any further detail.

The question as to how does a significant-expression furnish the kind of information it does, is an important one. The *Nyāya* answer is that it furnishes a particular-kind of information through its 'form'. Whether and to what extent the *Nyāya*-philosophers are right in saying this would be a topic for an independent inquiry. Instead of going into such methodological-details, we shall concentrate here merely on the problem: what is a significant-expression informative about, granting that it is. Our main-objective in such an inquiry is to expose some of the fallacies with which the *Navya-Nyāya* answer is beset.

Leaving aside, therefore, for the present the question of the methodological-foundations of the consideration of the form of significant-expression and of the notion of the information it furnishes in terms of its form; if we pool-together both the above-mentioned ways of explaining '*Padārtha*', then that would bring to the foreground two important-considerations: (a) 'a significant-expression is informative of something', and (b) 'it is informative in so far as it exhibits a particular-form'. At this juncture it is relevant to note that according to the *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers that a significant-expression is informative is one important-consideration in taking it to be significant. It goes without saying, however, that this is not the only consideration with reference to the determination of the significance of significant-expression *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers seem to have in their mind. Coupled with this is also the consideration of

the 'form of an expression' that is considered to be a significant. Thus, the *Navya-Nyāya* consideration of the significance of significant-expression is bipolar in nature, its one-pole being – 'what does a significant-expression inform us about'? While its another-pole being – 'what kind of information does it supply and how does it supply the kind of information it does in terms of its form?' Out of these two important-considerations, we shall dwell basically on the first in this chapter. But before that, let us consider some other relevant-point.

There is, however, a third-consideration that is attempted to bring-forward through still another-way of explaining-significance of the term *'Padārtha'*. It is maintained that *Padārtha* is anything that is designated, nominated or denoted by a significant-expression. This way understood, a *Padārtha* turns-out to be a *designatum* of the significant-expression.[3] Its nature, however, any significant-expression communicates in terms of its having a particular-form. But when the term *Padārtha* is understood in the sense of *Pramīti-viṣaya*, it means that the object-designated by a significant-expression is capable of being discovered or found-out in our epistemic-endeavour. These three different-ways of explaining significance of the term *Padārtha*, have different repercussions; but more about them later.

The *Navya-Nyāya* Project

It would be worthwhile to inquire into the project on which *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers want to embark. The problem before them seems to be two-fold:

(a) On the level of significant-expressions, in terms of the scheme of *Padārthas* that they accepted and adopted from the *Vaiśeṣika*-thinkers, they want to confront with the problem: Granted that we have significant-expressions, how shall we classify them, and which kinds of them shall we presume to be primitive, so that any significant-

expression could be shown to be significant by explaining it in terms of such kind of expressions as are taken to be primitive?

(b) On the level of the informativeness of any significant-expressions, they seem to be posing another-question: Granted that every significant-expression is informative, what is it informative-of? As significant-expressions could be classified, can they also classify those about which significant-expressions are informative? Granting that they can be so classified, into which different-kinds can they be classified? Hence, on this-level they are asking the question: What kind/s of things or objects shall we assume to be primitive, so that that about which any significant-expression is informative could be satisfactorily-explained in terms of them?

Thus, one-side of the problem taken-up for consideration by *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers is that significance of any significant-expression must be capable of being explained and justified. Such an explanation and justification presupposes certain-frame within which and with reference to which they can after-all proceed and stand. Such a frame has, according to them, two-aspects: (i) it will have certain-primitives, which it must assume; and (ii) it will also demand that any significant-expression as well as that about which it informs us, fits into a certain-model. Out of these two-aspects, it is the first-aspect of the frame that they are bringing-out in their acknowledgement that we need to presuppose certain-classes of significant-expressions; and certain-classes of those objects about which significant-expressions inform us.

Yet there is one additional-important point, which we cannot over-look. We may presume that every significant-expression is informative. It may also be maintained that such an expression is informative about an object. But the

moment we say this, we involve ourselves into an enigmatic-position, if we do not take necessary-precaution. Any object about which any significant-expression informs us or is said to inform us, has to be assumed. In different words, if there is no object, then there is no point in saying that a significant-expression informs us about it. Hence, the objects about which significant-expressions inform us have to be taken as real. Having taken this position, we come to maintain that any significant-expression is significant in so far as it informs us of an object that is real.

Additional Project of the *Navya-Nyāya*

From what we have stated above, it may appear that the project *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers want to embark-upon is establishment of the correlation between significant-expressions and their significances, on the one-hand; and the classification of significant-expressions and the objects they are supposed to signify or designate, on the-other. But this is not their project in entirety. Over and above this, they also intend to undertake at least four different-reconstructions, if not more. They are empirical, ontological, epistemic and logical or linguistic-reconstructions. Of these, empirical-reconstruction amounts to be reconstruction of an empirical-world, while ontological-reconstruction amounts to be reconstruction of the ontological-world. Epistemic-reconstruction, on the contrary, is tantamount to be reconstruction of human-knowledge, while linguistic or logical-reconstruction means reconstruction of the language through which and with the help of which human beings are in a position to communicate-significantly and meaningfully. Thus, logical or linguistic reconstruction amounts to be a reconstruction of the language of human significant-communication.

Every reconstruction (of this kind) demands that anybody, who embarks-upon any-one of them, is required

to presuppose that the characteristic-reals amenable to the respective-reconstruction are given. It is also true that no reconstruction is capable of being carried-out independently of such perquisite-reals that it demands and presupposes. But it is also true that the characteristic and particular-reals, which are presupposed to be given, that form basis of a particular-kind of reconstruction, are not necessarily the same-reals in terms of which a reconstruction of any other-kind can be undertaken; without a loss of either purpose or programme. This is particularly because the different-reconstructions enlisted-above not only do not have one-to-one correspondence necessarily with one-another, but also because they are not mutually co-extensive.

Anyone who wants to undertake a reconstruction of an empirical-world has to presuppose, in accordance with the requirement of any reconstruction, that appropriate-kind of reals are given in terms of which such a reconstruction could be undertaken and accomplished. Such reals may be material, physical, chemical or even biological in nature. Fundamentally every real that anybody undertaking reconstruction of an empirical-world presupposes and must fulfil, however, one-criterion – namely each one of them must be 'actually-given or must be capable of being given in and through empirical-experience'. This is what he will say, if asked: on what basis is any real taken to be commensurate with the requirements of the empirical-reconstruction, or reconstruction of an empirical-world. Each one of such a real, moreover, according to him, forms or is supposed to form a part of the furniture of the empirical-world; and that any real does so form a part of the empirical-world must be capable of being attested in and through empirical-experience.

Further, since anything that is empirical – no matter whether material, physical, chemical or even biological – is considered to be conducive to empirical-reconstruction, it

cannot be said that empirical-reconstructionist must acknowledge only either material, physical, chemical or biological-things as forming part of the furniture of the world. Such a kind of consideration, on the contrary, would be too stringent and exclusive.

As against this programme of reconstruction, someone may be interested in casting the net of the reconstructionist-programme bit-wider, although not so wide and extensive as the farthest-stretch of a fertile-imagination would allow. The general-contention to which such a person extends his reconstructionist-programme of the ontological-world in general, instead of restricting it to the empirical-world, as the empirical-reconstructionist would endeavour to do. Such a kind of reconstruction, too, presupposes that the objects conducive to that kind of reconstruction are given. The plea that comes to be forwarded in support of such an extensive-programme of reconstruction is that any object or real, that is supposed to be given in accordance with the demand and requirement of such a reconstruction, is part of the furniture of the world; irrespective of the fact whether it is given to us empirically or not. Hence, on this view, any real that an ontological-reconstruction presupposes is or is supposed to be the part of the furniture of the ontological-world, no matter whether given empirically or not.

Thus both empirical as-well-as ontological-reconstructionists are interested in undertaking reconstruction of a world but certainly not of the same-world. At the most it can be said that empirical-reconstructionist-programme is a cross-section of the ontological-reconstructionist-programme, provided the larger-allowance we have made for the latter-kind of reconstructionist-programme is accepted. Roughly speaking, it can be said that whereas the former of these is in accordance with empiricist-consideration, while the latter of these is in accordance with

the realist-consideration. For, what empiricist will make an allowance for will be empirical and empirical-entities alone; while a realist, other things remaining the same, will not only allow empirical-entities but other entities as well.

Anybody who wants to undertake a reconstruction of human-knowledge, too, has to presuppose such bits or elements, as are conducive with the constructionist-programme that he envisages to undertake. To presuppose such bits to be given is a very preliminary-requirement of any reconstruction, and reconstruction of human-knowledge is not a singular-exception to this. But it is important to remember that the bits or elements that are so presupposed to be given are parts of the furniture of human-knowledge only, and not necessarily of the world, no matter whether empirical or ontological. Further, on their basis what we succeed in reconstructing is human-knowledge; and not the world – empirical or ontological. At the most it can be said that on their basis what we succeed in reconstructing is epistemological-world, or the world of human-knowledge. It is quite possible that human-knowledge may either be knowledge of the empirical-world, or of the ontological-world. But reconstruction of the former is not tantamount to the reconstruction of the latter. Nor can both these reconstructions be undertaken on the basis of the same-primitives or bits. Moreover, neither the reals which either empirical-reconstruction or ontological-reconstruction demands can be treated on-par with one-another, nor those elements and the bits which reconstruction of human-knowledge presupposes can be allowed to rub-shoulders with one-another on the same-level; and as forming part of the furniture of the same-world, however, extensive and fascinating it may be. This is because it is methodologically-unwarranted as-well-as logically-indefensible.

A philosopher, who wants to undertake logical or

linguistic-reconstruction, as remarked earlier, wants to reconstruct language of human significant-communication. As, any reconstruction necessitates presupposition of something that is in accordance with it and also that which serves as its basis, similarly this kind of reconstruction, too, necessitates certain-presupposition/s. But what this kind of reconstruction expects us to presuppose are linguistic or logical-bits or elements, which, too, are presumed to be given. But this neither warrants their being confused with what reconstruction of human-knowledge presupposes, nor even the reals which either empirical-reconstruction or ontological-reconstruction presupposes. Moreover, all these 'givens' cannot be bundled-together, branded as 'reals' and taken to form part of the furniture of the same-world.

We had said above that the *Navya-Nyāya* wishes to undertake four different-kinds of reconstructions. It also wants to undertake these reconstructions not in succession, but simultaneously. Generally no-one would have an objection to such an ambitious-programme, in so-far-as every reconstruction is kept strictly within its own-limits and no-one is confused with another. We also had argued that according to the *Navya-Nyāya* contention, every significant-expression is assumed to inform us about some or the other object – the object through designation, its nature through its form. Be that as it may. But now combine both these considerations with the addition that every 'given' that any reconstruction-presupposes is the object or real that is signified-by any significant-expression. Even if we decide to brand and title every 'given' that any reconstruction-presupposes to be a 'real', and even if it is assumed that it is 'object' or 'real' about which a significant-expression informs us; it does not follow that each-one of them is 'real' in exactly the same-way. For, in accordance with the programme of empirical-reconstruction anything is real, provided it is or is capable of being given to us in and through empirical-

experience. But so granted the reality of an object is not determined by our using an expression of a particular-kind or by taking such an expression to be designatory of it. What matters is the fact that an object is 'given to us empirically'. In such a case, the object is not given to us in and through our-employment of an expression, but independently of it. The kind of reals, which so happen to be given to us, may be called empirical-reals forming part of the furniture of empirical-world, and the position which maintains that any kind of real we talk-about is and must be 'empirically given to us'; can be termed as 'empirical-realism'. Thus, on this view, empirical-reals are given to us in and through empirical-experience, and it is their so being given to us that determines that they are empirical-reals. The fact that we have expressions which inform us about them and that they are significant in so-far-as they inform us about empirically given-objects, is a later-problem. Here what is logically-first is not our using-expressions, but rather empirical-objects given in empirical-experience. One can never maintain in this connection that it is our using significant-expressions with reference to them that make the object/s referred to by them to be real. Rather, the case is exactly-opposite. The reality of objects is determined independently of our using-expressions with reference to them.

We do not, however, it may be maintained in accordance with realist contention, use expressions or even significant-expressions, only if the objects about which they inform us are empirically-given. We can employ an expression even-though no object of that kind is given. Its significance could also be determined, even-though we are not given the object about which it informs us in empirical-experience. Now, if it is maintained that even here the significant-expressions inform us of something, then it is quite different to maintain that the objects about which they inform us are real. But let us ask a question here: What kind of objects are these? Are

they given to us independently of the expressions that we employ with reference to them? This question may be answered affirmatively. But, right in the affirmative-answer to this question, there is a twist. It may be maintained that the objects about which significant-expressions inform us in such a case, too, are given to us independently of them. Let us continue to ask another question: how are they given to us independently of the expressions? In answer to this question, it may be argued that they are given to us in epistemological-consideration, or in logical-consideration. If the question is answered in this way, it makes a great-difference. For, whereas empirical-reals are given in empirical-experience, objects that arise in epistemological or logical-consideration may not be and often are not so given. Nor do they need to be so given. The objects that are given in epistemic-consideration are those that are conducive to epistemological-reconstruction, while those objects that are said to be given in logical-consideration are conducive to logical-reconstruction. Thus, objects conducive to epistemological or logical-reconstruction may not necessarily be given in empirical-experience. Hence, the kinds of reals we are talking about are different from empirical-reals, and it is enormous-confusion to open consideration of them just from the fact that all of them are called 'reals'.

The position which maintains that the objects we talk-about are epistemically-given to us and that is why they are reals can be termed as 'epistemological-realism'. While the position which maintains that the objects we talk-about are given to us in logical-consideration, may be termed as 'logical-realism'. The three-positions considered-above, viz. empirical, epistemological and logical realisms are certainly not the same; and the objects that are taken to be real in consonance with the empirical, epistemological or logical-reconstruction, too, may not be identical. Nonetheless, since we call each-one of them as real, we may be misled by this

kind of linguistic-convention to treat them alike. It may also be further maintained that the significant-expressions that we use with reference to them 'name' these reals and it is through 'naming' these reals that they inform us about them and that is how expressions turn-out to be significant. In connection with the point argued in the proceeding-paragraph, one important-consideration needs to be carefully borne in mind. Even if one maintains that some reals which significant-expressions inform us about are empirical-reals, from this it does not necessarily-follow that empirical-reals are the only kind of reals that one is prepared to acknowledge in the final-analysis. The reals, which a realist may be prepared to grant, do not necessarily arise out of the same-consideration about them. Some reals he may acknowledge and accept as forming part of the furniture of this world. But some others he may accept because they have explanatory-significance. Such significance may further be either epistemic or logical. The point that is important, however, is that calling each one of them 'real', does not make all of them reals-alike.

In this context it may be asked, why should a philosopher consider so-many reals? Answer to this question depends-upon what problem is the philosopher confronted with. He may be interested in undertaking a reconstruction of an empirical-world, or of human-knowledge, or of language that human-beings use in significant-communication. We need to presuppose 'reals' in terms of which each-one of such reconstruction can be carried-out. But we must understand that each-reconstruction has its own important-problem. Further, no two-reconstructions of them are equivalent with each-other, and the reals, in terms of which such reconstructions could be carried out, too, are not identical.

Moreover, it may be asked: Why should a philosopher consider so-many (kinds of) reals? Answer to this question

depends-upon what problem is the philosopher confronted with. He may be interested in undertaking reconstruction of an empirical-world, or of human-knowledge, of language that human-beings use in significant-communication. We need to presuppose reals in terms of which each-one of such reconstruction can be carried-on. But we must understand that each (kind of) reconstruction has its own important problem (to confront with). Further, no two-reconstructions of them are equivalent with each-other, and the reals in terms of which such reconstructions could be carried out, too, are not necessarily identical.

About the reals that we considered-above, a question may be asked: 'How are these reals given?' This question may be answered saying – some of them are given independently of language, while others through the employment of language itself. Under the latter-class fall the reals conducive to logical-reconstruction, while under the former-class fall the reals amenable to empirical and epistemological-reconstructions. But in answering this question in this way, we forget that this kind of answer engenders another kind of confusion. Since reals that warrant both empirical and epistemic-reconstruction are given independently of language, we come to treat them on-par. This is a very serious-mistake. For, a 'real' amenable to epistemic-reconstruction may not necessarily be the same, that is also conducive to empirical-reconstruction although we call it 'real'; and although it is given independently of expressions which we employ in language.

Taking these 'reals' together, we are likely to fall-into various (kinds of) confusions, the important of which are – (1) we may treat all reals-alike, simply because each of them is called 'real'. We may also treat them alike, because it is presumed that any expression used with reference to them is supposed to 'name' them. (2) We may confuse between

reals amenable to empirical and epistemic-reconstructions, simply because both of them are given independently of expressions with reference to them. (3) We may confuse reals conducive to an empirical-reconstruction with those conducive to a logical-reconstruction, since any assertion or claim about both of them is made on the level of language. Further, it is also possible to confuse reals of epistemic-reconstruction with those of logical-reconstruction, for the same reason due to which we confuse reals of empirical and logical-reconstruction. We become more prone to confuse reals of empirical-reconstruction with those of epistemic-reconstruction, because both of them are given in epistemic-situation. Lastly, (4) we may confuse a real amenable to any kind of reconstruction, with a real conducive to any-other kind of reconstruction; either because the question of the justification of any claim that is made about any real arises on the level of language or because any claim of this kind and justification of it is presumed to presuppose a particular-form.

Depending upon what kind of reconstruction one intends to undertake, one is required to acknowledge the kind of reals which would turn out to be conducive to that kind of reconstruction. One may be interested in undertaking more than one-kind of reconstruction-simultaneously. In such a case, accordingly one is required to posit reals amenable to those reconstructions. That one is required to posit reals is not the only consideration, although it is an important-consideration. Which reals should one acknowledge as primitive depends-upon what kind of reconstruction one intends to undertake.

Often we are hardly in a position to keep different (kinds of) reals as distinct, which we are forced to acknowledge in terms of different (kinds of) reconstructions that we intend to undertake. It is not a mistake on the part of a philosopher

that he is interested in succession or even simultaneously in undertaking different (kinds of) reconstructions, and hence is compelled to posit different (kinds of) reals in terms of which such reconstructions could be undertaken. But it is certainly a mistake to confuse one (kind of) reconstruction with another (kind), and it is equally a mistaken-step to confuse one (kind of) real with any other (kind). Further still, it is not only a mistake but also a category-confusion to argue that one can undertake two or three-different (kinds of) reconstructions, in terms of the same (kind of) reals. We may be misled, on the one-hand, to maintain that one (kind of) reconstruction and another (kind of reconstruction) are the same; because both of them fit into the same-form. We, on the other-hand, may be misled to argue that two-sorts of reals, in terms of which two different-kinds of reconstructions could be (and need to be) carried on, are in fact on-par with each-other, being real; and hence are of the same-kind.

The reason why we made these points is that at the hands of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers similar-things seem to have happened. They simultaneously pose, it seems, three-questions and each-one of these questions lead in the direction of one-kind of reconstruction. The three-questions *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers seem to be interested in are:

i. How shall we explain the fact that there are empirical-objects and that there is an empirical-world? It is for this purpose that they want to undertake empirical-reconstruction of the world, and the reals they posit for this purpose are appropriately empirical-reals.

ii. How shall we explain the fact of human-knowledge, and the fact that we do come to have the knowledge that we have? It is for this purpose that they want to undertake epistemological-reconstruction and posit corresponding-reals in terms of which such a reconstruction could be undertaken.

iii. How shall we account for the fact that we are able to communicate through language, the way we do? It is for this purpose, they want to undertake reconstruction of language or logical-reconstruction and to be able to do so they posit appropriate linguistic or logical-reals.

In spite of the fact that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers are interested in these three-different kinds of reconstructions, they maintain that whatever kind of real we are talking-about we employ expression in language and such an expression is informative about it. To put it differently, there is some kind of 'name-theory of meaning'[4] behind all these reconstructions. The common-thread that runs through all different (kinds of) reals, in terms of which various (kinds of) reconstructions could be undertaken, is that each-one of them is posited and each-one of them is taken as 'real'. Hence, as we remarked earlier, the basic-problem before *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers is – which kinds or classes of reals and of expressions shall we acknowledge, so that we shall be in a position to undertake and explain these different-kinds of reconstructions? Their *Padārthas* are such 'classes of reals' and of expressions, and the entire philosophical-frame which the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers create is an effort in the direction of three-different (kinds of) reconstructions simultaneously posed to be undertaken.

Although *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers are interested in these different-kinds of reconstructions, yet they have failed; as we shall see, to draw a line of demarcation between two important-considerations: (a) what is the distinction between empirical-reconstruction on the one-hand, and epistemic or logical-reconstruction on the-other. One can maintain that these different-reconstructions are related to one-another. One can also maintain that each-one of such reconstruction exhibits the same-form. But from this, it does not follow that these various (kinds of) reconstructions are interchangeably-

substitutable. As we shall see *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, unfortunately, completely miss this-point, leaning-heavily and almost entirely-upon the 'similarity of the form' of these various (kinds of) reconstructions. (b) Since each-one of such-reconstruction is undertaken in terms of reals, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers have, unfortunately, fallen-into a trap of believing that all these different (kinds of) reals are of the same-kind, and hence are on-par with one-another. In short, they maintain that all these reals are part of the furniture of this world. As a result of this, their position results into a kind of Platonism, according to which over-and-above the legitimate-reals, which can be said to belong to this-world, more reals belong to it. But it is not a Platonism of the kind which maintains that if different kinds of reals belong to different-worlds, i.e. form part of the furniture of different-worlds. In addition to this, the position of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers came to create what Quine calls 'an ontological-slum', in so far as all these reals are said to be the parts of the furniture of the same ontological-world. This move makes their ontological-world over-populated. In order to be able to see that the *Navya-Nyāya* consideration does seem to result into these fallacious-consequences, we shall have to undertake a detailed-examination of the *Padārthas* they accept. But, before that we take-up a point that one important-clarification is in order and it is to the consideration of that we turn.

Two Fundamental Relations: Some Clarifications

Before we proceed on our inquiry, however, some clarifications are in order. First, what we wish to maintain is that even if those to which different-reconstructions are amenable, are called reals, different-kinds of reconstructions presuppose and demand different-sorts of reals and not just reals. This being the case, it is enormously-misleading to hold that all these reals are on-par with one-another; just because

each-one of them is or is proposed to be called a 'real'. Secondly, ontological or empirical-reconstruction, reconstruction of human-knowledge as also the reconstruction of the language of human significant-communication are different sorts of reconstructions. That their forms are isomorphic with one-another cannot simply and solely be a matter of assumption. This must be established to be a fact, independently of such an assumption. The *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to have missed this point. Thirdly, in so far as every *Padārtha* is expected to stand for a *'Vastu'* – an object or a thing – which a *Pada* (significant-expression) is supposed to signify, all *Padārthas* are envisaged to be treated on-par with one-another. This contention seems further to be reinforced not only by confusing between different (kinds of) reals, but also between different (kinds of) reconstructions. But taking what each one of the significant-expression signifies to be real, a confusion seems to be ushered in and among facts, objects and things. Lastly, as isomorphism among various (kinds of) reconstructions cannot merely be a matter of assumption; similarly that we will be in a position to undertake each-one of the reconstructions within the same-frame and through the employment of the same-methodology and technique cannot also be a matter of sheer-assumption and presupposition. That such is the case has to be shown independently of such an assumption. This point, too, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to have missed. But more of it in the next chapter.

Enough by Way of Clarification

Before we take-up the problem of the detailed-consideration of the various *Padārthas* accepted by *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers, however, let us consider-briefly the two fundamental-relations between-or-among various-reals, which they have accepted. These relations are *Saṁyoga* (contact) and *Samavāya* (inherence). Out of these, *Saṁyoga*

(contact) is a relation between such *relata* which are both distinguishable and separable; while *Samavāya* (inherence) is a relation between two *relata* which are distinguishable but never separable[5]. The basic-consideration is to classify the *relata* of these two (kinds of) relations into two-classes, viz. separable and inseparable, respectively. Now, the *relata* which are inseparable must be at least distinguishable, if at all we are to say that there is a relation between the two *relata*. Otherwise that would violate the 'Law of the Identity of Indiscernible'. Hence, the class of *relata* which are inseparable nonetheless distinguishable; and the relation between them is *Samavāya* (inherence). Further, the *relata*, which are separable, are certainly distinguishable. But what is important about them, is that they are separable. This is how we get another class of *relata*, viz. those which are both distinguishable and separable; and the relation between them is said to be *Saṁyoga* (contact). Distinguishability of the *relata* of a relation gives us at least the numerical-distinction between them, while separability of them is indicative of the possibility of their standing-apart from each-other. More importantly, mere distinguishability is a mark of non-independence of the *relata*, while as separability of *relata* indicates their independence. Further, other things remaining the same, of the two *relata* which are inseparable from each-other at least one is non-independent. Lastly, many of the inseparable-*relata* could be said to be given only epistemically or logically; but never ontologically or empirically. Some of these points will significantly-figure in our later-discussions. Suffice it for the present to remark that out of the two relations under-consideration, one falls under one *Padārtha*, while another is an independent-*Padārtha*. For, while *Saṁyoga* (contact) is a *Guṇa*; *Samavāya* (inherence) is an independent-*Padārtha*. An inquiry into the reason behind this falls outside the scope of this chapter.

We have by now investigated the background on the basis of which various *Padārthas* which the *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers have accepted could be studied. But a detailed-investigation of each-one of them on the basis of this background will also expose some of the confusions, which *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers have left by way of their legacy to us. It is to this that we now turn.

Padārthas: A Detailed Consideration

(1) *Dravya*

Out of the seven-*Padārthas* accepted by *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers, the first is *Dravya*. Probably, *Dravya* is first or given priority, because it is the *Ādhāra* of every-other *Padārtha*. But, if we profess to start our inquiry from the reals amenable to empirical-reconstruction, then empirical-reals naturally come first. The *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers maintain that *Dravya* is anything, which has *Jātī* or *Guṇa* or both.[6] This explanation is to be understood in a certain-way. Every *Dravya* does have *Guṇa*, but some *Dravyas* have both *Guṇa* as well as *Jātī* (here we are using the word *Jātī* exactly in the way *Nyāya*-philosophers understand *Sāmānya*, and it is in this sense that the expression '*Jāti*' is intended to be understood here), there being many-reals of the same-kind, viz. *Aṇus* of *Pṛthivī*, or of *Āp*, or of *Tejas*, or of *Vāyu*. But, *Dravya* is *Jātimān* in still another-way, viz. each one of them being *Sattāvān*, i.e. *Sat* (real). For on *Dravya*, *Guṇa* and *Karma* there is a *Jātī* called *Sattā* (ontologically/empirically-real); and hence each one of them becomes *Sattāvān*. This contention, too, gives rise to one (kind of) confusion, but more of it later. Out of the nine-*Dravyas*,[7] accepted by *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers, *Pṛthivī*, *Āp* and *Tejas* alone are empirical-reals. Rest none of the *Dravya* is an empirical-real. Take the case of any one of the remaining six *Dravyas*. We are told that they are inferred and hence are inferable, and not given to us empirically. Each one of them, however, is called *Dravya*; because each one of them has a

Guṇa. If we ask 'are they inferred', then the answer is that each one of them is the *Ādhāra* of different *Guṇa/s*. Why do we need *Ādhāra* for *Guṇas*? Because every *Guṇa* is *Ādheya*, and every *Ādheya* is inseparably-connected with some *Ādhāra*. Further, we are told that there can be no *Guṇa* independently of any *Dravya*. Hence, every *Dravya* is a *Guṇī*. In fact the two-expressions, viz. *Dravya* and *Guṇī*, are synonymous, for *Nyāya*-philosophers.

Out of the inferred *Dravyas*, we are told that *Ākāśa*, *Kāla*, *Dik* and *Ātmā* are *Vibhū-Dravyas*. Anything is *Vibhū*, provided it is *Saṁyukta* (related by the relation of *Saṁyoga*) with every *Mūrta-Dravya*[8]. Anything is *Mūrta-Dravya*, provided it is capable of being grasped in terms of *Karma*. Further, it has limited-dimension. Now, what is meant by saying that *Kāla* is *Vibhū*? It simply should mean nothing else than saying that every talk in terms of time presupposes (existence of) time, and further that the nature of no empirical-real (in the context of this chapter we are using this term as a rough-analogue of what *Nyāya*-thinkers call *Utpanna-Dravya*) can be explained independently of temporal-consideration. Similar consideration applies to *Dik*, in the sense that no consideration in terms of direction can be independently of the presupposition of direction. This is how *Vibhutva* of *Dik* needs to be understood. But the consideration that applies to *Ākāśa* is two-fold: (a) no talk in terms of spatial-object would make any sense unless space is presupposed, and (b) sound which passes through space is inseparably-connected with it for such passage. Hence, sound is inseparably-related with space without which it will not pass from one point of space to another. The *Vibhutva* of *Ātmā* has to be understood in a particular-way. *Ātmā* is said to be the *Dravya*, which has in all eight-*Guṇas*, *Buddhi* or *Jñāna* or *Anubhava* being one of them. Treating these terms to be synonymous is confusing. But we shall not bother about it in this investigation. The *Vibhutva* of *Ātmā* has to be understood epistemically in the

sense of any *Jñāna* being inseparably-connected with it, as its knower. Thus, the professed *Vibhutva* of each-one of the *Vibhū-Dravya* is not and cannot be understood in terms of the empirical-explanation of *Vibhutva*. Understood that way, it means that the *Vibhū* thing is physically in contact with everything else. Such explanation of *Vibhutva* just cannot be applied to any *Vibhū-Dravya*. Its *Vibhutva* has, therefore, either to be understood epistemically or logically. The eighth *Dravya*, viz. *Manas* is inferred purely as an epistemic and an explanatory-requirement. Each-one of the inferred-*Dravya*, thus, is accepted because each-one of them has to be acknowledged as real, in the frame of explanation and justification. To put it differently, each-one of them has to be acknowledged either in epistemological or logical-reconstruction. The ground for their acceptance is either epistemic or logical. None of them is given to us empirically. Hence, none of them is empirical-real.

One of the classifications of *Dravyas* is into *Bhūta* and *Mūrta-Dravyas*. This classification is confusing and misleading on every count. We are told that anything is *Bhūta-Dravya*, provided we are able to grasp peculiarity of it empirically.[9] It is on this count that *Pṛthivī*, *Āp*, *Tejas*, *Vāyu* and *Ākāśa* are called *Bhūta-Dravyas*. But while in the case of *Pṛthivī*, Āp and *Tejas*, the peculiarities as well as the *Dravyas* are given-empirically; in the case of *Vāyu* and *Ākāśa* merely the peculiarity of each-one of them, viz. their so-called *Guṇas*, i.e. touch and sound, are given respectively. Do they understand in this way that they stand on-par? Certainly not. Same is the case with reference to *Mūrta-Dravyas*. For, whereas *Mūrtatva* of *Pṛthivī*, *Āp*, *Tejas* and *Vāyu* is empirical; that of *Manas* is not.

Here arises one important-question: Granting that each-one of the *Dravya* has one or many *Guṇas*, where both – a *Dravya* and its *Guṇa* – are given to us empirically; such a

Dravya and such a *Guṇa* will have to be classified as an empirical-real. But, how does the *Dravya*, which is not empirical, possess empirical-*Guṇa*? Further, grating that *Dravya* that is non-empirical, yet possesses an empirical-*Guṇa*, does it possess exactly the way empirical-*Dravya* would possess an empirical-*Guṇa*? If it does, on what basis do we say this? It is of no-use merely saying that there is a *Guṇa-Guṇī* relation between them, and any *Guṇa* of any *Guṇī* is inseparably-related with it. It is also of no-use saying merely that in the case of explaining both an empirical-*Dravya* possessing empirical or non-empirical-*Guṇa*, or even in the case of non-empirical *Dravya* possessing an empirical or non-empirical *Guṇa*, we employ the same-kind of linguistic-expressions, which give rise to or are expected to give rise to the same or similar-import.

If we now take it for granted that each-one of the *Dravya* is of the same-order as an empirical-real, then each-one of the *Dravya* must be given empirically. Understood in this way, each-one of the *Dravya* comes to form part of the furniture of the empirical-world. But if so, then the responsibility of the philosopher increases. For, there is a strain in the philosophic-position of a philosopher, who maintains that he is making a statement about the world or about a constituent of it; but it is not verifiable in any sense at all. If the philosopher is to maintain that the states of the world are experienceable but intuitively, or by some other kind of experience then this amounts to be merely a psychological-claim. Such a claim in its turn is further based on one more claim that we can have experiences other than those which we normally-associate with the usual-findings of our sense-organs. However, a philosopher cannot afford to stop here. He must further establish that not only such experiences are possible, but are also relevant to the statement of facts. This again he must establish through semantic-rules. Lastly, he

must also establish that independently of such experiences, statement of facts could not be (truly) statement of facts.

Let us consider two more-points, before we leave the consideration of *Dravya*. Firstly, we are told by the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers that *Kāla* is *Ādhāra* of everything[10]. It makes sense to say that *Kāla* is *Ādhāra* of any empirical-real, in the sense that the nature of no empirical-real would be explainable independently of time. Even here it is explanatory and justificatory *Ādhāra,* and not a cognitive one; much-less an ontological one. With reference to an empirical-real, this statement makes at least some sense. But what is meant by saying that *Kāla* is *Ādhāra* of real, conducive either to epistemic or logical-reconstruction? Does it mean that it is cognitive-*Ādhāra,* or does it mean an explanatory and justificatory one? Understood in any sense, it makes no sense to say that *Kāla* is *Ādhāra* of any real (that is) unnamable to either epistemic or logical-reconstruction. It makes sense, however, if we treat all *Dravyas,* in fact all reals, as empirical-reals. But, unfortunately, in that case troubles arise on other-counts, some of which we have indicated-above. Secondly, it is maintained by the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers that *Aṇus* of *Pṛthivī, Āp, Tejas* and *Vāyu* as well as *Dik, Kāla, Ākāśa* and *Ātmā* are *Nitya*. (According to the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, *Sāmānya* and *Abhāva* of certain-kind are also *Nitya*. We shall consider this problem at a later-stage). But *Nityatva* with reference to reals of empirical, epistemic and logical-reconstructions does not mean the same. It is possible that what they meant by it is ultimate-irreducibility. But ultimate-irreducibility of an empirical-real and that of a real of epistemic or logical-reconstruction is not the same. Even explanatory and justificatory-irreducibility is not the same. It is, therefore, misleading just to say that each one of the above-mentioned *Dravyas* is *Nitya*.

The above-mentioned examination brings it out amply,

it is hoped, that the *Dravyas Navya-Nyāya* philosophers' speak of do not amount to be reals of the same-kind, nor are they requisite in any-single reconstruction-programme. They are conducive to different (kinds of) reconstructions. Some of them are empirical, while others are not. Hence, to treat them on-par with one-another or even alike – definitionally – is a philosophical-blunder capable of engendering serious-consequences.

(2) *Guṇa*

Thus regarding the first *Padārtha*, empirical, epistemic and logical-considerations have been mixed-up and confused-between. Enough we have considered *Dravya*. Let us turn-to another *Padārtha* called *Guṇa*. It is said that a *Guṇa* is that which is different from both *Dravya* and *Karma*, and yet is *Sāmānyavān*[11]. We are also told that any *Guṇa* is an *Āsādharaṇa-Kāraṇa* of *Pramā* (correct-cognition). There are in-all twenty-four *Guṇas* that are accepted by *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers. They are further classified into various-classes. We shall just mention these classifications, and except in two-cases we shall presuppose the way these classifications are understood. Various-classifications of *Guṇas* are: (i) *Mūrta*, *Amūrta* or both – *Mūrta* and *Amūrta* – *Guṇas*, (ii) *Ekāśrita* and *Anekāśrita–Guṇas*, (iii) *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa–Guṇas*, (iv) *Indriya-grāhya* and *Atīndriya-grāhya–Guṇas*, former being further classified into *Eka-indriya-grāhya* and *dvīndriya-grāhya–Guṇas*, (v) *Kāraṇa-guṇa-utpanna* and *Akāraṇa-guṇa-utpanna–Guṇas*, (vi) *Karmaja* and *Akarmaja– Guṇas*, (vii) *Asamavāyī-kāraṇa-rūpa, Nimitta-kāraṇa-rūpa*, and both – *Asamavyāyī* and *Nimitta-kāraṇa-rūpa* – *Guṇas*, and (vii) *Vyāpya-vṛtti* and *Avyāpya-vṛtti* – *Guṇas*.

All of these are over-lapping classifications. Instead of going into the detailed-consideration of each one of them, for that would take us too much away from the main-line of argument, we shall consider some of the important-points

they give rise to. Let us take into account the consideration that is behind the first classification. Any *Guṇa* is called *Mūrta*, if it is a *Guṇa* of a *Mūrta-Dravya*, and a *Guṇa* of *Amūrta-Dravya* is called *Amūrta-Guṇa*. Any *Guṇa* is called both *Mūrta* and *Amūrta-Guṇa*, provided it is a *Guṇa* of both *Mūrta* and *Amūrta-Dravyas*. But we must make a distinction between following four-cases: (a) where a *Dravya* as well as a *Guṇa* of it are empirically-given, (b) where *Dravya* is empirically-given but not a *Guṇa* of it, (c) where the *Dravya* is not empirically-given but its *Guṇa* is, and (d) where the *Dravya* is or is not empirically-given, but although its *Viśeṣa-Guṇa* is empirically-given, its other *Guṇas* are not so-given. After we make such distinctions, the problems that arise are: (i) how do we know that a *Dravya* possess the *Viśeṣa-Guṇa* and any other *Guṇa* in exactly the same-way, even though both are not given-empirically? (ii) Does the *Mūrta-Dravya* have *Guṇas* exactly the way *Amūrta-Dravya* has? What is the ground to say this? Will merely the consideration of the linguistic-form of the significant-expression suffice to say that *Mūrta-Dravyas* possess *Guṇas* exactly the way *Amūrta-Dravyas* do and *vice-versa*? (iii) If we have known a *Guṇa* empirically, does it also mean that we have also known the *Dravya* empirically? (iv) Since each one of the *Dravya* is not empirical, should we not make a distinction between empirical-*Dravya* and epistemic or logical-*Dravya*? But correspondingly should we not make a distinction between the *Guṇa* of an empirical-*Dravya* and that of epistemic or logical-*Dravya*?

The difficulty about those *Guṇas* which are considered to be both *Mūrta* and *Amūrta* is still-greater. It may be correct to classify *Dravyas* into *Mūrta* and *Amūrta*, but does it justify applying the same-classification in the same-way to *Guṇas*? What is, for example, meant by saying that *Saṁkhyā* is a *Guṇa* of a real –empirical or otherwise? Is it given with the real or does it arise out of our employment of numerals with reference to them? Similar-kind of difficulty arises about

Saṁyoga; for whereas the *Saṁyoga* between any-two empirical or between one empirical and another non-empirical real is empirically-understandable, in so far as the boundary or limit of at least one of the real is capable of being empirically-specified, (but) the *Saṁyoga* between two *Vibhu-Dravyas* is not accepted. Why? Is it because it is logically-impossible or inconceivable? Certainly not. It is rather rejected, because it has no explanatory-value. Hence, it is rejected because explanatorily it's being redundant. Thus, what emerges out-of this consideration is that even about *Guṇas* there are confusing-considerations. For some *Guṇas* are empirically-given, while others are accepted on quite a different-consideration. So even if *Guṇas* are taken to be real, all of them are not real in exactly the same-way.

Let us consider another-classification of *Guṇas* into *Vyāpya-vṛtti* and *Avyāpya-vṛtti Guṇas*. *Vyāpyatva* of it is to be understood as *Alpa-deśa-vṛttitvam*. But the way *Deśa* is understood in different-contexts is highly-confusing. For, the notion of *Deśa* makes sense only with reference to that which has extension. But, what about concepts? What is meant by extension of a class-name? The notions of spatial-extension and of conceptual-applicability or even explanability are not the same. Nor are the notions of the range of spatial-extension and that of conceptual-applicability the same. It is misleading to maintain that both of them are to be understood in the same-way. In the same-way, the notion of *Avyāpya-vṛtti–Guṇas* is equally-ambiguous.

Thus as the consideration of *Dravya* confuses between reals, amenable to empirical, epistemic and logical-reconstructions; similarly the consideration of *Guṇas*. For, sometimes the consideration that matters in their being considered in a particular-way is empirical, sometimes epistemic, while sometimes else logical ones. But since all *Guṇas* are taken as real, it is supposed confusedly that reals

condusive to empirical, ontological, epistemic, and logical-reconstructions stand on-par. And, that there is no-difference between empirical, ontological and logical-considerations of them. This is misleading and being highly-ambiguous engenders further-confusions.

(3) *Karma*

The third *Padārtha* accepted by *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers is *Karma*[12] . Now since *Karma* can be spoken-sensibly only in those cases where both or at least one *Dravya* is *Mūrta*. We are told that *Karma* is that which is related only with a *Mūrta-Dravya*, with the relation of *Samavāya*[13] . But we must remember that considerations of *Mūrta-Dravya* and *Mūrta-Guṇa* are different-considerations. Merely because each of them is called 'real', from this it does not necessarily follow that each of them is empirical-real. So *Karma* that is related with any empirical-real with the relation of *Samavāya*, and the *Karma* that is related with any-real that figures in epistemic or logical-reconstruction with the relation of *Samavāya* have to be understood differently. Further, since any *Guṇa* is called *Mūrta*, from this it does not necessarily-follow that it is empirical. Hence, a distinction will also have to be made between *Karma* that is related with *Mūrta-Guṇa* that is empirical, and *Karma* that is related with *Mūrta-Guṇa* that is not empirical. Further still, we shall also have to distinguish between the *Karma* that is different from *Saṁyoga* and is yet the *Asamavāyī-Kāraṇa* of the *Saṁyoga* between the two empirical-things, and the *Karma* that is different from *Saṁyoga* between one-empirical and another non-empirical thing and still is *Asamavāyī-Kāraṇa* of *Saṁyoga* between them. For, whereas the former is empirical, the latter is merely explanatory. Thus, on the level of *Karma*, too, the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to make confusion between reals amenable to empirical, epistemic and logical-reconstructions.

We are also further told that each one of the *Dravya*, *Guṇa*

and *Karma* is *Sat* (i.e. it is real) and that is why *Dravyas*, *Guṇas* and *Karmas* taken together have a *Jāti* called *Sattā*[14]. This contention is the zenith of confusion. That is because even in the *Ādhāra-Ādheya*-model,[15] which the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers accept, *Dravya* on the one-hand and *Guṇa* and *Karma* on the other-hand stand on two different-strata. In addition to this, it is also important to remember that neither all *Dravyas*, nor all *Guṇas*, nor again all *Karmas* are empirical-reals. The *Karma* of *Manas* uniting itself with *Ātmā* on the one-hand and sense-organ on the other is certainly not empirical. Thus, the strategy of confusing among reals conducive to empirical, epistemic and logical-reconstructions is uniform with reference to *Dravya*, *Guṇa* and *Karma*. It is needless to consider this point in further details. Merely because each *Dravya*, *Guṇa* or *Karma* is called 'real', they do not cease to be reals assumed to be given in accordance with the requirements of reconstructions of different-kinds; and it is both confusing and misleading to treat them on-par and explain expressions used with reference to them in exactly the same-way just because they are informative and merely because they exhibit the same linguistic-form.

Further, if all *Padārthas* are real, then to single-out *Dravyas*, *Guṇas* and *Karmas* and say that they are real is both redundant and misleading. It is redundant because once having accepted that all *Padārthas* are real to say again that *Dravyas*, *Guṇas* and *Karmas* are real need not be separately pointed out and emphasised, unless we are saying that they are real in some different-sense. But in that case we would be using the expression 'real' equivocally. If, on the contrary, we want to say that *Dravyas*, *Guṇas* and *Karmas* are real, then something must be wrong with the contention that all *Padārthas* are real; for these two-statements put-together give rise to an inconsistency of a very serious-kind. But more about this point later.

(4) *Sāmānya*

Let us now turn to *Sāmānya*, the fourth *Padārtha*. Regarding *Sāmānya* there is a greater-confusion, because cognitive and explanatory-aspects have been mixed-up. That is, that the nature of which is to be explained and that in terms of which it is sought to be explained, have been mixed-up. It is with reference to those objects which are to be explained, and which we assume to be given that the notion of a *Jāti* ('set'), as the *Nyāya*-thinkers would call it, has significance. The notion of *Jāti*, therefore, is an extensional-notion, while that of *Sāmānya* is essentially an intentional-notion. The notion of *Jāti* is not an abstraction, while that of *Sāmānya* indeed is. These points will become clear as we proceed.

Sāmānya has been said to be an *Anugata-Dharma* (roughly what we may call *proprium*). It is said to be that which is one, and is inseparably-related with many-objects of a particular-kind[16]. But we must understand that *Sāmānya* is not given to us as something empirical (Even when the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers say that we cognise *Sāmānya* by *Pratyakṣa*, it has to be understood as being occasioned perceptually; and not as 'given-empirically' or even 'empirically-explainable'). We employ it, when we seek to bring-out the nature of some-kind of object in terms of abstraction of the nature of objects of a particular-kind. Thus, *Sāmānya* is a concept; and a concept is related with anything of a particular-kind not for its being cognised, but for its being explained and described. A concept or a class-name associated inseparably-with a particular-kind of object does not contain the object/s to which it is applied. The notion of a concept or of a class-name is not at all a notion of a container or of a 'set'. It is to bring-out difference of this-kind, perhaps, that we say that a given-object belongs to or is a member of a 'set', while a concept is applicable to it. It is quite-obvious that notions of

'belonging to' or 'membership of' on the one-hand and that of 'applicability' are not the same.

The notion of *Jāti*, on the contrary, is the notion of a 'set'. In the *Prācīna-Nyāya*, there was this correct-insight[17]. The insight is that one object is of the same-kind as the others (of that-kind) are (being members of the same-'set'). In the Vātsyāyana's-*Bhāṣya* also we are told that *Jāti* is that which differentiates something from something else[18]. But it is important to remember here that we are in a position to tell what kind of objects would be its members, the moment we are told what the given 'set' it is. We also presume with reference to a 'set' that its member's are given to us, when we say that it is a 'non-empty set' of a particular-kind of objects. But merely because we assume them to be given in accordance with their consideration as members of 'set', it does not follow that each one of them or all of them are reals of the same-kind. Similarly it also does not follow that each one of them is an empirical-real. To maintain this would amount to what Kant calls 'making bounds of sensibility co-extensive with real'. This is the grave-mistake *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers commit, when they maintain that there is a *Jāti* called *Sattā* or (rather of) *Dravyas*, *Guṇas* and *Karmas*.

Now, understanding *Jāti* in the sense of a 'set', it can be explained extensionally and thus explained, it makes sense of the classification of *Jāti* into: (a) having wider-extension, and (b) having narrower-extension. This classification is a kind of classification of 'sets' into 'larger-sets' and 'smaller-sets', as having many or few-members. The notion of a 'set' or *Jātī* is that of a container, and it is quite-legitimate to ask how many things or objects does a given container contain. Strictly-speaking, the *Nyāya*-thinkers should have developed the notion of a *Jāti* that has either just 'one or only one member', or of a *Jāti* that has 'no member' at all. However, unfortunately, they did not. For, there are certain-confusions,

which seem to have prevented them from arriving at these notions.

Firstly, the notion of *Jāti* was not developed on purely formal-ground. Secondly, the *Jāti* was confused with *Sāmānya*[19]. We shall comment on *Nityatva* later-on. If we press *'aneka samavetatva'* and if we further stress on the term *'aneka'* in this expression, then there can be no *Sāmānya;* if there are not more than one object to which it is applicable. That is why the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers say that there is no *Sāmānya,* where there is only one-thing or object of that-kind. What they really intend to say is that in order to explain the nature of one and the only object of that-kind, we need to make use of no concept or class-name; although we may use predicates for this purpose. We are required to make use of a concept or class-name, only where we are required to explain our meaningful-expressions used with reference to objects which are more than one of that-kind. *Sāmānya,* therefore, has nothing directly to do with extension. It is a device which we employ on the level of language, and that too only in those cases where it is possible to talk-about different-objects of the same-kind in terms of the same significant-expression. Since *Sāmānya* is, thus, essentially connotative-notion, it makes no sense to apply to it the considerations which arise with reference to *Jātī* or 'set'. That is why the classification of *Sāmānya* into wider (*Para-*) and narrower (*Apara-*) is really not a classification of *Sāmānya* at all. It is not, in different-words, the classification of concept at all; rather it is a classification of objects with reference to the explanation of the nature of which we use concepts. Thus, it is wrong to maintain that *Sāmānya* is of wider or narrow-extension. Since *Sāmānya* has no extension at all, it makes no sense to talk in terms of wider or narrow extension of it.

But a question may be asked. how is *Sāmānya* inseparably-connected with anything-else? The answer is:

Sāmānya is inseparably-related with certain meaningful or significant-expressions, in the sense that the expressions which we use with reference to *Dravyas*, *Guṇas* or *Karmas* of a particular-kind, wherever there are many of that-kind, such expressions cannot be explained independently of concepts or *Sāmānyas*. Thus, here the 'inseparability' is neither an ontological-one nor an empirical-one, but a logical-one. Unfortunately this has been lost-sight of, and *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers come to maintain that *Sāmānya* is of two-kinds as *Jāti* is. On the contrary, (according to *Vaiśeṣikas*) *Sāmānya* was earlier taken to be dependent-on intellect[20]. This was later-on forgotten, and it came to be maintained that as *Jāti* is a kind of container, so too *Sāmānya* is; and depending-upon the fact whether it contains many or few-members, it is of wider or narrower-extension. The *Nyāya*-contention that *Jātis* are *Nitya* has to be understood in two different-senses, depending-upon what we mean by *Jāti*. If we mean by it *Jāti* in the sense of a 'set', in so far as there are reals (and *Dravyas*, *Guṇas* and *Karmas* are reals) that there will be *Jātis* or 'sets' is a permanent-possibility. But if we say that the consideration applies to *Sāmānya* then it means that if there is expression which can be significantly-used with reference to or as descriptive of more than one object of that-kind, then such a significant-expression being explained in terms of concepts is a permanent-possibility. One possibility is extensional, while another is intentional and logical. Thus, the statement that *Sāmānya* or *Jāti* is *Nitya*, is not to be understood on the level of actuality; but rather on the level of possibility. Yet, it is interesting to note that the intended-possibility in both the cases cannot be of the same-kind.

It is not, unless we confuse *Jātī* with *Sāmānya* that we come to maintain that *Jātibādhaka-saṁgraha*[21], given by Udayanācārya, is also *Sāmānya-bādhaka*. It is certainly confusing to maintain that one and the same-thing is a member of two-'sets' simultaneously; but it is not confusing

that a significant-expression used with reference to many-things of a particular-kind is impossible to be explained simultaneously, in terms of two or more concepts. Concepts have explanatory-value; while 'sets' have a classificatory-value. There can certainly be a 'set' of an object or a thing, which is just one and unique; although it would be quite misleading to say that such an object is simultaneously a member of more than one 'set' at a time. For, if the purpose of 'set' is classificatory, then to hold that the same-object is simultaneously-classifiable as a member of two-sets defeats the very purpose of classification. *Sāmānya*, on the contrary, is an explanatory-tool or devise, which is capable of being employed only where there are at least two-objects or things of that-kind; for what *Sāmānya* seeks to explain is the nature of a thing/object in terms of all common-characteristics through-exemplification. Hence, it is quite understandable to say that there would be no *Sāmānya*, where there is just one-object; but it does make sense to say that there is a 'set' of which there is either just 'one-member' or that it has 'no-member' at all. That is, the notions of 'unit-set' and 'empty-set' are quite-legitimate, while notions of unit-concept and empty-concept are not. But if we confuse between a 'set' and a 'concept', as *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to have done, the notions of 'unit-set' and 'empty-set' too would turn-out to be meaningless. Thus, as the confusion between *Jāti* and *Sāmānya* makes *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to treat *Sāmānya* extensionally, so too it makes them to repudiate the notions of 'empty' and 'unit-sets'. Both the considerations are ill-founded, although for different-reasons. Moreover, there is another-difference between 'sets' and 'concepts'. Some 'sets' at least can be 'empirically-given' to us, but no 'concept' is so given; although concepts may be occasioned by empirical-experience. But being 'occasioned by empirical-experience' is not tantamount to 'being-given' by it. That which is given in and through empirical-experience is analysable and

explainable in terms of it, but not that which is occasioned by it. If we are talking about empirical-objects, the 'sets' of empirical-objects is empirically-given to us. But the concepts, which we employ to explain significant-expressions that we use with reference to objects, are certainly not empirically-given to us. The *Navya-Nyāya* contention that as we are given empirical-objects empirically, so-too we are given their *Jāti* also empirically; has to be interpreted with a caution and a note of warning. If *Jāti* here is understood in the sense of a 'set', the contention holds as it is stipulated; but if *Jāti* is understood in the sense of a concept or *Sāmānya*, and this is how *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to understand it, then it has to be understood in the sense of its being occasioned by empirical-experience. In the former-case, it serves a classificatory-purpose; while as in the latter case an explanatory-one. It is methodologically-expeditious that we do not confuse between these two-considerations. To confuse between or among various-considerations is one-thing, and to maintain that what one arrives at in terms of such confusions is a road to clarity is quite another. It is this point which *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to have unfortunately missed.

(5) *Samavāya*

Let us now turn to the consideration of the fifth *Padārtha* called *Samavāya*. We have already pointed-out that *Samavāya* is such a relation, the *relata* of which are distinguishable but inseparable. This relation is given to us not empirically, but inferentially. Thus, basically it has explanatory-value. We are told that *Samavāya*-relation obtains between the *relata* of following five-pairs: (i) *Guṇa-Guṇī Saṁbandha;* (ii) *Kriyā-Kriyāvān Saṁbandha;* (iii) *Avayava-Avayavī Saṁbandha;* (iv) *Jāti-Vyakti Saṁbandha* and (v) *Viśeṣa-Nitya-Dravya Saṁbandha*.

Let us consider each one of these pairs at some-length in order to be able to point out some of the confusions that

arise with reference to *Samavāya*. It goes without saying that as *Saṁyoga* is a fundamental-relation in the *Nyāya* consideration, so too *Samavāya* is. But there is a difference. For, whereas the relation of *Saṁyoga* is a contingent-one, in the sense of being *Anitya-Saṁbandha*, the relation of *Samavāya* is a necessary-relation being a *Nitya-Saṁbandha*. We shall consider this-point at a later-stage. Before we do that let us examine the nature of the *Samavāya*-relation between the *relata* of each-one of the above-mentioned five-pairs.

(i) *Guṇa-Guṇī-Saṁbandha:* The relation between *Guṇa* and *Guṇī*, we are told, is *Samavāya*. Since nothing except *Dravya* can have *Guṇa*, the relation between *Guṇa* and *Guṇī* is essentially a relation between *Guṇa* and *Dravya*. Hence, we can say that for *Nyāya*-philosophers, the terms *Guṇī* and *Dravya* are synonymous. Be that as it may. But as we have already pointed out, each one of the *Dravya* for *Nyāya*-thinkers is not an empirical-one. Similarly each one of the *Guṇa* is not perceptible-one. This being so, where both a *Dravya* and its *Guṇa* are perceptible, and where both are given-together the inseparability between them that we talk-about is an empirical-inseparability. But consider the following alternatives: (a) a *Dravya* is empirical but its *Guṇa* is not, (b) a *Dravya* is not empirical but its *Guṇa* is, and (c) neither *Dravya* nor *Guṇa* of it is empirical.

In each one of these cases, what kind of inseparability do we entertain? The inseparability-involved may be epistemic or logical-one. But in either case it is certainly not an empirical-one. What is meant, for example, by the inseparability between *Ātmā* and *Jñāna*, or between *Kāla* and *Parimāṇa*, or between *Āp* and *Gurutva*? On consideration of such and other examples, it turns-out that what is meant by inseparability between *Dravya* and *Guṇa* is sometimes incapability to exist-independently, sometimes otherwise inconceivability, sometimes inability to explain one

independently of the other, sometimes otherwise logical-inconceivability or otherwise unthinkability; while some other times constant-contiguity. But what is important to understand is that these notions are not synonymous, and it is a grave-error to bundle them under one-head.

(ii) ***Kriyā-Kriyāvān-Saṁbandha:*** To say that the relation between *Kriyā* and *Kriyāvān* is *Samavāya* raises another problem. We shall never be in a position to say that a *Kriyāvān* depends-on *Kriyā*, in the sense that it is impossible for a *Kriyāvān* to be without *Kriyā*. The inseparability, therefore, that matters here must be understood to be arising on the level of experience only. *Kriyā*, for being explained, is inseparably-connected with *Kriyāvān*; and the notion of *Kriyāvān* is impossible to be explained unless we presuppose *Kriyā*. The inseparability between *Guṇī* and *Guṇa* at least sometimes turns around the notion of existential-inseparability, but the alleged-inseparability between *Kriyāvān* and *Kriyā* does not and perhaps even need not. Further the *Nyāya*-thinkers have not distinguished between empirical and non-empirical *Kriyā*. In addition to this, we also need to distinguish between *Kriyā* of an empirical-*Dravya* and that of non-empirical one. None of these distinctions have been made and the extent to which they are not made, the consideration remains ambiguous.

(iii) ***Avayava-Avayavī-Saṁbandha:*** The relation between *Avayava* and *Avayavī*, we are told, is *Samavāya*. The notion of *Avayavī* is that of a whole, and a distinction should have been drawn between homogeneous-wholes and heterogeneous-wholes. Further, a distinction also should have been drawn between a mechanical-whole and an organic-whole. They have confused between mechanical and organic-wholes. *Nyāya*-thinkers seem to have wrongly-presumed that all wholes are both mechanical, and heterogeneous. As a result of this, they have also confused

between an *Avayava* and an *Aṁśa* on the one-hand and between *Avayavin* and *Aṁśin* on the other. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers not only confuse between various-wholes, but also come to consider some objects as composed of *Avayavas*. That is why although it makes sense to say that '*taṁtus*' are *Avayavas* of '*paṭa*', it does not make sense to say that *Kṣaṇa* is *Avayava* of *Kāla*, or *Khaṇḍa-kāla* is a 'sub-set' of *Mahā-Kāla*. For, as we have seen earlier, *Kāla* is a concept and it does not make sense to say that a 'concept' is a' set'. Similarly, *Kāla* not at all being a 'set' or container, it is an enormous-error to maintain that *Kṣaṇa* is an *Avayava* of *Kāla*. Similar consideration would apply to *Ākāśa*. Thus, the *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers confuse between *Avayava* and a conceptual-element, and this is a grave-mistake. For, the logic of the former and that of the latter are different. Inseparability-relation between an *Avayava* and an *Avayavin*, on the contrary, can be brought-out on the plane of explanation, although existentially or ontologically there are neither *Avayavis* on the plane of *Avayavas* nor *Avayavas* on the plane of *Avayavis*; saying that as it is impossible to explain the concept of an *Avayavī* independently of the concept of an *Avayava*, so too it is impossible to explain the concept of an *Avayava* independently of the concept of an *Avayavī*.

(iv) ***Jāti-Vyakti-Saṁbandha:*** The *Samavāya*-relation between *Jāti* and *Vyakti* raises many-confusions, the prominent being confusion between *Jāti* and *Sāmānya*. If the relation-between *Vyakti* and *Sāmānya* that is under-consideration, then the inseparability (-relation) is obtainable only in the region of explanation. We shall never be in a position to say that *Vyakti* is incapable of existing independently of *Sāmānya*. But provided there are many-*Vyaktis* of a particular-kind and if we are using a significant-expression, which can be significantly used with reference to any one of them, then such a significant-expression is inseparably-related with the concept with reference to which

alone it can be explained. But then inseparability between the *Sāmānya* and the significant-expression in this case, is direct; while between *Vyakti* and the *Sāmānya* is indirect or derivative.

If, on the other-hand, what we mean by *Jāti* is a 'set', then the inseparable-relation between *Vyakti* and *Jāti* is direct; in the sense that the *Vyakti* being member of a 'set' is inseparably-related with the 'set' of which it is a member, in so far as it is a member. Thus, the inseparability that figures here is an existential and extensional-one, and not merely explanatory. This is more so if the 'set' is a 'set' of empirical-things. In addition to the difficulties of this kind, what the *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers mean by *Vyakti* being ambiguous, there are further difficulties. For, sometimes what is meant by *Vyakti* is an empirical-real, sometimes a real conducive to epistemic-reconstruction – *Jñāna* or *Sukha* or *Duḥkha;* for instance – while sometimes what is meant is a real amenable to logical-reconstruction – for example, *Saṁkhyā*. This being the case, here also various-reals are confused. We had said that we shall consider what is meant by saying that *Samavāya* is a *Nitya-Saṁbandha* of a later-stage. Even with reference to *Nityatva* of the *Samavāya*-relation, there are various-considerations which have been confused between. Sometimes '*Nitya*' means 'constant' in the sense of 'never-vanishing', sometimes 'irreducible to anything else', while sometimes 'incapable of being accounted for in terms of something else'. But sometimes it also means 'logically-necessary'. It is clear that these-considerations are not synonymous, and it is confusing to bring them under one-banner.

(v) ***Viśeṣa-Nitya-Dravya-Saṁbandha*:** The relation between *Viśeṣa-Dravya* and *Nitya-Dravya* is also said to be *Samavāya*. What is meant by *Viśeṣa-Dravya* is peculiarity or uniqueness. The *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers have not cared to

distinguish between peculiarity of various-kinds and peculiarity of various-kinds of reals. Hence, sometimes peculiarity may be empirical, sometimes epistemic, or sometimes logical. In its logical-sense its meaning would be irreducibility. But in so far as these peculiarities are different, it is confusing to consider them together. Further, what is meant by *Nitya-Dravya*, too, in different-contexts is not the same. In the case of *Aṇus* what is meant by saying that they are *Nitya* is that each one of them cannot help but be ontologically. Thus, it means ontological-*Nityatva*. But with reference to reals-conducive to epistemic or logical-reconstruction, it just means irreducibility and nothing else. In neither of these contexts has it necessarily an ontological-implication. Thus, even here it is highly-misleading and confusing to bring them under one-banner. The general-consideration behind taking each one of them as *Nitya* seems to be saying that each one of them is primitive. But even then each one of them is not primitive in exactly the same-sense, and for every-kind of reconstruction.

Thus, even regarding the *Padārtha* called *Samavāya*, reals-conducive to empirical, epistemic and logical-'reconstructions' on the one-hand, and empirical, epistemic and logical-'considerations' on the other seem to have been confused. In spite of the fact that the relation-between separable and inseparables have been correctly-distinguished, the further distinctions which should have been drawn were not drawn; and hence the confusions arise from such a failure to draw distinction.

(6) *Viśeṣa*

Let us turn to the sixth *Padārtha* called *Viśeṣa*. Much of it is already-explained in-connection with *Samavāya*. The only-point that should be specially-stressed is that peculiarity or uniqueness is a notion, which arises only when there are many entities. That is, it is only in pluralism and realism

that the consideration of peculiarity or uniqueness arises. But it will not do to assume that peculiarity or uniqueness of each one of the real is to be understood in the same-way. We must not confuse-between general-form of peculiarity, and peculiarity of a particular-object. Since peculiarity in different-contexts means different-things, it is quite-confusing to consider *Viśeṣas* of various-kinds of things in the same-way. That is the error which the *Nyāya*-thinkers seem to commit. Further, according to *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers *Nitya-Dravyas* alone have *Viśeṣas*[22] . They have not explained why a *Guṇa* or an *Anitya-Dravya* cannot have a peculiarity, although it is existent (*Sattāvān*). Similar consideration applies to *Karmas*. If all *Dravyas* are empirical-real[23] while *Guṇas* etc. are not, then it is thoroughly-misleading. Lastly, even when *Nitya-Dravyas* are taken into consideration, they too are not free-from confusion; for it is completely-misleading to consider *Aṇus*, *Ākāśa*, *Kāla*, *Ātmā* to be *Nitya* in exactly the same-way.

Perhaps what is meant by *Nityatva* of any *Nitya-Dravya* is the ultimate-irreducibility of each one of them, and peculiarity is expected to be spoken of about such ultimately-irreducible *Dravyas*. But even so considered there are troubles. Firstly, irreducibility of every so-called irreducible-*Dravya* does not mean the same-thing. Secondly, if peculiarity is connected with *Nityatva* then there is no reason why it should not have been extended even to *Sāmānyas* or *Jātis* as also to *Atyantābhāva*, which too are *Nitya*. If, on the contrary, it is a characteristic-feature of any *Dravya*, no matter whether *Nitya* or *Anitya*, then there is no reason why it should not have been extended to all *Dravyas*. If, on the other-hand, it is to be restricted only to *Nitya-Dravyas*, it is arbitrary.

(7) *Abhāva*

Lastly, let us consider the seventh *Padārtha* called *Abhāva*. *Abhāva*, we are told, is anything that is other-than six

Padārthas – starting from *Dravya*[24]. We are also told that what is meant by *Abhāva* is the same as that is meant by *Abhāvatvam*. *Abhāvatvam*, we are told, is a kind of *Svarūpa-Saṁbandha* that regulates our understanding, both regarding *Bhāva* and *Abhāva* of the kind either that something is not here or that something cannot be this[25]. We are, further, told that *Abhāva* is basically of two-kinds: (a) *Saṁsargābhāva* and (b) *Anyonyābhāva*. *Saṁsargābhāva*, again, is of three-kinds, while *Anyonyābhāva* is only of one-kind. *Saṁsargābhāva* is that in terms of which the *Pratiyogitā* in the *Pratiyogī* of it comes to be explained in terms of the relation of *Tādātmyā*. We shall not go into the methodological-technicalities here. Let us, nevertheless, bring out the format of these two-kinds of *Abhāvas* and the confusion with which they seem to have been conceived.

We have already pointed-out that *Saṁsargābhāva* is of three-kinds. They are: (a) *Prāk-abhāva* (b) *Pradhvaṁsābhāva* and (c) *Atyantābhāva*. What is meant by *Prāk-abhāva* is the non-existence of an object, prior to its emergence, e.g. non-existence of a *ghaṭa* before it is manufactured. *Pradhvaṁsābhāva*, on the contrary, is the non-existence of an object, after it is destroyed, e.g. *Abhāva* of a *ghaṭa* after it has been destroyed. *Atyantābhāva* means *Abhāva* of anything for all the time, e.g. *Abhāva* of *Rūpa* in *Vāyu*. From these considerations, it is plain that the *Saṁsarga* that is intended is between time and a particular-object. If time (i.e. moment of time) that is considered is the one that was prior to the thing being created, what we get is the first-kind of *Saṁsargābhāva*, if such a moment of time is after the thing is destroyed, then what we get is *Pradhvaṁsābhāva*; while if any moment of time that is considered then what we get is *Atyantābhāva*. The considerations that matter in the case of *Saṁsargābhāva* are primarily-empirical. That is why we are told that the consideration with regard to *Atyantābhāva*, too, must be capable of being confirmed or must in fact be the

one that is confirmed-experientially[26]. What matters is not logical-inconceivability. It is for this reason that square-circle or son of a barren-woman are not taken as instances of *Atyantābhāva*. If we do decide to take both empirical and logical-inconceivability into account, then such a kind of *Abhāva* will have to be classified as *Atyantābhava*. Logical-inconceivability is purely-formal and the *Nyāya*-thinkers do not seem to be concerned with it, at least so far as *Saṁsargābhāva* is concerned. What matters for them, in this connection, is empirical-inconceivability backed-by verification or confirmation. Perhaps, this is understandable, if we make an allowance for the fact that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers always insist-on talking in non-empty universe and their insistence on *Udāharaṇa*, as a checking-procedure or a test to consider whether one is so talking in non-empty universe or not is indicative of it. We need, however, hardly to dive-deep in such details here.

When we come to *Anyonyābhāva*, on the contrary, we notice that various-considerations are mixed-up and confused. *Anyonyābhāva* is that in terms of which we come to know that that is not that or two-objects are different. What it means is difference (*Bheda*). Now when we say that two-objects are different, various-considerations come to the foreground; according to what we mean by an object. If we are talking-about two empirical-objects, then difference between them is that which rules-out identity of them. Here *Bheda* is empirically-given as identity of two empirical-objects may be. But sometimes the objects between which we conceive *Bheda* may be epistemic or logical, or one empirical and another epistemic or logical. Furthermore, sometimes those objects the *Bheda* in which we seek to understand may be complementary of each-other. The complementary again may sometimes be given in-terms of the relation of contradiction – e.g. *ghaṭa* and *aghaṭa* – or sometimes in terms of the relation of contrariety – e. g. man and woman. But

now let us ask a question: What is it in terms of which we seek to bring-out the *Bheda* or difference between *ghaṭa* and *aghaṭa* on the one-hand, and man and woman, on the other? Certainly, not the *Bheda* that is empirically-given. Rather, we do that in terms of the consideration of logical-relation, viz. contradiction and contrariety. The difference-between *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* is a difference that is accountable in terms of logical-relation of contrariety. It is quite possible that in a given-context the contraries may turn-out to be such that both of them cannot be true, nor can both of them be false. That is, contraries may contextually-behave exactly the way contradictories may behave context-freely. That is how in such-circumstances the laws of contraries and contradictories turn-out to be the same. But this is no ground to suppose that in every-context such is the case. What is intended to be pointed-out is that our account of *Bheda* in different-contexts, even where purely logical-considerations are involved, does not remain the same; and hence it is confusing to presume that it is the same. It goes without saying that logical-considerations and empirical-considerations, in terms of which we may succeed in accounting for the *Bheda,* are certainly not the same. What has happened, unfortunately, is that *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers, it seems, have confused between them.

One more point before we close our account of *Abhāva* and a critique of it. When we say that two-expressions are different, the difference between them is in terms of significance of them; and when we say that two-expressions are different what we rule-out is not their identity but their synonymy. It makes no sense to say that two-expressions are identical, even when they mean or signify the same. Rather, what is correct to say is that the two-expressions are synonymous. Thus, the *Tādātmya*-relation, which we rule-out in terms of the difference, does not mean the same-thing in different-contexts. Sometimes it means identity of two-

things – both of which are empirical, or one of which is empirical and another epistemic, or logical, and so-forth. It is here that consideration of 'Theory of Types' comes to the foreground, and we come to reveal that *Nyāya*-thinkers seem clearly to mix-between or among various-types. In the case of two-expressions having different-meanings, what we rule-out is not identity of them; but their synonymity. *Nyāya*-contention that in terms of *Bheda* we rule-out *Tādātmya* is confusing; for *Tādātmya* sometime means 'identity', while sometimes 'synonymity'. While at other-times it means 'inclusion' as *Vedāntins* and Buddhists want it to understand. But such 'inclusion' itself can be understood in three ways: deducibility, sub-set – proper or improper – and structural-component. Except saying that these considerations are different, we need not dwell-on them any further.

Thus, under the consideration of *Abhāva*, too, various-considerations are mixed-up – empirical, epistemic and logical – and hence the considerations of the *Padārtha* called *Abhāva* are not free from confusion.

We examined each-one of the *Padārtha* accepted by *Nyāya*-thinkers, and our investigation has shown that with reference to each-one of the *Padārtha*, there is a confusion between empirical, epistemic and logical that is at the back of the consideration of it at their hands. We also argued that behind what they mean by *Padārtha*, too, there is such a confusion.

Résumé of Difficulties

Our investigation of each-one of the kind of *Padārtha* has convinced us, it is presumed, that the ground which prompted *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers to assume, *Padārthas* was not the same. They wanted to account for empirical or ontological-world, world of knowledge or epistemic-world, and the language or logical-world. In each one of such a world, the basic-question that they raise is that of

reconstruction of it in terms of primitives and relations between or among them, or operations-performed on them. Had they grasped that these reconstructions are different, they would have been in a position to sort-out different-reals in terms of which each one of such a reconstruction is to be carried out. This point, unfortunately, they seem to have missed. As a result of this, they treated all such reconstructions on-par with one-another. This happened, perhaps, because *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers wanted to embark-upon all these reconstructions-simultaneously. That a philosopher is interested-simultaneously in various-kinds of reconstructions is not a mistake. But that he fails to draw a line of demarcation between them is certainly a mistake. The frame or the scheme of *Padārthas* that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers adopted from the *Vaiśeṣika* thinkers is certainly plastic, in the sense that it could be exploited to undertake different-kinds of reconstructions. This is certainly the case as-far-as it goes. But this plasticity of the frame itself ushers-in certain-confusions, which *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers not only could not keep themselves off-from but also that they defended them at the cost of clarity.

In their entire endeavor two-main confusions can be prominently singled-out, for our present-purpose. First is to treat ontological, empirical, epistemic and logical-reconstructions alike and on-par with one-another. In terms of such confusion, we come to mix-up among frames of reference. We come to confuse between different-contexts. Such contexts may be related with each-other. But from this, it does not follow that they are the same. Even if we succeed in establishing that the form of any two-reconstructions is the same and even the form of the principles operative in each one of them is the same, from this it does not follow that one-reconstruction is deducible from the other. It would also not follow that the principles of one-reconstruction are deducible from those of the other. Such a kind of similarity

may have pragmatic or heuristic-value, which may facilitate investigation. But this in itself would neither warrant deducibility nor automatic-transition from one to the other.

Moreover, there is the confusion to treat all-primitives as part of the furniture of 'this'-world. Every reconstruction-presupposes certain-primitives. It is in terms of such primitives that any reconstruction happens to be undertaken. 'To presuppose such primitives' means 'to assume that they are given'. It is in this sense that they happen to be spoken of as 'reals'. To call them 'real' is no guarantee that all of them or some of them are empirical-reals. To be able to say that some of them are empirical or ontological-reals, we must specify another-criterion. It is such criterion that does not seem to come-forth from *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers. Merely saying that each-one of them 'is', does not and will not suffice.

The second confusion, therefore, to which *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers fall-a-pray, was to treat various-reals, in terms of which different-reconstructions could be carried-on, as parts of the future of this world. They treated all these reals on-par with one-another, and argued in terms of the frame of Platonism. It is this approach that creates 'an ontological-slum'. But this, unfortunately, is not the end of confusion. Having treated different-reconstructions on-par and having treated different reals alike, they ingeniously-devised a methodological-frame in terms of which the plastic-frame that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers accepted from *Vaiśeṣikas*, could be exploited to defend their confusions. It is such a frame that probably-blinded them, and prevented them from disentangling confused-elements. A critical-examination of the methodological-frame of the *Navya-Nyāya* is beyond the scope of this chapter, although such methodological-consideration is logically-prior to the considerations on which we have focused our attention in this chapter. We shall, however, raise some important issues regarding *Navya-Nyāya* theory in the next two chapters to follow.

The realism of the *Navya-Nyāya* not only confuses among various-frames and various-reals but also commits a category-mistake to the extent to which it maintains that reals belonging to different-reconstruction – worlds could be characterised in terms of the same-predicates. This it is in a position to maintain simply because it treats various-reals on-par with one-another, nay, in fact as forming part of the furniture of this world! Had *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers drawn some of the important-distinctions, some of which are suggested-above, they would have been in a position to avoid some important-errors to which they seem to fall-a-pray.

A Probable Defence of the *Navya-Nyāya* Theory

It may be maintained in face of the above-contention of ours that our charges that *Navya-Nyāya* theory commits the fallacy of ontological-slum, and also that it seems to blur the boundaries between empirical, epistemic and linguistic-reconstruction is a bit too-much to say. It was not the fact that the kind of distinctions we have been demanding-from *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to have been made were not seen by them, but rather that such distinctions were not required to have been made. For, what for them the significant-expressions seem to designate are not things or objects, but rather facts; and on the plane of facts to say that the world is made-up of facts and to treat all facts on-par with one-another does not at all amount to resorting to the fallacy of ontological-slum. Moreover, in such consideration not only the question of the distinction between various-kinds of reconstructions does not arise but also that the charge of blurring-frontiers between them is redundant and unwarranted. Further, to the extent to which all facts could be treated on-par, although, perhaps, to say that all of them are real amounts to resorting to Platonism, it certainly does not lead either to ontological-slum or category-mistake; which we are holding *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to have subscribed to.

Rebuttal of the Plausible-Defence

This line of defence of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is, at least *prima-facie*, certainly a very formidable-one. But the defence does not seem plausible on the following-grounds. First, this line of argument does not have the necessary-warrant and support from *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers themselves. For, they never say that they are talking-about facts rather than objects or things, as the possible *designata* of the significant-expressions. Their claim, rather, seems to be that what they are concerned with are things or objects. Secondly, if what they are talking-about are facts, it suffices to presume that facts are given. It is needless and pointless to engage in the discussion of how a particular-fact is given and on which basis it is acknowledged. Thirdly, if what are taken as the components of the world are facts, then the only considerations that would be in order by way of classification of facts would be just two-fold, namely (a) simple and compound facts, and (b) existent and non-existent facts; even if the necessary-allowance for Platonism is made. But beyond this, it would be meaningless to say that facts have *Guṇas* or *Karmas*, and many other-considerations which *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers do not wish to give-up. Fourthly, on this consideration the contention that *Padārthas* are *Vastus* tumbles-down, for no Indian philosopher has ever used the word *Vastu* in the sense of a fact. It is always used in the sense either of a thing or of an object. If *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers wanted to depart-from this contention, then there was no reason why they should not have stipulated such a different-convention; as in many other cases they have very ably done. Fifthly, to say that what *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers talk-of are facts, that makes them to depart both from commonsense and ordinary-language – both of which *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers will oppose tooth-and-nail. Lastly, in accepting the *Vaiśeṣika*-scheme of *Padārthas*, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers have never given-up the original-

purpose of that scheme – namely ontological-reconstruction. The only thing they seem to have done, exploiting its plasticity, is to generalise it in such a way that reconstruction of human-knowledge and that of the language of human significant-communication could also be undertaken on its basis. The fact that *Vaiśeṣikas* never talk-of facts, but always of things and objects, is too well-known to need a special-mention and separate-emphasis; and *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers have not departed from this. On the basis of these points, therefore, the plausible-defence of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory remains unsound and unwarranted.

A Leap Ahead

These and perhaps some more arguments go against the above-mentioned line of the defence of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. This being the case, we do not seem to be far too-wrong in holding that what *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers are talking-about are objects or things. But given this kind of distinctions we have been demanding from them too seem to be in order. Moreover, they also seem to be interested in at least three different-reconstructions. Given this and assuming that we are not totally-mistaken in holding this, our insistence that boundaries between them should have been demarcated seems, other things remaining the same, quite in-order. As against this expectation, there is also the fact that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, resorting to their Platonism, seem to have given rise to the ontological-slum on the one-hand and also blurred the line of demarcation between different-reconstructions they seem to be inclined to embark-upon on the other. This must not have happened, we trust, through sheer-contingency and mere-coincidence. These confusions they might have been led to embrace, it seems, because they developed and accepted a particular-methodology. The roots of their ontological-slum and blurring the boundaries between various-reconstructions

seem to penetrate a stratum deeper than that of treating all reals on-par and holding that different-reconstructions fit into a particular-form. Such a deeper-stratum seems to be that of their methodology and it is in their methodology, therefore, that we propose to probe in the next-chapter.

NOTES

1. *pramitiviṣayāḥ padārthāḥ/Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* of Kaṇāda with *Bhāṣya* (also known as *Padārtha-Dharma-Saṃgraha)* of Praśastapāda; Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series; Banaras; 1963; see I.1.i.
2. *abhidheyatvaṁ padārtha sāmānyalakṣaṇam/ Nyāya-Mañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (part-I); Śukla, Surya Nārāyaṇa Shastri (ed.); (2nd ed.); Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series; Varanasi; 1971; p. 7.
   Tarka-Saṁgraha of Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa (with his *Dīpikā* and Govardhana's *Nyāya-Bodhinī*); Athalye, Y.V. and Bodas, M.R. (tr. into Eng. and ed.); Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute; Pune; (2nd ed.) 1974; Pp. 2, 73.
3. *padasya arthaḥ, padena sūcitaḥ vā arthaḥ; padārthaḥ/Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya; I.1.i; Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp.2, 73.
4. For further explanation of this point, please see the next chapter.
5. The terminology into which the distinction between the two fundamental-relations is expressed I owe to Prof. S. S. Barlingay. For detailed-consideration, see his paper entitled 'Distinguishables and Separables'; *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2; 1974.
6. *jātimatvaṁ guṇavatvaṁ vā dravyasāmānya lakṣaṇam/ Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp. 4, 73-75.
7. Nine *Dravyas* accepted by *Navya-Nyāya* are: *Pṛthivī, Āp, Tejas, Vāyu, Ākāśa, Dik, Kāla Ātmā, and Manas. Ibid;* p. 3.
8. *sarva mūrta dravya saṁyogitvaṁ vibhūtvam/ Tarka-Saṁgraha;* p.11.
9. *bahirindriya-grāhya viṣeṣaguṇavatvam/ Vaiśeṣika-Sutra;* I.1.17. *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* of Viśvanātha-Nyāya-Pañcānana; Bibliotheca Indica; Calcutta;1850; Pp.23-33.
10. *sarvādhāraḥ kālaḥ /Sarva kārya nimitta kāraṇam / Tarka-Saṁgraha;* p.11, 129.
11. *dravya-karma bhinnatve sati sāmānyavān guṇaḥ / Ibid;* p. 5, 81-87.
12. *saṁyogabhinnatve sati saṁyoga asamavāyī kāraṇam / Bhāṣā-pariccheda;* 23. *Tarka-Saṁgraha;* p.5
13. *mūrtāmutra saṁavayitvaṁ karma / Vaiśeṣika-Sutra;* see I.1.17.
14. It is generally held that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers do not accept *Sattā* as a *Jātī* of *Dravya, Guṇa* and *Karma.* But against this, our

contention is that this is not strictly and universally the case. Moreover, even those *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, who do not expressly state that they accept it, have, nevertheless, utilized such examples which are in testimony of their acceptance of it. Lastly, although some *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers did attempt to repudiate *Sattātva* of *Dravya*, *Guṇa* and *Karma*, this attempt did not seem to have gathered general-acceptance and universal-recommendation. Hence, for our purpose, we shall continue to hold universal non-rejection of it, at their hands. It is on this ground and basis that we are trying to make a point that it gives rise to confusion.

15. For further explanation of it, see the next chapter.
16. *ekatve sati aneka samāvāyitvam / Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp. 6, 90
17. *Samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ/ Nyāya-Sūtras;* see 2-2-71.
18. *Yat ca keṣāñcit bhedaṁ kutaḥcit bhedaṁ karoti tat .... jātiḥ/-* N.B. 2-2-71.
19. Which is defined as *nityatve sati aneka samāvāyitvam/ Tarka-Saṁgraha;* p.61
20. *Buddhi-apekṣam/ Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras;* see I-ii-3.
21. *'Jātibādhaka saṁgraha';* Udayanācārya; *Kiraṇāvalī; mentioned in the Tarka-Saṁgraha;* p.92; *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies;* Potter, Karl (ed.); Vol.-I; Motilal Banarsidass; Delhi;1970; p.45.
22. *nitya-dravya-vṛttayaḥ viśeṣaḥ / Tarka-Saṁgraha;* p.6.
23. What is meant by saying *'nitya-dravya-vṛttayaḥ viśeṣaḥ/' Tarka-Saṁgraha* with *Dīpikā;* Pp.6, 96-99.
24. *dravyādi ṣatka anyaḥ/ Nyāya-Kośa;* Jhalkikar, Bhimacarya; The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute; Poona; (2nd ed.); 1893; p. 369.
25. *idaṁ iha nāsti, idaṁ na bhavati, ityādi pratīti niyāmakaḥ bhāvābhāva sādharaṇaḥ svarūpa saṁbandha viśeṣaḥ/ Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya; I.1.i; Bhāṣā-pariccheda;* p. 23
26. *nāsti iti anubhavasiddhaḥ nityasaṁbandhaḥ atyantābhāvaḥ/ Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp.99-103.

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Chapter-2

A Critical Reapraisal of The *Navya-Nyaya* Methodology

This chapter, as mentioned towards the end of the preceding-chapter, aims at a critical re-appraisal of the methodology, adopted by the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers. It is directed also at a critical-consideration of its format. This is proposed to be undertaken with a view to explain and elaborate the foundation of their methodology on the one-hand and to make, on the other-hand, explicit some of the confusions it is beset with. The *Navya-Nyāya* methodology is intended to be critically-investigated, because it is this methodological-perspective that is the spinal-cord of their realism. Exposition of the fallacies in their methodology, it is hoped, will also help us to see how the methodological-confusions lend-support to the fallacies of their realism is wrought-with.[1]

Statement of the Problem

The realism of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers is rooted-in their taking-over of the plastic-scheme of *Padārthas* from *Vaiśeṣika*-philosophers. It is the plasticity of this scheme that helped them to undertake in-all four different-kinds of reconstructions – ontological, empirical, epistemic and logical. These different-reconstructions certainly do not aim at reconstructing the same-world. The ontological-reconstruction they undertake is directed at reconstructing the ontological-world out of the ultimate ontological-

components of it. The empirical-reconstruction is aimed at reconstructing empirical-world. The epistemic-reconstruction is a reconstruction of human-knowledge, no matter whether such knowledge is derived by-acquaintance or by-description; while logical-reconstruction is directed at reconstructing-language along with its mode of signification. These various-reconstructions that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers propose to undertake are neither arranged in logical nor in chronological-order. In fact, this is needless to be done expressly, because all of these reconstructions are proposed by them to be undertaken-simultaneously. To facilitate these reconstructions they posit various-types of reals. Plainly-speaking, they hold that there are not only those reals which would facilitate ontological-reconstruction like *Aṇus* of *Pṛthivī*, *Āp*, *Tejas* and *Vāyu*; reals amenable to empirical-reconstruction – namely reals like *ghaṭa*, *paṭa*, *taṅtu*, *kulāla*; or reals amenable to epistemic-reconstruction – viz. reals like *Ātmā*, *Manas*, *Sāmānyas*, etc. but also reals which a logical-reconstruction would presuppose – viz. reals like *Ākāśa*, *Kāla*, *Dik*, *Saṁkhyā* etc. Each one of these reals is a kind of irreducible, although irreducibility in different-contexts has to be understood-differently. Further among the reals facilitative of ontological, empirical, epistemic and logical-reconstructions, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to hold, a need to presuppose one-directional-relation such that in this series every later presupposes the former, but not necessarily the *vice-versa*. Are these reals, it may be asked, as a matter of fact reals according to *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers? If so, is the word 'real' understood-univocally or equivocally. Whatever the case may be. But the various-reals *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers speak-of are at-least those that they make use-of, in different-reconstructions they envisage to undertake. This means that it may not necessarily be the case that, according to them, there really are these four-kinds of reals as a matter of fact. But it may also be the case that they might

be using the word 'real' not univocally but equivocally. It goes without saying, however, that all of them are ultimate-irreducibles of one or the other-kind on the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. Be that as it may. To the extent to which *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers propose to undertake four different-kinds of reconstructions in terms of these different kinds of reals, they should have really talked in-terms of four different-worlds. But that would have raised the problems of inter-relation between or among them. Whatever the reason may be, they, however, talk in-terms of one-world. As a result of this, although they are in a position to avoid that kind of Platonism, according to which different-kinds of reals belong to different-worlds, they nevertheless resort to, nay, they are forced to resort to, that kind of Platonism, at least, according to which all reals are part of the furniture of this and the same-world. Although this raises an enormous-problem of defending and explaining inter-relation among the reals, yet over-looking this, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers hold this position-steadfastly. It is this endeavour on their part that does in fact lead them to embrace two-fallacies – 'Platonism', and 'Ontological-slum'.

However, such broad-based realism of the *Navya-Nyāya* is backed-by the methodology that is adopted by *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers. Such methodology serves two-important purposes – that of explaining and elaborating the realism adopted by them as their philosophic-position, and of defending it against the attacks it suffered when they came to confront with the followers of the other schools of philosophy that grew in India. But the point of importance to be considered, however, is that the methodology they adopted serves the important-purpose of backing the naive-realism they propagated. The question that arises in this connection is: how does the methodology serve this purpose? It is this problem that is proposed to be investigated in this

chapter. Along with this, there is also a problem of elaborately bringing-out pit-falls in their methodology.

In Defence of the *Navya-Nyāya* and its Answer

It may, nevertheless, be argued in defence of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers that realistic-postulates may justify a convergence of several, not all, reconstructions. Perhaps it may. Such in fact seems also to be the contention of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers. It is, nevertheless, important to remember that such a convergence may be a matter of contingency and accident. In such a case from the fact of such a convergence the intended-consequence that the reconstructions under-consideration must converge and cannot help converging, would not follow. What we are trying to urge is not that two or more-reconstructions must never converge-upon each-other. Far from it. Our only-plea is the convergence of two or more-reconstructions cannot be merely a matter of presupposition. Nor can such convergence be held to be established on the basis of the presupposition that either the 'form' of two-reconstructions is the same or similar, or that the 'methodology' to be employed in them is the same. That such in fact is the case has to be established independently-of such a presupposition. Having established this, presuppositions of the above-kind will reinforce the point. It is an enquiry of this sort and endeavour of this kind that seems not to be forthcoming from *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers and it is this, we think invites the kind of inquiry we propose to undertake. What we seek to do is to enquire: what might have led the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to hold the view which they do seem to be holding, and whether and how-far they might have been right in their so being led.

Relation between a *Pada* and a *Padārtha*

Whatever kind of real we may be talking-about, every significant-expression that we use with reference-to it is, according to *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, descriptively-

informative of it. This being the case, every significant-expression, according to them, supplies-information about that real of which it is informative. But the information any significant-expression supplies, according to them, is always complex. What is meant by saying this is that it is composed of many information-elements or units. It is this kind of situation that raises one pertinent-question: how are we to connect various informative-elements of the complex-information that any significant-expression furnishes in such a way that we shall be in a position to get that information, which the significant-expression furnishes? The significant-expressions are, thus, according to *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, simultaneously-connected with two-things: (a) the reals of which they are informative, and (b) the complex-information they furnish. The significant-expressions are in this-way the bridge-between the reals on the one-hand, and the information they furnish on the other. This is how the *Nyāya*-contention that what they endeavour to do is to consider the relation-between *Pada* and *Padārtha*, needs to be understood. Here what *Pada* stands-for is significant-expressions, while what *Padārtha* stands-for is either any one of the *Padārtha* out the seven-*Padārthas* (understood either in the sense of kinds of reals, or in the sense of reals), or significance of the significant-expression – meaning thereby the information it supplies. It is further equally-important to note that according to *Navya-Nyāya* any-real that we are capable of cognising – through acquaintance or through description – is always complex; such that its components are at least distinguishable, if not separable too. This has enormous-implications in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, but more about it later.

A Classification of *Padārthas*

In order to be able to understand-fully the significance of the methodology *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers adopted, we

need to take a fresh-look at the classification of *Padārthas* they gave. All the seven-*Padārthas*, according to them, fall readily into two-classes. Under the class of *Bhāva-rūpa-Padārthas* fall first-six *Padārthas* starting from *Dravya*, while under the *Abhāva-rūpa-Padārthas* comes only one *Padārtha* called *Abhāva*. Although this is said to be a classification of *Padārthas*, yet really-speaking, it amounts directly to be a classification of predicates – into positive or affirmative, and negative. Any significant-expression does supply information, such information is complex too. But if we ask a question: how does a significant-expression supply the information, it does? Then the *Nyāya* answer seems to be that it predicatively-supplies the information. Again, how does it predicatively-supply the information? The answer is in terms of affirmative or negative-predicates. The expression *Bhāva-rūpa-Padārtha* means an expression the significance of which is to be determined in terms of affirmative-predication, while the term *Abhāva-rūpa-Padārtha* should be taken to mean that expression the significance of which is to be determined in terms of negative-predication. *Bhāva-rūpa* and *Abhāva-rūpa-Padārthas*, it seems, does not amount to classification of things which are and which are not; similarly it also does not amount to be a classification of 'reals' into those which are and those which are not. In fact to talk in terms of 'a real that is not' is a contradiction. Further when *Nyāya*-philosophers talk of *ghaṭābhāva*, they are certainly not talking of *ghaṭābhāva* that is not, i.e. *ghaṭābhāva* that is not real. They are also not talking-about any *ghaṭa* that never was, is or will be. The expression *ghaṭābhāva* is a negative-predicate, and just as in terms of affirmative-predicates the nature of a real could be brought-out similarly in terms of negative-predicates too. Affirmative as well as negative-predicates are, thus, equally proper-candidates to be employed in bringing-out the nature of any real. This seems to be the general-purport of the *Nyāya* classification of *Padārthas* into *Bhāva-rūpa* and *Abhāva-rūpa-Padārthas*.

The classification of *Padārthas* into *Bhāva-rūpa* and *Abhāva-rūpa* can be understood, it seems, in yet another-way, too. Even-if we are talking-about statements, which we employ to descriptively bring-out the nature of things or objects in which either affirmative of negative-predicates are employed, they seem to fall readily into two-classes: affirmative-statements and negative-statements. Thus, on the one-hand the above-mentioned classification of *Padārthas* gives us a classification of predicates, while on the other hand that of statements. Something of this kind also seems to be implied by *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers. It is seldom, however, that this point is made. Ordinarily when the expressions under-consideration are attempted to be explained such explanation gives us impression that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers are classifying reals into existent and non-existent. But this is certainly misleading to say the least. It could be read as a classification of facts into affirmative and negative ones. But that would engender the other confusions, some of which were mentioned in the previous chapter. We need not probe in this point in any further details here.

A Methodological Model

The information that significant-expressions furnish is always, on the *Navya-Nyāya* view, predicative. If the information they supply as well as those about which they supply information are to be understood, then, on the *Navya-Nyāya* view, expressions, information and those about which expressions give information must be seen through a particular methodological-perspective. The general methodological-model that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers adopt is known as *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model. Roughly-speaking, *Ādhāra* means substratum or basis, while *Ādheya* means that which is on a substratum or basis. The *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model is as plastic as the scheme of *Padārthas* to which it is molded. As the scheme of *Padārthas* can be used to undertake ontological,

empirical, epistemic or logical-reconstruction; so too the *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model can be profitably-used in the three different-frames of reference – cognitive, explanatory and justificatory.

Let us turn to the cognitive-frame. If we cognise that there is a *ghaṭa* on *bhūtala,* then in such a cognition *bhūtala* on which we perceive *ghaṭa* is the *Ādhāra;* while the *ghaṭa* which we perceive on *bhūtala* is the *Ādheya*. If we cognise *nīla-ghaṭa,* then in such a case *ghaṭa* is the *Ādhāra;* while *nīla-rūpa* is the *Ādheya*. If, however, we cognise a *ghaṭa,* then in such a cognition of *ghaṭa* is the *Ādhāra;* while *ghaṭatva* is the *Ādheya*. Whatever it may be that we cognise and where ever we may cognise it, fits, on the *Nyāya*-view, into the *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model. From these examples it will become clear, it is presumed, that what is *Ādhāra* in one cognitive-situation may become an *Ādheya* in another; and *vice-verse*. Thus, *ghaṭa* that is *Ādheya* in '*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*' becomes *Ādhāra* in '*nīla- ghaṭaḥ*'. But one-thing we must note very-carefully. That is, in a given-situation nothing can be both *Ādhāra* and *Adheya* with reference to the same-thing. Hence, something may be an *Ādheya* with reference to one-thing, but an *Ādhāra* with reference to another. Consider, for instance, the example of a book that is on a table; which, in turn, is on the ground. Here the ground is the *Ādhāra* of the table; but the table which is on the ground is the *Ādheya* with reference to the ground, nonetheless the table is itself an *Ādhāra* with reference to the book that is on it. Even though every-real is either *Ādhāra* or *Ādheya,* there are no reals that are permanently either *Ādhāra* or *Ādheya*.

There are few-exceptions to the contention we have put-forward in the last-sentence of the preceding-paragraph. They may be enlisted as: *Paramāṇus* of *Pṛthivī, Āp, Tejas* and *Vāyu, Kāla* and *Atyantābhāva* (in one of its important-consideration) are always *Ādhāra;* while a *Guṇa,* a *Karma,* a

Sāmānya etc. cannot be *Ādhāra* alone; for each one of them at least is an *Adheya*. For the present-purpose we need not take these nuances so seriously, since they do not go contrary to the general-point we are making here. The contention generally applies to any *Utpanna-vastu*.

Even when we turn to the explanatory-frame, the mode of the application of the *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model does not undergo-change. The context of explanatory-frame arises, when we seek to explain either one of the two-things: (a) what kind of information does a given significant-expression furnish? And (b) what is it about which a significant-expression furnishes an information? The answer to the first-question is that the information-supplied by any significant-expression is predicative in nature. Any predicate that we consider, no matter whether affirmative or negative, is always a predicate of something. That of which it is a predicate, provided it is a genuine-predicate, has to be pre-supposed. It is something like Aristotle saying 'to be A' presupposes 'to be'. It is in such a context that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers posit various-kinds of reals conducive to different-reconstructions, which their realism so marvelously accommodates. It is not only this-consideration that is behind positing so many-reals. In addition to this, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers also presuppose 'name theory of meaning' with the conviction that 'every name is to be understood denotatively'. Not only is that to which predicate applies has to be presupposed, but also the predicate itself. What every predicate, nevertheless, does, is that it brings-out a particular-aspect of the nature of the subject. The way it does, will become clear as we proceed. Thus, in bringing-out the information that a significant-expression furnishes, we are required to explain the relation of predication-between a predicate and that of which it is a predicate. But beyond this, we are also required to connect with each-other or one-another, the different informative-elements of the complex-

information that a significant-expression is supposed to furnish. In both these attempts, explanation proceeds in accordance with the *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model. When we bring-out the predicative-relation between predicate and subject, it is the subject that is *Ādhāra;* while predicate is *Ādheya.* When, on the contrary, we link different information-elements, that element with which another informative-element comes to be connected is to count as *Ādhāra.* That about which any information happens to be given may, *prima-facie,* be any one of the *Padārtha;* but in the last-analysis it is *Dravya* that is *Ādhāra* and any other *Padārtha* is *Ādheya.* The reason of this-contention will become clear later. What is important to be considered here is that as in cognitive-frame the *Ādhāra-Ādheya,* as a methodological-model, has a significant-role to play, so too in the explanatory-frame.

We not only are required to utilise the *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model, according to the *Navya-Nyāya* consideration, in order to explain cognition and the information any significant-expression furnishes or is supposed to furnish; but also to justify that such-and-such is in fact the nature of the object, which either we cognise or about which some descriptive-information is supposed to be conveyed through significant-expressions. For instance, if we want to explain – rather justify – why the given-thing is a *ghaṭa,* we would have to say that it is a *ghaṭa* because it is a thing circumscribed by the *Sāmānya* called *ghaṭatva;* where the thing – viz. *ghaṭa* – is the *Ādhāra,* while *ghaṭatva* is the *Adheya.* This point, too, we need not consider in any further-details here.

As the scheme of *Padārthas,* exploiting its plasticity, when applied to the four different-kinds of reconstructions – ontological, empirical, epistemic and logical – gives rise to confusions; similarly, the *Ādhāra-Adheya* model used in the three different-frames – cognitive, explanatory and justificatory – engenders confusions. Whereas the fallacies

that arise out of the first endeavour are of Platonism and creation of an ontological-slum, those that arise out of the second-attempt are of confusing-between 'order of knowing' and 'order of being' on the one-hand; and of confusing-between 'order of cognition or cognitive-order' and 'order of justification or justificatory-order' on the other. Of these the fallacies of realism, we have already considered in the proceeding-chapter, while those of priority we shall deal with in the sixth-chapter.

The *Navya-Nyāya* Presuppositions

Granting, then, that the general-frame of the information that a significant-expression furnishes, according to the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, is always predicative; the *Nyāya* strategy always has been of justifying a given-predicate. For, once it is granted that an expression is significant and once it is conceded that the information that significant-expression furnishes is reliable, the question that crops-up is: what kind of information does a given significant-expression furnish and how do we gather the reliable-information? Such justification of a predicate is in order, because unless one is resorting to a particular methodological-frame, it is not possible to bring-out what information does a given-predicate, give us. Before stipulating a particular methodological-frame, the question of its reliability will just not arise. And after the reliability-issue has been settled, independently of the methodological-model and the justificatory-frame, the only legitimate-approach is to seek to justify a given-predicate. This is precisely what *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers undertake to do. Their approach, therefore, is that of justifying a predicate that figures in a significant-expression; and not of a critique of predication, (which was) the approach adopted by Nāgārjuna and Śaṁkara to select just two prominent-representatives of this-camp.

In spite of the fact that the *Navya-Nyāya* effort is directed at justifying a predicate, to make this effort-successful in addition to the methodological-model of *Ādhāra* and *Ādheya* that it employs, it makes certain-presumptions each one of which is not only unwarranted, but also is the one that engenders confusions. The presumptions are:

1. In the last-analysis it is *Dravya* that is the object of predication. Every genuine-predicate is, thus, considered, in the final-analysis, to be a predicate of a *Dravya*. The view that we are considering is analogous to the view that 'every-predicate or attribute is of a substance'. But while making this-point in this-way we must always be cautious to bear two-considerations in mind: (a) what we are calling a 'predicate' is a rough-synonym of the *Nyāya* term '*Dharma*'. This being the case, we should never slip-into saying that 'a predicate is the same as an attribute'. (b) Similarly, we must remember that the *Nyāya* term '*Dravya*' cannot legitimately be translated by the term 'substance'. The point that is made-above, nevertheless, is directed at bringing-out the analogue of the view that was once held by some Western-philosophers[2]. But *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers go a step-ahead in their contention. Their view is not only that every *Dravya* is real, but is a separable-real; although it is not an empirical-real. This presumption has very serious-implications. One of them is that every genuine-predicate is ultimately a predicate of a separable-real and is descriptive of its nature. A close and critical-examination of the various-*Dravyas* acknowledged by the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, however, will convince anybody that this contention is thoroughly-unwarranted. For, even-if it is maintained that every real is separable, provided either spatial, or temporal or both spatial and temporal-limit of it could be spoken, such specification of a limit in this-way too does not proceed in exactly the

same-way with different separable-reals they make use of.

2. The *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers further presume that the grammatical and the logical-form of every genuine-predicate to be the same. We shall soon see that the presumption on their part is a serious-mistake. It will become clear, it is presumed, that although in some cases the grammatical and the logical-form of an expression are isomorphic with each-other, it is slippery to maintain that such is the case in every instance of a grammatical-expression that we encounter.
3. Thirdly, the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers presume, it seems that various informatory-elements of the complex-information that any significant-expression makes available could be connected with one-another exactly in the way logical or linguistic-elements could be connected. That is, the relation-between or among them is extensional. If this contention is to stand, then first we shall have to establish that informational-elements can justifiably be connected with one-another in this-way. Just on the basis of presumption, we shall not be in a position to maintain that such is the case.
4. There is one more profound-presupposition that the *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers employ in their methodology. They seem to presume that the complex-information that any significant-expression furnishes and the object, about which it is information, are, roughly-speaking, isomorphic with each-other. That is, complexity of information and complexity of an object are isomorphic with each-other. This, being the case, it is in terms of the employment of the same methodological-model and same-scheme of *Padārthas*, reconstruction of the complex-information will pave-way for our comprehension of the similarly complex-nature of an object about which such

complex-information is supplied with the help of appropriate significant-expression/s. Here again the *Navya-Nyāya* contention slips, it seems, into an erroneous-view. We do not classify objects into simple and compound or complex, on the basis of what kind of information is furnished about them. That is, we do not say that an object is complex, provided we get complex-information about it; nor do we say that an object is simple, if we get simple-information about it. In order to be able to maintain this, we shall have to independently-establish that it is impossible to get a complex-information about a simple-object.

Lastly, to be able to maintain that complexity of an information and of an object is isomorphic with each-other, we shall have to establish that in-fact such is the case. Thus, it is only in terms of the fulfillment of a satisfactory-criterion that we shall be in a position to hold this view. Here, again, it is no use merely to presume that such is the case. Even the fact that this presumption works will not be a full-proof-guarantee for its acceptability.

The Motto

The general-strategy of the justification of a predicate that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers employ is further backed-by the motto – *pratītiśaraṇaḥ naiyāyikaḥ/*, which means that various-considerations that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers put-forward are those which would be ordinarily-accepted. We have already pointed-out that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers are simultaneously-interested in four different-reconstructions. Each one of such a reconstruction is to be undertaken in terms of the commonly-accepted conventions in that reconstruction. But the *'Pratīti'*, on the basis of which we are to undertake a reconstruction, does not mean the same in the context of each-reconstruction. *'Pratīti'* in-general means 'a mode of (something) being clear or intelligible'. Or

differently, *Pratīti* may be taken to mean 'the mode of something being given to us'. But, although the *Pratīti* in terms of which we are to undertake any-reconstruction is of a great-importance to it, yet it is not the same *Pratīti* that counts in every-reconstruction. Thus, for anyone of the four-kinds of reconstructions *Pratīti* matters, but it is preposterous to presume that the same-type of *Pratīti* matters. What *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to have confused is 'sameness of kind' with 'sameness of type'. We shall argue this point in-different but similar-context later. At present it suffices to note that although every-reconstruction would be undertaken in ordinary-way, yet the mode of undertaking one-reconstruction in ordinary-way is not of the same-'type' of undertaking another reconstruction in ordinary-way.

It is, nevertheless, the case that each one of them is called *Pratīti*. Mere concentration on the common-noun and saying that since in any-reconstruction *Pratīti* matters; one may easily slip-into saying that since in any-reconstruction *Pratīti* matters, there should be the same-'kind' of *Pratīti* that accounts for any-reconstruction and hence all *Pratītis* are of the same-'type'. To say this is nothing short of confusion. It is not saying that *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers did maintain that what matters is the same-'type' of *Pratīti* in every-reconstruction. I do, however, wish to say that they over-concentrated on the genuine-feature of *Pratīti*, if any. For, if this were not the case, they should have given us criterion or criteria of distinguishing-between various-*Pratītis* that matter/s for various-reconstructions. This unfortunately they did not. What they presumed is that for every-reconstruction *Pratīti* matters; but they coupled this with the neglect of distinguishing-between various-*Pratītis*. It is this kind of situation, it is presumed, gives rise to confusion.

As *Pratītis* that figure in the context of different-reconstructions are differents, similarly a *Pratīti* that figures

in the context of one-reconstruction has at least three important-considerations about it; taking into consideration why do we want to employ *Pratīti*? Investigations of this-kind will lead to the problems that would arise either in cognitive/genetic, explanatory or justificatory epistemology. Although these problems are important, investigations into them fall-outside the scope of this inquiry. We want, however, to hint that to answer the questions: what sort of object is the given-object? What kind of nature does it have? What sort of information does the given significant-expression furnish? How shall we be in a position to justify it? saying of such a kind, such-and-such a nature, such-and-such information and this is how we are in a position to justify it respectively on the one-hand, and to answer, if asked: why so? Saying because this is how people ordinarily do, lead to serious-misunderstanding. For, ordinary-modes of doing all these are certainly not explainable on the basis that they plausibly fit-into the same or at least similar-'form'.

Leaving aside these problems about *Pratīti* it remains, nevertheless, the case that *Navya-Naiyāyikas* understand by *Pratīti* an ordinary-mode of our being given the reals that matters for various-reconstructions. Similarly, the way of undertaking each-one of such reconstruction is the ordinary-mode of undertaking it. However, as reconstruction of ontological, empirical, epistemological and logical-worlds are different, even if it is argued, that each-one of them is to be undertaken in ordinary-way, and that too in terms of the reals given to us ordinarily, it would be preposterous to claim that ordinary-mode of undertaking each-one of these reconstructions is the same. If we are to say that these reconstructions are mutually-reducible to one another, this must be done independently of the claim that any one of them is to be undertaken in ordinary-way. Moreover, such inter-reducibility of various-reconstructions cannot just be a matter of assumption. Similarly, if we are to claim that the

reals, in terms of which we are to undertake different-reconstructions, are on-par with one-another, it cannot be on the consideration that each-one of them is given to us ordinarily. The *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers could say that various-reals are on-par, on the basis of their realism leaning in the direction of 'Platonism' and 'Ontological-slum'. But the reason that leads them to argue that not only various-reals are on-par but also that various-reconstructions are on-par, is their over-concentration on the linguistic-form of an expression. We shall consider this point in further details below.

General Form of Statements and its Four Contexts

We have indicated-above that whatever kind of real we are talking-about, such a talk, according to the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, turns-out to be predicative in nature. Any statement, thus, on their view, turns-out to be 'S-P form' of statement. It is further sought to be maintained that any 'S-P form' of statement is indicative and descriptive. The 'Subject' is that which are sought to be described or indicated, while 'Predicate' is the description of its nature. The *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers not only maintain that every significant-statement is of 'S-P form', but also that every significant-expression too is a 'condensed-statement' and that too is of an 'S-P form'. This is how that '*ghaṭaḥ*' means '*ghaṭatvāvacchinna (vastu)*', is to be understood. Be that as it may. But, even if this view of the nature of statements and significant-expressions is accepted, yet we must never overlook the distinction between context/s within which 'S-P frame' could be profitably-employed; and yet that too is not necessarily in the same-sense. We shall distinguish here four such contexts, which are:

i. Ontologically-speaking, subject of 'S-P type' of statement would turn-out to be a 'substance' in the language of Western Philosophy, while in the language of *Nyāya* it

would be a '*Dharmī*'. 'Predicate' in this context would be a 'nominative', or other kind of predicate; or in the language of *Nyāya* it would be a '*Dharma*'. In such a context 'subject' must be an 'ontological-real', the 'predicate' being not necessarily an 'ontological-real'. This kind of understanding would safe-guard '*Ādhāra-Ādheya* model', which the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers make so much capital about.

ii. In the context of epistemology, irrespective of the distinction between cognitive, explanatory and justificatory-epistemology, 'subject', in the primary-sense, shall always mean the 'person' who cognises, explains or justifies, while 'predicate' itself will be, interestingly enough a 'combination of both subject and predicate'; where 'subject' would mean 'that which is cognised, explained or justified', while 'predicate' would mean 'that what is cognised, explained or justified of it'. Actually in epistemology, the 'person who knows alone is the subject', while 'everything else is object'. In the object-part itself, there are both 'S' and 'P'; but this 'S' is non-epistemic 'S'. It would be disastrous, nevertheless, to equate it with 'ontological or logical-subject'. Even a clue that it can be equated with 'grammatical-subject' cannot be taken as driving-in the direction of solution of the problem. We are not, however, trying to maintain that epistemology necessarily-requires a 'subject'. There can indeed be 'an epistemology, without knowing subject'. But, if anyone insists that epistemology does require a subject, then this contention, it seems to us, is advanced as a sort of a tool of drawing a distinction between 'logical and epistemological-contexts' by endeavoring to draw a line of demarcation between 'statements and assertions'. We cannot afford to discuss this point here in any further detail.

iii. In the context of ordinary-language and grammar,

'subject' would be that which is a 'grammatical-subject' and 'predicate' would be that which is a 'grammatical-predicate'. It is important to note, however, that 'grammatical-subject' is neither co-extensive necessarily with 'ontological-subject (i.e. substance)' nor with 'epistemological-subject (i.e. knower)'. Even when 'grammatical-predicate' is said to be in nominative, accusative or in any other-case, it has nothing to do with what kind of an object it is of which it is a predicate. For a 'grammatical-case' means a mode of relation of 'one-noun or pronoun' with 'another-noun or pronoun'. Although we use various-*Vibhaktis* (cases) to indicate various-*Kārakas*, yet what is meant by a '*Kāraka* is a relation of a noun with a verb'. Concentration on both *Vibhaktis* and *Kārakas*, it seems, creates an important-issue. But a detailed-consideration of it falls outside the scope of this chapter. What is important to remember, however, is that as 'grammatical-subject' is neither co-extensive with 'ontological-subject' nor with 'epistemic-subject', so too 'grammatical-predicate' is not co-extensive with 'logical-predicate'.

iv. In the context of logic, too, we make a distinction-between 'Subject' and 'Predicate', assuming of course that a logical-statement is of 'S-P form'. Obviously in such a context, 'subject is a logical-subject' and 'predicate is a logical-predicate'. Any expression is a logical 'subject' or 'predicate', if it turns out to be so in the language of 'Predicate Logic'. Logical-subject as well as logical-predicate may not be and often are not co-extensive with grammatical-predicate. This being the case, every case of grammatical-subject or predicate is not a case of logical-subject or predicate.

Problems that Crop-up

Given these different-contexts of using subject and

predicate, as it would be misleading to maintain that subjects that figure in various-contexts are of the same-kind, similarly it is confusing to argue that predicates that figure in different-contexts are of the same-nature. Further, although perhaps it would be proper to say that every logical-subject is also a grammatical-subject, though not conversely – it is preposterous to maintain that every grammatical-predicate is also a logical-predicate. Even if grammatical and logical-subjects are treated on-par, this in itself does not necessarily have an implication that a grammatical or logical-subject is either an ontological, epistemic, empirical, or even a logical-real. For, a claim in terms of a grammatical or logical-subject is not and cannot be a claim in terms of what kind of real it is. For, a grammatical or logical-subject may not stand-for any-real at all, and hence the question: what kind of real does it stand-for is simply out of consideration.

But as grammatical as well as logical subjects do not necessarily lead to any commitment about any-kind of real, similarly saying that a particular-expression is a grammatical-predicate does not necessarily drive to the commitment that it is also a logical-predicate. Logical 'predicate' being that alone, which figures in the language of the 'First Order Predicate Logic'. Any predicate that is a grammatical-predicate but fails to figure in the language of the 'First Order Predicate Logic' shall not be counted as a 'Logical-Predicate' at all. Some logical-predicates may be grammatical-predicates, but every grammatical-predicate is not necessarily a logical-predicate at all. In fact, saying that it is, itself leads to some undesirable consequences. But more of it later.

This being the case, even if we start with the assumption that every significant-expression is informative, and it is predicatively-informative; yet from this (assumption) only two implications-follow. They are: (i) 'every significant-

expression is informative about something or the other'; and (ii) 'various statements, no matter whether explicit or condensed, are essentially of 'S-P form'. But even if an allowance to both these implications is made, it neither has an implication of saying that subject is indicative of some kind of real, nor also does it have an implication that various-predicates are on-par.

However, to say that every significant-statement is of 'S-P form' commits one, *prima-facie*, to hold the view that given any-statement two-parts of it are discernible – subject-part and predicate-part. Since this distinction is to be made and is intended to be made on the plane of language, the clue to make such a distinction obviously should arise from the consideration of language. To put it differently, the clue must be linguistic. It is such a clue that is supplied when it is said that subject is that about which something is said, and predicate is that which is said about a subject. But as mere saying something does not necessarily have realistic-implications, so too saying that subject is that about which something is said does not necessarily have any realistic-implication. In spite of this, saying that every significant statement is of 'S-P form' brings out one important-consideration about any statement, and that is: every-statement has the same-form, and hence the 'mode of connecting predicate in it with the subject of it' is the same.

Degenerate-Sentences

Concentrating on the 'form' of any subject-predicate proposition and assuming that any significant-statement is predicatively-informative, it may be presumed to say that a statement is of 'S-P form', what is required is the consideration of the 'form of a statement'. It should be possible to discern, it may be argued, on the plane of language, subject from predicate. This would turn-out to be a plausible-argument, assuming that every statement is of

'S-P form'. But, one may ask, what about significant-expressions, like 'words' or 'phrases'? For, whereas statements like '*ghaṭaḥ asti*' are clearly of 'S-P form', what about such expressions as '*ghaṭaḥ*' or '*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*'. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers hold throughout that even such expressions as '*ghaṭaḥ*' or '*bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*' too are of 'S-P form'. This is what is meant when they tell us, for example, that what we should understand by '*ghaṭaḥ*' is '*ghaṭatvāvacchinna (vastu)*'. To bring-out the 'S-P form' of the expression under-consideration, it should better be read as '*ghaṭaḥ ghaṭatvāvacchinna (vastu asti)*'. The syntax of Sanskrit-language allows omission of the 'declension-forms of the verb' '*as*', which means 'to be' or 'to exist'. This is evident even on the basis of an elementary-knowledge of the language. The expanded-expression means: *ghaṭa* is an object that is qualified by *ghaṭatva*. This clarification is obviously an answer to the question: what sort of (object) is *ghaṭa*? Be that as it may. What it brings out, nevertheless, is their contention that even such expressions as '*ghaṭaḥ*' too are of 'S-P form'. For, what *ghaṭaḥ* is syntactically equivalent to is '*ghaṭaḥ asti*', which is a full-fledged 'S-P kind of sentence'. They hold this view, because any significant-expression, according to them, is a 'condensed' or an 'enthymematic', or what Wittgenstein calls a 'degenerate-statement'; and since every statement is of 'S-P form', such condensed or enthymematic-statements, too, are of 'S-P form'. Thus, it turns-out that on the *Navya-Nyāya* contention every-statement or an expression is of 'S.P form'. The only difference that needs to be considered is that whereas some statements are fully-expressed 'S-P statements', nevertheless others, of the nature of words or phrases, are condensed; but of 'S-P form'. Moreover, complete as well as such degenerate-sentences are alike descriptively-informative. The thrust of this point will become clear, as we pass-on.

Three Further Considerations

All these considerations serve to bring-out the bent of the *Navya-Nyāya* methodology. Now, to this view that every statement is of 'S-P form', and in such a statement 'P' is always predicatively-descriptive of 'S'; add two further considerations: (a) subject of any 'S-P type' of statement is always denotative of some or the other real. Remember that this alone does not and cannot specify what 'type' of real it is; but it, however, does bring-out that real it is. If a question is asked: how is one to decide 'what kind of real it is'? Then the answer would be that it is that kind of real, the kind of reconstruction it helps us in undertaking. Further, such a philosopher may contend that it turns-out to be that kind of real, the way and the particular-context in which we assume it to be given to us. Thus, the question: 'what kind of real it is' and 'the mode of its being given to us', are different-kinds of questions. On the view we are considering subject of every statement does stand for some or the other real, although mere consideration of subject of a statement is unable to tell us what type of real it would stands for. The question about the 'type' of that would arise on a different-plane. That is a question that would be important, if we want to classify either reals, or we want to distinguish one-'type' of reals from another 'type'.

(b) Another consideration that needs to be added is that, *prime-facie* at least, there is no difference between grammatical and logical-predicates. What we are trying to maintain is not that there is no difference between grammatical and logical-predicates. We are, rather, saying that the *Navya-Nyāya* does not seem to acknowledge the distinction-between them. It seems to take every predicate to be equally-genuinely a logical-predicate. The reason that may be brought-forward for such a move is that every logical-predicate is a grammatical-predicate. (This is true. But, in

the heart-of-hearts, it is the converse of this contention that the view under-consideration intends to add.) Hence, it may be argued, as it is legitimate to ask: whether a logical-predicate is nominative or otherwise, similarly it is equally-legitimate to classify grammatical-predicates in this way. This is certainly a mistake. For, the criterion of a logical-predicate and that of a grammatical-predicate are not the same. Logical-predicate is a predicate that is retained or is retainable in the language of Predicate Logic; while grammatical-predicate is considered to be so purely on grammatical-considerations. But forgetting this distinction, it comes now to be maintained that since any predicate is a grammatical-predicate any predicate that is retainable, on whatever plane it may be so retainable, must be so purely in terms of the consideration of the fact that it is a grammatical-predicate. It is needless to point-out that this line of thought paves a way for horrible and unsurmountable-confusion/s.

But these are not the only considerations. Add to these also the consideration that a predicate is not just a grammatical or a logical-predicate, but the one that describes the nature of the real denoted by the subject. The real that is denoted by a subject, it may be argued, may be the one that is either separable or distinguishable. For, given reals which various subjects can denote, and no expression, in principle, is free-from being used as a subject; there are only two-relations that remain obtainable between them, viz. separability and distinguishability. The question whether both these relations are equally-primitive or whether one of them is reducible to the other, is important one. The *Navya-Nyāya* reply to this question is that both of them are equally-primitive. This reply of the *Navya-Nyāya* is of course bit-confusing. What separability boils down to is divisibility or separability 'in order of being'; while what distinguishability means is what Aristotle calls 'separability in-thought'. Thus understood, we would be in a position to segregate two-

things from each-other 'in order of being', provided they are separable. But we will be in a position to discern two-items in thought, provided they are distinguishable. If one is talking of two-domains simultaneously – the domain of ontology and of epistemology – then one would require both separability as well as distinguishability. But even if one holds that all reals are on-par with one-another, one would require both separability as well as distinguishability, because they are not inter-definable. This is further so because any two of the reals so conceived are certainly not separable from each-other, although distinguishable certainly they are. But mere distinguishability does not warrant separability in order of being, nor separability in order of being is a criterion of distinguishability. Their non-inter-definability springs, however, from the fact that the two notions – rather two-relations – owe their allegiance to two different-domains. It is this fact that seems to be not taken a serious-notice of by *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, in spite of the fact that they are considered under two different-kinds of *Padārthas*. The *Navya-Nyāya* contention, therefore, that distinguishables and separables are equally-primitive, it raises the question whether both separable and distinguishable reals are primitive. We shall briefly answer this question in the next chapter. We shall also investigate into the grounds of this contention of the *Navya-Nyāya* in the next chapter. For the present suffice it to note that for *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers whatever may be the real that is denoted by a subject, and predicate of a statement describes the nature of the real denoted by subject; and hence the general-form of any significant-statement is a 'Subject-Predicate form'. Further, since subject-term always denotes a real and since it is a contradiction to say that a real does not exist, the only course that we are left with regarding any predicate – no matter affirmative or negative – is of justifying it. It is assumed here that the predicate is significant. It is

only on this assumption that the question of justifying it arises, a non-significant predicate being incapable of being justified. But, given that we are talking about significant-discourse, the point was not made quite at the outset. It goes without saying that it is this strategy that the *Navya-Nyāya* adopts.

Some Remarks about Separables and Distinguishables

It may be argued that the *Navya-Nyāya* distinction-between *Saṁyoga* and *Samavāya* as two equally fundamental-relations is very-profound, and the *relata* of these two-relations are of two different-kinds, viz. separables and distinguishable. Distinguishable-reals as well as separable-reals are reals. But the distinction proposes to institute a classification of reals into two-kinds: (a) those reals which exist independently, and (b) those reals which exist dependently. Even if this is maintained, it turns-out to be misleading. For, how are we to understand independence? And how are we, similarly, to understand dependence? A skepticism about this distinction may not be fact-challenging, but warrant-challenging-skepticism is certainly tenable. If what we are to mean by 'independent' is that it is 'irreducible', then even irreducibility understood in different-contexts is not the same. If, on the contrary, it is argued that what is meant by 'independent' is that it is something concrete that is given to us empirically, then the consideration turns-out to be too stringent and restrictive – at least in so far as the frame of *Navya-Nyāya* position is concerned. It may however, further be argued that *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers are right in intuiting and instituting the distinction. This distinction must have been suggested to them only by the consideration of that kind of separables that are given to us as something concrete-empirically. Where they went wrong is in the 'application of the distinction'. This might be the case. But it could equally be the case that they really wanted

to talk in terms of so-many 'types of reals', and given so-many types of reals as those that are denoted by various-names that occur as subjects of any 'S-P type' of statement, they might have thought that the only two relations-between them could be specified, viz. separability and distinguishability, irrespective of the context within which and the 'type of real' with regard to which we use any predicate as descriptive of its nature. This is not of course to hold that the distinction-between separability and distinguishability is context-free. Rather, it is context-dependent. The contexts on which they are dependent, or by which the notions are respectively governed have already been pointed-out above. If one is to argue that such a loose-way of instituting the distinction demands a loose-criterion, one is quite-right. Such a loose-criterion of separability would be – 'anything is separable, provided either spatial or temporal, or both spatial and temporal-limit of it could be specified'. It is this loose-criterion, flexible as it is, makes an allowance for the contention of *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers that not only two-ontological or two-empirical but also that an ontological and an empirical, reals are separable. It would be wrong to argue that it is with the same-plausibility that we apply spatio-temporal considerations to each-one of these types of reals. But in defence of what *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers actually do, it may be said, therefore, that it may not be the case that their insight into the distinction that was confused, but rather its application. This might be the case. But even if it were the case the distinction under-consideration does not, as it will become apparent in the next-chapter, stand under all circumstances. Hence, the line of argument that seeks to defend the *Navya-Nyāya* contention may maintain that the position that intends to consider relations between or among all reals, irrespective of the distinction of 'types' to which they belong, in this way, might have gone wrong in applying the distinction. But it is equally-plausible to maintain that

Navya-Nyāya philosophers not only wrongly-applied the distinction, but also that they wrongly-conceived it; except physical-things which alone are separable in the real sense of the term. One who presumes that all objects or things are real, does not and need not necessarily presume that all of them are given in the same-context and on the same-plane. But even granting this, he may maintain that the reason as to why those that are called separables, out of the totality of reals, in various-contexts are uniformly the same; and the same-criterion is applicable to each one of them in exactly the same-way. But, unfortunately, even in this contention such a philosopher is not free-from being wrong. We shall investigate the issue of separables and distinguishables in further-details in the next chapter.

Additional Remarks about 'S-P Form'

Returning to the *Navya-Nyāya* contention that every-statement is of 'S-P form', it needs to be pointed-out that predicate in the *Navya-Nyāya* consideration is never understood as a predicate in First Order Predicate Logic. Thus, *'ghaṭaḥ'* understood as *'ghaṭatvāvacchinna (vastu)'* cannot be symbolised as 'Gx', but as 'GRs'. For, according to *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, there is a certain-bond, tie or relation-between subject and predicate. Hence, every-predicate that the *Navya-Nyāya* understands is related to its subject by a certain-relation. The subject is always some-substantive or nominative that is either separable-real or a distinguishable-real. But, the predicate is always a distinguishable-real, except where it is a nominative-predicate. It is also envisaged to be maintained that in the last-resort every-predicate is of some or the other type of separable-real. When *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers maintain that *Dravya* is *Ādhāra* and anything else is *Adheya*, the expression *Dravya* is intended to mean a separable-real. Even so understood, it leads to certain-troubles. But a more

detailed-consideration of them will be undertaken in the sixth chapter. Actually the distinction between separables and distinguishables should have been applied only to the reals, and even so, as explained-earlier, it causes sufficient-tensions in the *Navya-Nyāya* explanation. But, unfortunately, the distinction was applied to *Padārthas*, understood in the sense of 'kinds' or 'types' of reals. It is in doing this, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers commit a mistake of confusing-between distinguishables and separables. For, kinds or types are distinguishables alone; they are not separable from one-another. The very distinction that was brought-forward as a road to clarity, being blurred and confused, takes the wicket of clarity itself. We shall argue more about such points in the ninth chapter.

Even though every-predicate is thus relationally-applied, yet whatever the type of real may be, the mode, it is presumed, in which predicate is applied to any substantive is the same, viz. '∅Rx' where '∅' stands for any-predicate, 'R' stands for any-relation and 'x' stands-for any-substantive; no matter whether it is a separable or a distinguishable-real. Concentrating on the general-form of any significant-expression or statement that is to be understood predicatively, and on the *Navya-Nyāya* view there is no exception to this, it came to be maintained that any real-predicate is to be applied in the same-way. Hence, in the above-mentioned '∅Rx' form of expression, if we retain both '∅' as well as 'R' and substitute 'X' by 'Y' or 'Z' for 'V', the relation would remain the same. Going by form alone, this seems plausible. But, there are two very important-problems, and they are:

(a) Reals are of two kinds, viz. separables and distinguishable, and (b) each-one of these two kinds of reals is further of various-types. Since different-separables, not to talk of distinguishables, are of different-types, it is improper

to maintain that predicate of each-one of them is to be understood in the same-way; and is to be made applicable in exactly the same-way. Let us make ourselves further clear, even at the cost of a little-digression, least we are likely to be misunderstood. Although *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers take *Dravyas* alone to be separables, to be able to take them as genuinely-separables, they should have been of the same-type. But unfortunately such does not seem to be the case.

Anything is taken to be a separable-real, as pointed out earlier, provided a spatial or temporal, or both spatial as well as temporal-limit can be spoken of about it, no matter literally, analogically or even metaphorically. This is what leads them to count *Pṛthivī, Āp, Ākāśa, Kāla, Ātmā* etc. as alike-separables. What we have been arguing, on the contrary, is that although all of them are called 'separables', and in calling them to be so, there is a category-mistake. It is in the sense that in so far as physical, epistemic, ontological-entities are bundled-together as falling-under one-type; for while physical-entities along are separable, epistemic or logical-entities are distinguishable only. Further, even on the *Navya-Nyāya* consideration itself distinguishable-reals are of different-types. We may not accept the types accepted by them. But it seems that we too should not be unable to hold that distinguishable-entities are of two-kinds – epistemic and logical or linguistic. This is what we wanted to hint-at in our statement that separable as well as distinguishable-reals are of different-types. It goes without saying that the former of these is a misnomer, and such a contention can be defended only if we mix-up between distinguishable and separable-reals, as *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to be doing, while the latter seems to have a tenable-basis. Enough of this digression. If we are to concentrate just on the form, even if we are using x, y, z, u to stand-for different-type of reals – irrespective of the distinction between separables and distinguishables – and since '∅Rx' '∅Ry' '∅Rz' etc., logically

speaking, make no difference, it is but natural to argue that not only x, y, z, u etc. are on-par as variables, but also the reals they stand-for. Further, as '∅Rx' '∅Ry' etc. are logically on-par, so too, ΨRx, ΨRy etc. too, logically-speaking, are on-par. Hence, it is also quite natural to concentrate on the form of an expression. For someone to put-forward the view that no matter what 'type' of or 'kind' of real, and no matter what kind of relation, and no matter what kind of predicate, the mode of the applicability of the predicate is universally the same. It is this kind of consideration that led *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, it seems, to treat all-types separables or distinguishables on-par, forgetting of course that even qua-separables or distinguishables they are of different-'types'; although of the same-'kind'.

We may, at this juncture of our inquiry, point-out that while 'kind' may bring within its fold entities of different-'types', a 'type' cannot do so; for to do so would be a category-mistake. Thus, a classification in terms of 'kinds' can be horizontal as well as vertical, 'type'-classification is always horizontal; meaning thereby embracing entities of the same-'type'. Hence, consideration in terms of a 'kind' is a loose-one, while that which arises in terms a 'type' is a strong-one. But precisely that is why every-'type' is a 'kind', but not conversely. In so-far-as *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers equate 'kind' with 'type', they confuse that which arises in terms of loose and strong-consideration. 'Kind' is a weaker-notion, while 'type' is a stronger-one. Separables equated with *Dravyas* can fall under one-'kind' but *Dravyas* can fall under one category, if one equates 'kind' with 'type'. Category must be specified in terms of 'types' and not in terms of 'kinds'. In so far as *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers pull various-'types' of separables just under one-category, they indulge into what may be called a 'category-mistake'. But they also pull both distinguishables as well as separables under the *Padārtha*

called *Dravya*. We shall examine the reason of this, in the sixth chapter.

Consideration of Form as the Basis of Realism and Platonism

However, concentration on the formal-aspect of the predicative-expression does not give rise to this fallacy alone. Categories, basically-speaking, are distinguishables; although reals characterised as belonging to the same-category may be separables. Distinguishables again may be of one 'kind', but may be of different 'types'. To treat various-distinguishables on-par is also a 'category-mistake'. But graver-still, if we, for some-reason or the other, treat distinguishables as separables, this leads to a horrible-kind of 'category-mistake'.

It is concentration on the 'form' of predicative-expressions that made *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers treat all distinguishables alike. It is again the concentration on form, in terms of which distinguishables and separables happen to be taken-alike, as occupying subject-place standing for a substantive, leads them to take all-reals alike and as parts of the furniture of this-world. Thus, formal-considerations not only help them as defense, explanation and justification of their realism, but also gave them the instrument of defending, elaborating and justifying not only their 'Platonism' but also the 'ontological-slum' that they uphold.

Our contention in the preceding-paragraph, if it is not to generate-misunderstanding, invites a point by way of clarification. What we want to maintain is not that we involve ourselves into a 'category-mistake', if we pool all-substantives under one-type or category. This would be the case, nevertheless, provided every substantive stands-for a genuine-substance; in the sense that it is part of the furniture of the genuine-world and not of the Platonic-world; as *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to understand. What expressions

occurring in subject-place designate in the *Nyāya*-theory are separables as well as distinguishables, substances as well as quasi and even pseudo-substances, alike reals which are amenable ontological, epistemic and logical-reconstructions. It is this-situation that is embarrassing, and it is this kind of situation, according to us, leads or seems to lead *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to embrace the fallacy of category-mistake. One important-reason of it is to have confusion-between 'substantivity' and 'substantiality'.

Hints about Further Questions

We must take a note of warning here. Although such formal-considerations help *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to defend their realism methodologically, yet the methodology that they adopt itself is beset with some confusions. Such confusions, to reiterate them, are of confusing-between different-'kinds of subjects' and different-'kinds of predicates' on the one-hand, and of confusing-between 'kind' and 'type' on the other. Apart from this, in their elaboration, explanation and justification, there is also a confusion-between context of discovery, explanation and justification on the one-hand, and a confusion-between different-kinds of priorities. We shall dwell on these confusions in the fifth and sixth chapters, respectively. But it is such methodological-bias that again leads them to commit fallacies of 'category-mistake', and confuse one consideration with another. It is very interesting to note that the methodology they adopted and utilized was suggested to them by the consideration of the linguistic-expressions as they are given in an ordinary-language. Wrong-clues from ordinary-language led *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to adopt incorrect-methodology, and it is this incorrect-methodology that serves as a powerful-instrument of the defence of their realism. Which clues did *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers gather from linguistic-consideration? How did these clues suggest the

methodological-considerations that they did adopt and utilise? It is to the consideration of these problems that we turn in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. The fallacies that realism of the *Navya-Nyāya* gives rise to, are discussed in the previous chapter.
2. *Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp.76-78. Though all traditions use the word *Dravya* (generally translated as substance) the meaning of it differs at the hands of each one of them. It is interesting to inquire into it, however, it goes beyond the scope of present discussion.

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Chapter-3

Language As a Clue to Philosophical Inquiry

Introduction

In this chapter, I propose to analyse the *Navya-Nyāya* attempt to raise and answer certain philosophical-problems. It is by taking-clues from language, it seems, that it raises those problems. It is, again, its attempt to keep as close as possible to the linguistic-considerations that have shaped, perhaps, the answers it gives to the problems it raises. It will be argued that it is clues from language that makes the *Navya-Nyāya* attempt hold two commitments: one arising out of *Vibhaktis*, and another arising out of *Kārakas*. As a larger-consideration arising out of this, two problems will be raised: (i) how far, if at all, language can be used as a clue to philosophical-inquiry? And (ii) where and how was the *Navya-Nyāya* attempt mistaken, and what confusions does it give rise to?

Out of the two sets of questions, we propose to discuss concentrating first on the questions that arise in the larger-considerations. Later on we shall turn to the problems that arise out of the *Navya-Nyāya* concentration on *Vibhaktis* and *Kārakas*. For the order of considering these questions will bring out, it is hoped, such connection between these two-sets of questions that consideration of the former-question serves as a general-background of the consideration of the latter question.

Word-World Relationship: Scientific and Philosophical Approaches

There always has been a considerable-tension between scientific and philosophical-considerations, each-one of which is directed at establishing certain-kind of correlation-between facts on the one-hand and expressions in language on the other. For wherever we use language meaningfully, we always use it to communicate something about the facts. This purpose any significant-language is expected to serve, and (conversely) in so-far-as it serves this purpose that it comes to be considered as significant. But, given a language, we shall not be in position to say that this purpose has been fulfilled (each and every time). This is how there arises a problem: given that there is a language, what is it by which or how shall we show that it is significant? This is a problem that confronts both philosophers and scientists. Yet, the mode in which both of them show this, are remarkably so different from each-other that any attempt of bringing any-kind of correlation between them creates a tension.

A scientist would maintain that an expression is significant, which can be correlated with a fact/s that we already know, or a fact/s that we are supposed to know. In this endeavour, therefore, 'facts are primary'; significance of an expression is a consequence, following-from its being correlated with a fact known-already. Thus, this attempt proceeds or attempts to proceed in the direction of tailoring expressions to facts, and thereby establishing their meaningfulness. A philosophic-endeavour, on the other-hand, starts from 'primacy of language'– in one or the other sense. This being the case, a philosopher will try his best to invent a fact, if necessary, that can be correlated with an expression in language; provided it is to be taken as significant. Thus, the philosophic-endeavour attempts to tailor facts to significant-expressions in language.

In the first-attempt, the direction of correlation that is attempted to be established is from discovered-facts to significant-expressions. In the second-attempt, on the contrary, the direction of correlation-between facts and significant-expressions that is attempted to be brought about is from significant-expressions to either (already) discovered or invented-facts. Each of such an attempt takes hold of one clue – either a clue from discovered-facts to significant-expressions, or a clue from significant-expressions to discovered-facts or invented-facts – and seeks to bring-out and explain correlation-between facts and language. The first attempt leads to naive-scientific-realism, whereas the second leads to a naive-philosophic-realism. Each-one of them uses a mono-directional-criterion that brings-about and explains correlation between facts and language.

But then, it may be asked, where is the difference between them? In so-far-as each-one of them uses some – one or the other – mono-directional-criterion of bringing-about and explaining correlation-between facts and significant-expressions, each-one of them is guilty of a similar-mistake. The objection that we are considering rests on a confusion. The confusion is based-upon the 'similar' and the 'same'. The only similarity between both these positions is that each-one of them uses a mono-directional-criterion of establishing a correlation-between facts and significant-expressions. But the mono-directional-criterion employed is not the same. For, scientific-naive-realism what is primary is (already) discovered-fact; while significant-expression becomes significant in so far as it can be correlated with such a discovered-fact. On the contrary, for a philosophic-naive-realism an expression is significant primarily, and that it is significant can be explained by correlating it with either a 'discovered-fact/s' or an 'invented-fact/s'. It is only in the case that either discovery or an invention of a fact that can be correlated with the given-expression is blocked by certain

considerations. That a naive-philosophic-realist will come to maintain that a given expression is non-significant one. Nevertheless it is important to note that for a naive-philosophic-realist the fact that comes to be correlated with significant-expression need not necessarily be a discovered-fact. He would consider it to be too-stringent a requirement to stipulate and explain any significant-expression as significant.

It is precisely in this that lies the tension between philosophic and scientific endeavour. Philosophic-endeavour, by its very nature, turns in the direction of 'proliferation of facts', being bent-upon showing that so-many expressions are significant as-many-as it maximally could be allowed in terms of either discovered or invented-facts being correlated-with them. The scientific-endeavour, on the contrary, will attempt at 'minimization of significant-expressions'. Hence, what a philosopher starts from is what a scientist will challenge as too-wide. On the contrary, what a scientist starts with will be challenged by a philosopher as something too-narrow. This is what we have called-above as tension-between scientific and philosophic-endeavour.

One point needs to be clarified at this juncture of our investigation before we proceed any further, least a certain-misunderstanding would ensue. By the kind of policy scientific-naive-realism seeks to pursue it may turn-out to be as accommodative of common-sense as possible; not challenging, by-and-large, any common-sensical thesis about facts, and yet in face of a glaring and fundamental-differences it would uphold those to be facts which prevalent-scientific-opinion would be prepared to accept. But philosophical-naive-realism not only accepts everything of what common-sense accepts but may, and often has tended to, enlarge the domain of facts accepted by common-sense. Such an enlargement of the domain of the common-sensical-facts

philosophical-naive-realism may undertake for various reasons, which we need hardly to investigate here. But one of the principle-motive might be an attempt to try to make the ordinary-language sensible and significant. It is this fact which is of importance in our present-investigation.

Whether it is naive-philosophic-realism or naive-scientific-realism, it has to pay the price for the fact that each-one of them uses a particular mono-directional mode of bringing-about correlation between facts and significant-expressions. None of them is in a position to draw a line of demarcation between cognition, explanation and justification. For, no one is in a position to distinguish between them, unless he has a clue of establishing correlation not only from facts to expressions but also from expressions to facts. But in so-far-as scientific and philosophic-naive-realism has maximally only-one clue at its disposal, which is mono-directional, it cannot give rise to bi-directional-clue; and in so-far-as such bi-directional-clue does not come forth it is impossible to distinguish-between context of discovery, context of explanation and context of justification. Scientific-naive-realism is unable to do this, for on the plane of facts alone these distinctions cannot be made; while philosophic-naive-realism cannot institute these distinctions, for they do not arise only on the plane of language. Thus, scientific as-well-as philosophic-naive-realism give rise to similar vagueness and ambiguity, but due to different reasons.

There is one more difference, nevertheless, between these two-positions. Scientific-naive-realism does not lead to Platonism; but philosophic-naive-realism not only is prone to Platonism of one or the other-kind, but it also sometimes leads to such horrible-Platonism that makes it accept what may be called 'ontological-slum'. This is the gravest-kind of confusion. The *Navya-Nyāya* realism is guilty precisely of this mistake. As a corollary of this distinction between scientific-

naive-realism and philosophic-naive-realism, there arises another difference between them. Scientific-naive-realism may maximally-confuse between empirical and ontological-reals; whereas philosophic-naive-realism may not-only confuse between empirical and ontological-reals, but-also among ontological, empirical, epistemic and logical-reals without any (kind of) discrimination. Thus, philosophic-naive-realism has a preponderance-over scientific-naive-realism in its capacity to engender confusions, and making the situation worse-confounded.

Name-Theory of Meaning

Forgetting this or due to the failure of taking note of this, a naive-realist-philosopher may consider that the best-field to take-clues for a philosophical-inquiry is that of an ordinary-language. Such a naive-realist-philosopher would be prepared to accept what can be called as a 'name-theory of meaning'. The consideration that is at the back of this theory is the 'model of proper-names', which are used as names of objects or individuals of which they are names. It may be argued that any proper-name is significant, for it names an individual. Generalizing from this clue, one may come to maintain that every significant-expression in language is a name of something. Such generalisation may be turned into an assumption that every significant-expression in language as a matter of fact does name something, and it is a job of a philosopher to find-out what it is that is named by a significant-expression. The gamut of proper-names may so come to be enlarged that not-only names of persons and animals are treated as proper-names, but-also names of qualities or adjectives, and names of relations too, and what not. Thus, on the view under-consideration, the expression "proper-names" is so vastly-generic that it accommodates ordinary-proper-names, logical-proper-names, demonstrative-symbols, as also of

adjectival and relational proper-names. Such a name, again, may be a name of a real, imagined, quasi- or even pseudo-real entity.

Such a theory has to introduce a distinction-between an expression and a significant-expression. If a significant-expression is taken to be a significant-name in accordance with the name-theory of meaning, then it has to introduce a distinction-between a name and a significant-name. One may, of course, confuse between the two – but simply because one accepts naive-philosophic-realism, one need not necessarily confuse-between them. What it has to assume, however, is that every significant-expression or a name names something. For, it is significant-expressions alone that name, and every expression, in so far as it does not turn-out to be significant, is not a significant-expression. A naive-realist starts, nonetheless, with the assumption that every expression is significant. It is starting from such an assumption that he attempts either to discover or invent that which is named by it. If his effort succeeds, then his assumption stands. Otherwise a particular name turns-out to be a name that names nothing. To the extent to which this can be allowed, even naive-philosophical-realism accepts that there are some names that in-fact do-not name anything, and hence are not names properly so-called. Considered in this way, some names would turn-out to be meaningless. For this reason he would just-eliminate such names from his language, but with regard to the remainder otherwise he would accept, in general, the equivalence between a name and a significant-name.

Every name, however, considered in this way, names something outside it; and since language is nothing short of 'cluster of names', on this view, these names are names of something outside this cluster. Obviously, on this position, every name in-language names something outside-language.

Thus, whereas naive-philosophic-realism leaves no-room for 'nominalism' of any-sort, it at the same-time ushers in a confusion-between 'naming' and 'naming something outside-language'. For naive-philosophic-realism, 'naming' and 'naming something outside-language' are synonymous-expressions.

Such a position is also unable to sort-out two further-confusions that it may inadvertently-allow to-pass under the banner of truism. They are: (i) as it does not introduce a distinction-between a 'mentioned-name' and a 'name-used to name', it comes to equate these two-kinds of names; and argue that each-one of these names name. And (ii) it similarly fails to make a distinction-between 'a name that does as a matter of fact name' and 'a name that is presumed to name something'. It is without doing-away with these confusions that it argues that every name or an expression names either discovered or invented-fact that is correlated with it.

When we maintain that *Navya-Nyāya* advocates 'name theory of meaning', as a background of its realism, it is not intended to argue that it does embrace these confusions. The fact remains, however, that it does not, unfortunately, provide us with an adequate-apparatus with the help of which we shall be in a position to get-over these confusions. Be that as it may. Taking a clue from proper-names, it may be argued that as meaning of proper-name is the object-denoted or referred to by it; similarly in so-far-as every significant-expression, understanding it as a name that names, is on-par with proper-name and its meaning is what is denoted or referred to by it. Thus, on this view, every significant-expression is to be denotatively-understood. As a name it names its denotation, while as a significant-expression it denotes it. This may further be extended into contention that every denotation (at least) is to be understood substantively, if not substantially as well. This is what the

Navya-Nyāya is forced to commit to, by its methodology. This will become clear as we proceed.

Then, it may be asked: which expression is to be taken as not naming anything at all? In answer to it, it is argued that only those expressions which do not name properly, whose *denotatum* is impossible to obtain even inventively. Thus, any expression, acceptance of the *denotatum* of which leads us to embrace contradiction or impossibility, alone does not name anything. Such an expression alone is meaningless. The language of *Navya-Nyāya*, however, shall not allow such expressions to significantly-occur in it. Consider for instance such expressions as *Kha-puṣpa, Vandhyā-putra*, Square-circle, five-sided-tangle as also *Rūpa* of *Vāyu, Gurutva* of *Ātmā* etc. Rest every expression is presumed to be naming something. Hence, such an expression has denotation and that's why it is significant. Rather, it is because it has denotation due to which it is significant.

Every name, thus, stands-for an object that it names and every significant-name cannot help naming some or the other object. Restricting to significant-discourse, it comes to be maintained that on the level of language we have names that name; while in the world we have *denotata* that are named by them. Thus, taking a clue from proper-names and understanding every expression that is significant on-par with proper-names, we have cluster of names on the one-hand and cluster of *denotata* denoted or named by them on the-other. If these *denotata* are taken as real, they being taken as substantives, we have (consequently) cluster of reals.

Let us proceed to consider what further clues we get about these reals. Given that language is, thus, a cluster of names, the problem that arises is: what relations can we envisage between 'nouns' and 'names'? On the level of language and grammer, the problem is: how shall we bring-out relation of a noun with another noun? Since pronouns

are used in place of nouns, the question becomes still a general one: how shall we state relation of a noun or pronoun with another noun or pronoun? This question is answered on the level of grammer and language in terms of a grammatical-case. Grammatical-case relates one-noun with another one. But, it at the same-time also brings-out differentiation-between them. Thus, a grammatical-case on the one-hand relates one-noun with another noun/pronoun, and yet differentiates-between them on the other-hand. It is for this reason, perhaps, that grammatical-cases are called as *Vibhaktis* in Sanskrit. But when we use *Vibhaktis* to differentiate one-noun from the other, the question is purely on the level of language and grammar. However, correspondingly, it raises also an issue about the *denotata* of names or nouns. If language is taken as a totality of names and if the problem on the level of language is of differentiating between names, then taking world to be a totality of *denotata* denoted by names (the problem is) how do we differentiate between different-*denotata* denoted by various-names? If *denotata* are equated with substantives, then the question is: how do we differentiate-between various-substantives? And further, if substantives are equated with reals, however, equating-substantives with *denotata* denoted by significant-expressions, while named by names; then the problem is: how shall we differentiate-between different-reals? And moreover, if we can classify-nouns on the level of language and grammar, according to the kind of objects they name into proper-nouns, common-nouns etc. then similarly we should also be in a position to classify-reals that are named by names. The problem that thus arises is: how shall we classify-reals? The *Navya-Nyāya* answer is that reals fall readily into two-classes: separables and distinguishables. Let us not forget that the reason why the *Navya-Nyāya* maintains that all of these reals are in this world, is because each-one of them is named by a certain

name and all such reals that are named are outside-language in which there are names that name these reals.

If a question is asked: why are all these reals held as belonging to the same-world? The answer, in terms of and in consistency-with the theory we are attempting to explain, is very simple. As the significant-expressions or names which name various reals belong to the same-language, similarly the reals belong to the same-world outside-language. The contention is perfectly and completely-realistic in approach. Here there is a confusion both on the side of language, as also on the side of the real-world. On the former-side the contention seems to over-look the fact of strata of languages, and different significant-expressions figuring-appropriately on such different-strata. Correspondingly, on the latter-side, there is a confusion-between something being substantive, substantial and real; as also a confusion-between an object and a thing. We need hardly, however, to probe further into these problems here.

If a question is asked to the *Navya-Nyāya*: why there are these two-classes of reals; then its answer will be, because separables are related by the relation called *Saṁyoga*, while distinguishables are related with one-another by the relation of *Samavāya*. This is how these two-relations turn-out to be primitive and their *relata* as different-kinds of reals. In terms of these relations, they turn-out to be separables and distinguishables respectively. It is the assumption that all these reals are in this-world that leads to the 'ontological-slum' advocated by the *Navya-Nyāya*. It also leads the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to confuse-between reals amenable to ontological, empirical, epistemic and logical-reconstructions. But we hardly need to dwell on this point here.

Verbs and Anthropocentricism as well as Action-centricism

Just as language has nouns so too it has verbs. It is a verb that makes sense of a sentence complete. Although

sometimes omission of a verb is permitted, we cannot afford to omit verb every time. Further, it is only the syntactical-structure of some languages, like Sanskrit, that omission of a verb is allowed. But, even when where a verb is permissibly-omitted, we are required to supply the missing-verb to bring-out the full-implication of the sense of a sentence or a statement. This is not an important-consideration for us for the present. Granted that there are verbs, the problem that arises is: can noun/s be connected with verb/s, as they can be connected with (other) noun/s? The answer is affirmative. As *Vibhaktis* are devices used to connect a noun with another-noun, *Kārakas* are devices to connect nouns with verbs. Thus, just as through *Vibhaktis*/ grammatical cases we not only connect one-noun with another, but also differentiate-between them; similarly through *Kārakas* we not only connect a noun with a verb but also differentiate-between them.

Every verb of language, it may be argued, stands for a certain action. This is especially the case at least with regard to transitive-verbs. We have seen that a clue from *Vibhaktis* that connect nouns with nouns leads to a philosophical-problem of connecting one-real with another. This clue also leads to another problem of classification of reals. In the same-way a clue from *Kārakas*, which connect noun with verbs, gives rise to a philosophical-problem. We argued above that what verbs in language are taken to denote are actions. Thus, whereas nouns denote reals, verbs denote actions; which, too, in turn are reals. Accordingly verbs (at least transitive ones) can be said to stand for or name such actions. No sooner we allow a philosophical-problem to emerge with regard to the reals (alone), then we are also forced to make a similar-allowance to the philosophical-problem with regard to action. This is how it gives rise to another philosophical-issue in the frame of the *Navya-Nyāya*. The problem is of connecting reals with action. For, as one-

real can be connected with another-real, so also a real can be connected with an action. As the problem of the relation-between reals leads, in the *Navya-Nyāya* frame, to the doctrine of distinguishables and separables, similarly the problem of relation between a real and an action, in the same frame, leads to the doctrine of *Vyāpāra*. Anybody who has studied at least basic-elements of the *Navya-Nyāya* and especially its schema of the *Kāraṇa-Kārya* relation known as *Ārambhavāda* would be in a position to vouchsafe the importance of *Vyāpāra* in it. We hardly need to probe-deeper into it here. For, what suffices for our present-purpose is to understand that the clue for it comes from language.

One point needs, however, a special-emphasis before we leave consideration of *Kārakas*. Although in any language there are two kinds of verbs – transitive and intransitive – the *Navya-Nyāya* concentrates only on the transitive-verbs to get a clue of a philosophical-problem. Such a kind of concentration not only brings in anthropocentricism, but also action-centricism. Under the former, reals belonging to the world are conceived through human-perspective, while under the latter the relationship between or among them is conceived on the pattern of a relation between an organism and a thing. As a result of this, especially the former, the objectivity and inter-subjective-warrant that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers come to speak of is more anthropocentrically-objective, rather than cosmocentrically-objective. That is, the objectivity they speak of is the one that is available in a world in which there are things as well as human beings, and not merely things. But more of this point later.

Statements and Statemental Philosophical-Problems

It is not merely linguistic-considerations that arise with reference to names and verbs, which indicates to philosophical-problems. Considerations that arise with reference to sentences too have deeper philosophical-

implications. Let us consider two such philosophical-implications: (i) every sentence/statement is of 'subject-predicate-form[1]'. Subject being that about which something is said, and predicate being that what is said about it. In such consideration, what we are talking-about are grammatical-subject and grammatical-predicate. But forgetting this, we may attempt to correlate the distinction-between grammatical-subject and grammatical-predicate with a logical-subject-and logical-predicate; or with a metaphysical-distinction between a substance and an attribute. In each case, it creates a confusion that is extremely-difficult to get-over. The *Navya-Nyāya* effort is at least guilty of correlating the distinction-between grammatical-subject and predicate with that between logical-subject and predicate. But it cannot be said to be absolutely free-from confusion of grammatical-subject with at least substantive, and hence real in however weak-sense of that term. With regard to grammatical-predicate, the *Navya-Nyāya* makes the confusion worse-confounded in so-far-as it is prepared to take even a predicate standing for a substantive. Such a kind of confusion arises at the hands of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers not merely because they confuse-between a grammatical and a logical-predicate, but also because of the name theory of meaning and predicates are not excluded from coming under the perview of that theory. Any way considered, there arise complicated philosophical-issues. (ii) But it may be argued that the distinction-between grammatical-subject and predicate, can be correlated with philosophical-distinction between a topic and a comment. If it is held that the distinction-between a topic and a comment applies only to assertions and not to statements, then, it may be confused with epistemological distinction-between subject and object. But if it is maintained that the distinction-between a topic and a comment holds on the level of statements, then this distinction may come to be correlated with the distinction-between logical-subject and

predicate. This distinction may, however, be correlated with the distinction-between metaphysical-subject and predicate. In any case, it is misleading. Thus, it turns-out that the grammatical distinction-between subject and predicate cannot be correlated with any of the philosophical-distinctions, taking linguistic-distinction to be surest-way of arriving at any of them.

Genesis of the Distinction between *Saṁyogins* and *Samavāyins*

It may be argued that the grammatical distinction-between subject and predicate can at least be correlated with the classification of reals into separables and distinguishables. This argument, too, is untenable. Both separables and distinguishables are taken to be substantives by the *Navya-Ṅyāya*. Even then the distinction-between grammatical-subject and predicate can hardly be correlated with the distinction-between separables and distinguishables. For, it is not merely separables that occur as subject/s of a statement. Even the attempt to justify *Navya-Nyāya* statement that *Dravyas* are *Ādhāra* in the last analysis, understanding them as separables, too fails to find out any clue from language.

As grammatically any-noun can be related with another-noun, and as grammatically-considered there is nothing-wrong with it; so too any real, it may be thought, can be related with any-other real. This is how we get a clue to the *Navya-Nyāya* contention that by *Paraṁparā-Saṁbaṅdha* called *Kālīka-Saṁbaṅdha*, we can significantly say that almost anything is anywhere at a given (point) of time. What we forget here is that whereas noun is a grammatical-category, real is not a temporal-category. Nor it is a grammatical-category. But a similar-consideration holds with regard to the name theory of meaning. Names might be giving us reals. But their classification is a philosophical-issue, and not at all

a grammatical-one. Even the distinction-between proper-nouns and common-nouns cannot be used as a guide for this consideration. Hence, in terms of grammatical-considerations the distinction-between distinguishables and separables cannot be brought-about. The distinction-between nominative-object on the one-hand, and accusative-object, dative-object, verbs and complementaries on the other-hand, too, does not account for this distinction.

It may, nevertheless, be argued that although the *Navya-Nyāya* distinction-between separables and distinguishables cannot be correlated with any of the grammatical-considerations, yet it is a very fundamental-distinction. But this argument, too, is misleading and untenable. What the *Navya-Nyāya*, being faithful to its realism, does is to correlate the world of facts or reals with significant-expressions in language; and then looking through the prisom of language it gets the spectrum of separables and distinguishables. But let us remove both the endeavors to correlate facts with expressions in language, as well as the attempt of looking at facts through the prisom of language. What has happened to the spectrum? There remain just separables, and not both separables and distinguishables. Similarly, considered in this way, there would remain things with properties/dispositions as also related-things, if they are related. But by any means we would not get things and properties or their dispositions, as also things and relations, which relate them. Such a view seems more in accordance with the 'principle of parsimony' (*Kalpanā-Lāghava*) of which *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers often make capital. Such a view is, further, more akin to common-sense rather than to the view that there are things and qualities, or that there are things and relations by which they are related. If the separables that so remain are correlated with language, it will be noticed that many expressions in language are just names that in fact do not name any separable. This is how we get Nominalism. But if

we say that both distinguishables as well as separables are ultimate and primitive, then there is no room left for nominalism at all.

Errors of the *Navya-Nyāya*

The fundamental-error of the *Navya-Nyāya* is not so much that it gets clues to philosophical-inquiry from its investigation about language. The major-defect with which it is beset is that starting from the clues that such a consideration of language makes available, it arrives at certain-fundamental philosophical-confusions. Its clues from the consideration of *Vibhaktis*, leads it to the classification of reals into 'separables' and 'distinguishables'. But it also brings in the confusion of a 'kind' with a 'type'; and of 'denotation' with 'real'. Its clue from the consideration of *Karakas* leads it to the 'doctrine of '*Vyāpāra*', in terms of which everything that emerges comes to be related with an action, as also that from which it emerges. This creates another-tension of arguing always in terms of *Vyāpāra*. But the clues on the level of a statement, lead it to confuse-between grammatical, epistemic, logical and other kinds of considerations with one-another.

A Leap Ahead

Thus, starting from the clues arising from the consideration of language, it creates rigmarole of philosophical-puzzles. To muddle through these puzzles, it engineers certain-rules so-ingeniously that separables and distinguishables as reals can be treated on-par with each-other. But in spite of such engineered-rules, it is unable not only to draw a line of demarcation-between 'discovered-facts' and 'invented-facts' on the one-hand, but it also is unable to draw a line of demarcation-between 'context of discovery, context of explanation and context of justification' on the other. Investigation of the reasons responsible for this would be taken-up for a detailed-consideration in the fifth chapter. But before that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory needs to be

stated in a modern-language, with a view to enable us to raise and answer further-problems about it. It is to this task that we turn in the next (i.e. fourth) chapter.

NOTES

1. We are using here 'sentence' and 'statement' interchangeably, taking both of them to be declarative. This does not, however, mean that there are no sentences that express commands, wishes etc. But for our present purpose, we need not embark-upon the consideration of the distinction between sentences and statements. Suffice it merely to say that we understand both of them declaratively.

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Chapter- 4

Restatement of The *Navya-Nyāya* Theory

Introduction

Opening our critique of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory with the contention that it leads to embracing 'Platonism' and 'ontological-slum', we investigated into its methodology. The conclusion we arrived at was it embraces confusions. With a view to trace the source and genesis of those confusions, we undertook a kind of fiber-tracing about the clues from ordinary-language on which its methodology seems to be based. But even in this endeavour, we found that the clues it receives from ordinary-language have been confusedly-coupled with logical, epistemic, ontological and other considerations. These are not the only points which we intend to bring-forward against the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, couple of others have been mentioned in the previous chapters, which are waiting to be considered. But some additional-issues, too, we intend to raise-about it. To be able to deal with these problems, it seems desirable that we restate the *Navya-Nyāya* theory in modern-language; so that the further-points we wish to bring-forward with regard to it would stand-out in bolder-relief against the background of such a restatement.

The purpose of this chapter is to present a general-characterization of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory[1]. It will be argued that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is 'ontological-individualism', and 'methodological-holism'. Such a re-statement of the

Navya-Nyāya theory is necessitated by the further-considerations that we propose to bring-forward with reference to it. Such further-considerations lie outside the scope of this chapter, although what these considerations would be will be indicated towards the end of it. These issues we propose to take-up for further analysis in the subsequent chapters of the present work.

Conceivable-Individuals as Items-Named by Names

Taking clues from language and correlating these clues with the name theory of meaning, the *Navya-Nyāya* arrives at those which are named by names. Let us presume that anything that a name can name, in-principle, is an individual. It is obvious that the term individual here does not stand-for things, persons or an object of a particular-kind. Rather, it stands-for anything that can be said to be named by a name. But, this raises a very serious-issue: What are we to count as an individual? It may be maintained, following Starwsonian consideration in general, that anything is individual if and only if we are in a position to distinguish it from its-kind. Thus understood, it means that anything is individual provided we can not-only identify and re-identify it, but also that if we can distinguish it from another individual that is considered to be so; precisely because in its case too the same consideration holds.

However, it may be further contended that by accepting this consideration not only fictitious and real-objects would turn-out to be individuals, but also those that are impossible to be taken as objects. For instance, on this consideration, it would turn-out that even square-circles, horns of heirs, flowers of sky etc. too would count as individuals. *Prima-facie* this contention is sound. The soundness of the contention itself, however, posses another problem: how shall we be in a position to ward-off such individuals that in-principle can be taken to be named by corresponding

names in language, but which as a matter of fact not only are not named but are also impossible to be said to have been named by names; provided we are to claim that only those names name if what they name is not something inconceivable in-principle.

Thus, any name in-principle can name. But simply because any name in-principle can name, from this it does not follow that every name does as a matter of fact name. Given a name that it can name something is a permanent-possibility. But merely this consideration does not suffice. Any name, it can be argued, names not solely because it is a name; but over-and-above this it can be said to be naming anything provided what it names is not in-principle inconceivable. Due to this additional-consideration it now turns-out that anything that can be said to have been named by a name, is not only an individual but also something over-and-above this. The additional-consideration being that it must never be inconceivable.

Thus, what the names that are said to name anything at all are not just individuals but conceivable-individuals. It is these conceivable-individuals that are named by those names that do name anything, and it is in so far as the names name such conceivable-individuals that they are said to be naming; not simply because they are names. As an individual is identifiable, re-identifiable and distinguishable from another-individual; so too, a conceivable-individual is identifiable, re-identifiable and distinguishable from another such individual.

Distinguishable and Separables

Given any two of such conceivable-individuals, they are, to say the least, distinguishable from each-other. Let us remember, however, that it is this realm of conceivable-individuals that a philosophical-realist takes to be the realm of reals. Hence, for him to say that something is real would

be tantamount to say that it is a conceivable-individual, and given such any-two conceivable-individuals or reals the least that can be said about them is that they are distinguishable.

However, the reals a philosophical-realist would be prepared to allow to-inhabit the realm of reals, is very-large. He would have no objection to reals which ontological, epistemic or logical-reconstructions presuppose, and even fictitious-reals rubbing-shoulders with one-another in the realm of reals. In so-far-as each-one of them is conceivable-individual it is real, no matter conceivable as a physical-object, empirical-object, epistemological-object or logical-object, or even as a fictitious-object. This is how he would be prepared to make an allowance for negative-facts, inhabiting the realm of reals. The net that he throws-open also makes an allowance-for any conceivable-individual masquerading as a real.

Starting from such a totality of reals, each-one of which is conceivable and any-two of which are distinguishable from each-other, a philosophic-realist, of the nature of philosophers of the *Navya-Nyāya* school, asks another question. That question is: Granted that any two-reals are distinguishable from each-other; is this all that we can say about them? His reply to this question is in the negative. His contention is that although any two-reals, to say the least, are at least, distinguishable; there are some-reals in the totality of reals such that any-two of them are not only distinguishable from each-other but also are separable from each-other.

Not being fully-convinced by the contention of a philosophical-realist, someone may ask: It may be plausible to say that reals are of two-kinds: distinguishable only, and both distinguishable and separable. But on what basis are the separable-reals considered to be separable? Is it an arbitrary-decision, or is it on the basis of the fulfillment of a

particular-criterion? The realist would answer: well, precisely because a criterion is applicable. The criterion is that anything is separable – rather any real is a separable-real – provided either spatial, or temporal, or both spatial and temporal-limit of it could be specified. Let us not forget that specification of a spatial, or a temporal, or both spatial and temporal-limit for him would not necessarily mean factual-specification as it can be understood; for example, with reference to a physical-thing. For him what suffices is that such a limit is conceivable. He would not even care to consider whether the limit is materially-conceivable, or analogically, or metaphorically-conceivable. The optimum-consideration that matters for him is the fact that such a limit is after-all conceivable.

On this consideration, therefore, it is not that any two-reals are considered to be separable. Rather, only those reals are considered to be separable the spatial, or the temporal, or both spatial and temporal-limit of which is conceivable; understanding the conceivability of such a limit in a very loose-sense of the term. Compared with the consideration of distinguishability, the consideration of separability is more-stringent; and it is for this reason that every real for such a realist, qua-real, fails to comply with it. Hence, only some reals are separable, while every real is at least distinguishable. That is why the reals that are separable are also distinguishable, but not *vice-versa*. What distinguishability alone gives us is sheer-discernability, while what separability gives us is the possibility of a division, separation or disentanglement. This way of understanding the reals brings one more-consideration to the foreground, viz. while two-reals, each-one of which is separable, are not only separable but also distinguishable; while two-reals, each-one of which is minimally and just distinguishable, give only those reals that are just distinguishable. As against this, two-reals, at least one of which is distinguishable, give us

distinguishable-reals alone in that context; distinguishability being the minimum-condition that is fulfilled by each-one of them.

Thus, there arise two-classes of reals – separable-reals and distinguishable-reals –and yet these two-classes are over-lapping; in the sense that every separable-real is also a distinguishable-real. But these two-classes are over-lapping in still another-way also. We shall not be in a position to say that a particular-real or a particular-kind of real is always a separable-real, although we shall always be in a position to say that any-real, of whatever kind it may be, is at least distinguishable. In fact the fact that it is distinguishable from something else rules-out their identity. It is these separable and distinguishable-reals that the realism of the *Navya-Nyāya* has as *Saṁyogins* and *Samavāyins* respectively, and it understands *Saṁyoga* always as a relation-between separables alone; while *Samavāya* is considered to be the relation either between two-separables[2] (e.g. *Kāraṇa* and *Kārya*, *Avayava* and *Avayavī*), or between a separable and a distinguishable-real (e.g. *Rūpa* and the *Jāti* of it). We hardly need to penetrate into these details here any further.

Simple and Compound Reals

Distinguishable and separable-reals are not, however, the only kinds of reals. These classes are collectively-exhaustive of all reals that are conceivable. They are not, nevertheless, mutually-exclusive classes. This classification of reals we get, provided we accept one *fundamentum-divisionis*. In fact the criterion of separability acts as a *fundamentum-divisionis*, while the criterion of distinguishability serves as a minimum-condition – or optimum-condition – of differentiating one-real from another. Be that as it may. What needs to be noticed very-carefully is that this classification is just the starting-point of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. There is another classification of reals that is tacitly-presupposed by it. It is a

classification of reals into simple and compound-reals. One may, however, prefer another-terminology and say that according to this classification, reals are of two-kinds – simple and complex-reals. Without entering into the terminological-nuances, however, let us consider this classification of reals into further details, and let us account for the considerations that it gives rise to in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory.

Simple-reals are those that are themselves not composed of reals, while compound or complex-reals are those that are composed either of compound or simple-reals. In short, whereas simple-reals are not themselves composed of reals; compound or complex-reals, on the contrary, are. As a matter of fact compound or complex-reals cannot help being composed of reals. It is for this reason, precisely, that they are called compound or complex.

As compared with the classification of reals into separable and distinguishable-reals, the classification of reals into simple and compound-reals scores a point-over the former. Whereas each classification is collectively-exhaustive of the entire-realm of reals, while the classification of reals into separable and distinguishable-reals is not mutually-exclusive as compared to that between simple and compound-reals. In fact the classification of reals into simple and compound is more-fundamental than the separable and distinguishable-reals classification. This being the case, simple as-well-as compound-reals are such that each-one of them may either be a separable or a distinguishable-real. Just because a real is compound, its so being does not at all preclude it from being either a separable or distinguishable-real.

Further as a separable-real may be an object, which ontological, epistemological or even a logical-reconstruction may presuppose, or as a distinguishable-real may be of anyone of these types; so too a simple or compound-real may also be of any-one of these types of reals.

Reducible and Irreducible Reals

This is not, however, the profound theoretical-consideration about simple and compound-reals. Each-one of these is a real. Yet the classification of reals into simple and compound-reals brings to the foreground one very-important consideration. Rather to accommodate this theoretical-consideration that the classification under-consideration, it seems, is instituted. Since simple-reals are those that are composed of no reals, they may be taken to be what are called irreducible, or primitives. They are derived from nothing. And in their being non-derivative in this way could be used as a criterion of their independence. They have to be presumed as 'given' in some sense. The compound or complex-reals, on the contrary, are not irreducible. They exhibit two-characteristics. First, they can be constructed out of simple-reals with the help of certain-relations. Such relations, in their turn, need not necessarily be primitive or irreducible. They can as well be reducible-relations. In fact the *Navya-Nyāya* accepts only a few irreducible-relations, namely *Saṁyoga, Samavāya, Svarūpa, Tādātmya* etc. We hope we would not be far too-wrong in saying that what the *Navya-Nyāya* accepts to be *Sākṣāt-Saṁbandhas* are irreducible-relations. But it also makes use of certain other-relations called *Paraṁparā-Saṁbandhas*, which are, to say the least, reducible-relations. We hardly need to dwell on this point here. Thus, in terms of or with the help of such relations complex-reals are constructed. Secondly, although they are complex or compound-reals, they are reals. But they are reducible-reals. The reals to which they are reducible are obviously those of which they are composed. Thus, although reduction of this kind does not necessarily demand annihilation of components; what it does demand, however, is dissolution of the constructed-complex or compound-real. Reduction, thus understood, is disappearance of complexity from that level of complexity, although it may not amount

to the utter-dissolution of complexity. This is how the *Navya-Nyāya* maxim – "*asamavāyī kāraṇa nāśāt kārya nāsaḥ/*"[3] needs to be understood. But more of it later.

Thus, the classification of reals into simple and compound or complex-reals that is tacitly-presupposed in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory brings to the foreground two profoundly-important issues. They are: (a) starting from the simple-reals, it brings forward the issue of construction, while (b) starting from the compound or complex-reals, it brings to the foreground the issue of reduction. Now, if simple as-well-as compound or complex-reals may on the one-hand not only be separable or distinguishable-reals; but on the other-hand may also be reals which ontological, epistemological or logical-reconstructions presuppose and if particular-type of compound or complex-reals could only be constructed out-of that type of simple-reals of which type of compound or complex-reals is, then it automatically-follows that we need to presuppose so many-types of simple-reals as many-types of compound or complex-reals there may be. But conversely, if we can reduce a particular-type of compound-real only either to the relatively-less compound or complex-real or to the simple-real of that type, then, too, it is obvious that we need to have at our disposal so many-types of simple-reals as many-types of compound or complex-reals there may be. For, as it is impossible to undertake ontological-reconstruction in terms of the reals, which epistemological-reconstruction presupposes; similarly it is not possible to undertake logical-reconstruction in terms of the reals that either ontological or even epistemological-reconstruction presupposes. This is precisely the consideration that guides the *Navya-Nyāya* view in accordance with which it posits simple-reals, not only namable to ontological, empirical, epistemological but also logical-reconstructions. Examples of these are *Paramāṇus*, *taṅtus* or *ghaṭa-kapāla*, *Ātmā* and *Kāla* respectively. But it similarly

presumes that at least so many-kinds of compound or complex-reals could be constructed-out of them. The examples of these are *Dvyaṇuka, paṭa* or *ghaṭa, anuvyavasāya* and *Mahākāla* respectively. We hardly need to penetrate deeper into this problem.

Ontological-Individualism and Methodological-Holism of the *Navya-Nyāya*

Simple-reals are individuals, as was previously brought-out. They are, nevertheless, irreducible-individuals. They are not-only parts of the furniture of the world, but-also are the primitive structural-components of the world. It is out of these, ultimately, that any compound or complex-real is composed. But it is to them, again, that any compound or complex-real is finally, reducible. From the point of construction, they are the starting-points; while from the point of view of reduction, they are the end-points of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. They are not-only irreducible to anything else, but are also mutually-irreducible to one-another. At the same-time, they are considered to be on-par with one-another, simply because they are structural-components of the world on the one-hand; and because it is to them that any compound or complex-reals is, on the other-hand, finally reducible. The fact that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory presupposes such simple-reals to be the ultimate-components of the world makes the *Navya-Nyāya* theory to embrace what may be called 'ontological-individualism'. Such 'ontological-individualism' does neither preclude 'reductionism', nor does it preclude 'atomism' of some kind. On the contrary, it is consistent with both these positions. Nay, 'ontological-individualism' is a theoretical-foundation of the 'atomism' and 'reductionism' that is accepted by the *Navya-Nyāya*.

The fact remains, however, that such 'ontological-individualism' of the *Navya-Nyāya* embraces alike reals

amenable to ontological, empirical, epistemic and logical-reconstructions within its fold. It also remains a fact that these different-types of reals come to be treated on-par, each-one of them being ultimate -irreducible in one or the other sense. All this is consistent with its realistic philosophical-position. Such a state of affair engenders certain incorrigible-strains in the theory of the *Navya-Nyāya*. But more of it in the next chapter.

As simple-reals are parts of the furniture of the world, so too compound or complex-reals are parts of the furniture of the world. That is, as simple-reals belong to the realm of reals, so also compound or complex-reals belong to the realm of reals. Thus, compound or complex-reals, too, are reals. But as contrasted with the simple-reals, out of which they are constructed and to which again they are finally-reducible, they exhibit a striking-point of difference. Whereas both of them are ontological, in the sense that each-one of them is part of the furniture of this world; while simple-reals are structural-components of the world, the compound or complex-reals are as it were functional-components of the world. That is, while simple-reals are structural-parts of the furniture of the world. The compound or complex-reals are functional-parts of the furniture of the world. The compound or complex-reals are wholes. But they are such wholes as could be constructed out-of simple-reals as-well-as such whole as are and can be shown to be reducible to them. Thus, the compound or complex-reals are not-only wholes composed of simple-reals, but are also such as can be methodologically shown to be explainable. Simple-reals, on the contrary, are assumed to be 'given' in some or the other sense. Hence, this consideration that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory advocates with regard to compound or complex-reals, makes it to embrace what may be called 'methodological-holism'; in the sense that they can be shown to be composed of irreducible-simple-reals.

Thus, the *Navya-Nyāya* theory on the one-hand is 'ontological-individualism', while on the other-hand, is 'methodological-holism'. On each count, it ushers in certain unsurmountable-strains which, although consistent with the philosophic-realism of the *Navya-Nyāya*, are, nevertheless, both philosophically and theoretically bewilderingly-notorious. But, we shall postpone the consideration of them to the chapters that are to follow.

Two Levels of Reals

Although the reals that we encounter as parts of the furniture of the world could satisfactorily be accounted for, according to the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, in terms of simple and compound-reals; yet we must also note one-point very-carefully that plays a significant-role in the entire *Navya-Nyāya* theory. The point is that whereas simple-reals are on one-level, the compound-reals are on another-level. There are no complex-reals on the level of simple-reals, as there are no simple-reals on the level of complex-reals. Simple-reals, that are so, are so because they are irreducible. But they are not irreducible as components of the complex-reals. Rather, as parts of the complex or compound-reals, they merge their separate-identity, as it were, into compound or complex-reals; and on the level of complex or compound-reals what we have are just compound or complex-reals. That is all. It is due to the binding-cement of relations that the simple-reals become organised into compound or complex-reals as wholes. But, at the same-time, simple-reals lose their separate-identity as simple-reals in so-far-as they persist as parts of wholes. Thus, whereas they are separable-from complex or compound reals as simple-reals, as parts of the compound or complex-reals or wholes they are inseparable-from them. The separability and inseparability of simple-reals from the compound or complex-reals in this way is to be understood on two different-levels. This is how the *Navya-*

Nyāya contention that *Kārya* is a new-whole that emerges and yet is inseparable from *Kāraṇa*, needs to be understood. But *Kāraṇa* and *Kārya* are also inseparable from each-other in yet another way, namely epistemologically, in the sense that we shall never be in a position to explain the notion of *Kārya* independently of presupposing the notion of *Kāraṇa* and *vice-versa*. For, every *Kārya* is contextually-related with some or the other *Kāraṇa* and every *Kāraṇa* is contextually-related with some or the other *Kārya*.

All these considerations have a profound-implication in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. This is, for example, the theoretical-foundation of the *Asatkāryavāda* that the *Navya-Nyāya* so emphatically-advocates. What we need, in our present context, nevertheless, to notice is that on the theory of the *Navya-Nyāya* simple-reals and compound or complex-reals are on two different-levels; and it is this consideration that lends additional-support to the *Navya-Nyāya* theory of 'ontological-individualism' and 'methodological-holism', which in-turn is consistent both with reconstruction and reduction. The emergent-complexes or compounds are not just bundles of their components, but rather are unitary-wholes over-and-above their components. Yet they being complex or compound are reducible to their components. Such, in nut-shell, is the outline of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory.

Further Issues

The 'ontological-individualism' and the 'methodological-holism' that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory advocates is consistent with the realism, as a philosophical-position of the *Navya-Nyāya*. Further, it is also consistent with the proposal of the *Navya-Nyāya* of attempting to undertake the four different-types of reconstructions side-by-side. Such reconstructions are reconstruction of the ontological, empirical, epistemic and logical-worlds. The programme that the *Navya-Nyāya* attempts to work-out is, thus, to say the least, very-ambitious.

But, unfortunately, it is not sheer-ambition of the programme and its proposed or envisaged wide-extension that guarantees it's being worked-out successfully. We must have such resources at our disposal, which would facilitate working-out of the proposed-programme. The *Navya-Nyāya* theory sets before itself a very ambitious-programme indeed. But it remains to be seen whether it has the requisite-resources at its disposal to work-out consistently the programme that it envisages to work-out.

A question regarding resources of a theory that enable it to work-out its programme amounts to be a question: whether a theory can, in principle at least, make certain fundamental-distinctions, which stand no-matter what theory we are talking-about. Within its own limited-range, howsoever limited it may be, every theory should, in principle at least, be in a position to institute and use certain fundamental-distinctions. We can single-out two such distinctions. First, we can significantly-talk in terms of the distinction-between context of discovery, context of explanation and context of justification. Secondly, we can similarly significantly-talk in terms of at-least three distinct-priorities – ontological, epistemic and logical. The success or failure of a philosophical theory would largely, if not exclusively, depend-upon its capacity to institute and use these distinctions. But such a capacity of a theory would, in turn, depend-upon the resources that it has at its disposal. It is interesting to see whether and to what extent the *Navya-Nyāya* theory can, after all, consistently-institute and use these distinctions. Its success or failure hinges on that. It is to the consideration of these two-problems that the following two-chapters are addressed. We shall discuss these problems in the two separate-chapters in the same-order in which we have posed them here. In the next chapter, therefore, we turn to the consideration of the problem of distinction-between contexts of discovery, contexts of explanation and contexts

of justification, with a view to examine whether and to what extent the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is in a position to institute and sustain such a distinction consistently without giving rise to philosophical-blunders.

NOTES

1. A substantial part of this chapter was presented as a paper, under the same title in the *Golden Jubilee Session* of the *Indian Philosophical Congress* held at Delhi, in Jan. 1976; in which Dr. Karl Potter was present in the Session. And later on, the central thesis of this chapter which is substantially in agreement with his contentions and the thesis of Dr. Karl Potter was published in (cf. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*; Vol-II; Pp.40-46). Hence, one may find similarity in my central contention of the thesis presented in the form of paper, and his publication; but assuredly it is not a borrowing from him.
2. Although two-separables can be related either by *Saṁyoga* or *Samavāya*, there is a fundamental-distinction, which the *Navya-Nyāya* would never be prepared to make a compromise with. The distinction is that whereas separable-reals connected by *Saṁyoga* always belong to the same-level; the separable-reals connected by *Samavāya* always belong to two different-levels. This point will become clear as we shall proceed.
3. *Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp. 24-29,196-210

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Chapter-5

Context of Discovery, Explanation and Justification

We attempted a restatement of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory in the previous chapter. We maintained that *Navya-Nyāya* theory amounts to be 'ontological-individualism' and 'methodological-holism'. We also argued that a theory, no matter whether it is philosophical or scientific, remains tenable to that extent to which it is able to make, stand by and utilise certain fundamental-distinctions. One such distinction is the distinction-between context of discovery, explanation and that of justification. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is after all in a position to make these distinctions, without falling into confusions. It will be necessary to inquire as to what kind of confusions does it fall-pray-to and due to what reasons. It is to these considerations that we turn in this chapter.

Preliminary-Consideration

In order to be able to raise and answer these questions, it is desirable, by way of a preliminary-consideration, that we give a sketch of what is meant by discovery, explanation and justification[1]. Such a kind of preliminary-clarification is needed expressly for two reasons. First, it is very often than not that in common-parlance we hardly make a distinction-between explanation and justification. Secondly, in the recent-literature on the subject, especially in 'Philosophy of

Science', the term 'explanation' is often used in the sense of 'justification'. But what prompts us, however, to undertake the kind of preliminary-clarification that we propose to is not merely prevalence of this situation. Such a preliminary-clarification is deemed necessary because, independently of it, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to consider whether and to what extent the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is in a position to institute and use these distinctions.

In any discovery there is and should be, what may be called, 'a passage from facts' to the 'information about facts'. If by knowledge we mean information, then discovery can be said to be that in terms of which we gather or come to gather some information about some fact/s. Whether the information that we so come to have is reliable or not happens to be decided by the consideration: whether it is true or not-true; while whether the information is true or not happens to be settled by the consideration: whether it is prone to confirmation or verification, as the case may be, in terms of correspondence with facts. But, just because we have information or on the basis of some unconnected-pieces of information, we are hardly in a position to explain the nature of a fact. For, to be able to explain the nature of a fact, we need to have at our disposal what may be called an 'organised or interconnected-information'. It is not on the basis of discrete-informational- elements that we are in a position to attempt a sketch; such that it turns-out to be an explanation of the nature of a fact. Explanation is such a description of the nature of a fact on the basis of an organised-knowledge or information. In an organised-knowledge that explanation-presupposes various discrete-informational-elements happen to be inter-woven with one-another; and unless we have such a net-work of interwoven-informational-elements, it is impossible to offer explanation of anything which in short amounts to be a description of the nature of a fact. But it may be asked: how does information or knowledge become

organised? What is the basis of it? The answer is that the organised-knowledge that any explanation-presupposes happens to be organised by us, and we are in a position to organise knowledge on the basis of a theory. A theory is a conceptual-scheme, such that it establishes or rather enables us to establish such kind of interconnections between or among concepts that are rationally-intelligible. Thus, a theory is a net-work of concepts, backed-by rational-considerations. Nonetheless, it is a theory that serves as a basis of an organised-knowledge, and it is organised-knowledge that is the basis of an explanation.

Justification is warrantability of organised-information on the basis of a theory. What we, therefore, primarily justify is a (knowledge-) claim, and it is secondarily or derivatively that we can sensibly-talk in terms of justification of facts. Primary-question about facts is their nature being explained, and this is what an explanation is supposed to do. Theory, on the contrary, is aimed at justifying-knowledge. In short, a theory justifies knowledge and explains facts.

Thus, we can argue, it seems, that whereas 'discovery' is a passage-from 'facts to information', 'explanation' is a 'description of the nature of a fact on the basis of an organised-knowledge that it presupposes'. Theory is the basis of justification. Every justification is and should be, to say the least, theory-prone and theory-based. What we do in justification is to seek to justify certain course of action that knowledge or proposition leads to. Thus, the context of justification is a context of establishing such a relation between a theory and knowledge. In other words, it is a context of justifying or vindicating our claim on the basis of a theory.

It may be argued, nevertheless, that justification no doubt presupposes a theory; but every justification is and should always be rule-prone or rule-bound. Such rules, in terms of

one of their classification, may be hypothetico-deductive, probabilistic or reductive-rules, giving rise to hypothetico-deductive, probabilistic or reductive-theories. It would be too much to insist-upon any-one of these kinds of rules, as 'the only rules' that make a theory possible. It would further be too much to maintain that the justification that any-one of these kinds of rules make possible, alone is the justification. It may be possible, in terms of such stringent-requirements being imposed on justification, to distinguish one-type of justification from-another type; and consequently one-type of theory from-another type that we come to prefer-over another, being the most-appropriate in that situation and context. However, it would be too stringent to maintain that a particular-type of justification is the one that is to be universally-accepted. A theory may include within its fold not-only rules, but-also different-kinds of concepts; the four-kinds of which can be singled-out. They are: empirical, analytic, theoretical, and what are called thematic-concepts. The rules that a theory takes within its fold are those that establish intelligible-interconnections among such concepts. To say that there can be no theory without rules is one thing, while to say that a justification is nothing-else-but that which is offered in accordance with particular-kind of rules is quite another.

On this point we need not linger any-more. The rules that a theory can accept within its fold, may be classified in yet another-way. That is: (a) constitutive-rules, (b) regulative-rules and (c) what may be called engineered-rules. We shall explain later-on in what follows the nature of these rules. Justification in terms of such rules, too, is possible. Sometimes the justification that such rules warrant may turn-out to be a loose-justification. But on this ground to say that any justification that is other-than a particular-kind of justification, is no justification at all; is to say bit too-much than what is warranted.

Another Way of Distinguishing Contexts of Discovery, Explanation and Justification

There is yet another-way of bringing-out the distinction-between context of discovery, explanation and that of justification. It may be argued that context of discovery is that context in which we are in a position to answer such questions as: what do we know about? Meaning there by: What is it about which we know, and what information do we have about it? In the context of explanation, the question that we are in a position to answer is: what are we in a position to say, sensibly of-course, by way of a description of the nature of that about which we know in the context of discovery. In the context of justification, on the contrary, we are in a position to answer such question as: on what basis are we in a position to say sensibly whatever we do say?

But this way of spelling-out distinctions-between the three different-contexts under-consideration is ambiguous and imprecise. Further, when we attempt to distinguish-between context of explanation and that of justification, we do not and cannot rule-out apriorily of the fact that, it is often than not, explanation itself functions as justification. What we do maintain, however, is that although in many cases context of explanation and that of justification overlap, this in itself is no guarantee to argue that they cannot help so-overlapping. What we are interested in pointing-out minimally is that a theory, qua-theory should not start-from the presumption that there is no distinction-between explanation and justification. In other-words, a theory should have the provision to honor the distinction in principle between explanation and justification. But more about this point later.

A Problem about the *Navya-Nyāya* Theory

Granting, then, that a distinction-between the context of discovery, explanation and that of justification is tenable,

the issue that we are confronted with is: whether the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, as it was outlined in the previous chapter, is in a position to honour this distinction throughout. For, to the extent to which it is able to honor this distinction throughout, without giving rise to ambiguity and confusion, it is a theory worth the name. To that extent, again, the *Navya-Nyāya* theory could be said to be consistent. We had already argued that although the *Navya-Nyāya* theory accepts the distinction-between simple and complex or compound-reals, yet each-one of these-kinds of reals is either a separable or a distinguishable-real. Furthermore, whether a real is distinguishable or separable, it is presumed in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, it may be the one that is in accordance with the requirement of either ontological, empirical, epistemological or logical-reconstruction, irrespective of differences among them. (With the addition of reals amenable to psychological-reconstruction, which also the *Navya-Nyāya* theory accepts, but which were left-out to bring-in simplicity in our consideration, it makes an exhaustive-account of reals, the *Navya-Nyāya* acknowledges.) We need not dwell on this point here.

An Argument in Defence of the *Navya-Nyāya* and its Rebuttal

It may be argued that although the *Navya-Nyāya* can be said to have admitted reals amenable to these different-types of reconstructions within the fold of its theory, it may not necessarily be on the same-ground. Seeing, perhaps, that although space or time could at least in principle be taken to be infinitely-divisible, and understanding that it would be paradoxical to say that matter is also infinitely-divisible, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, it might be argued, might have been confronted with a dilemma: either the world of facts is infinite as space or time is, or it is not. If the former, then-alone some correlation-between the two could be established;

while if the latter, it is impossible to do so. Hence, although *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers might be convinced-of the fact that material or physical-world is finitely-divisible, yet it is as a pragmatic or methodological-device that they accepted infinite-facts. Whatever may be the reason as to why they might have done it, we are not concerned with the inquiry-into the genetic-conditions that might have led them to advocate the theory they do advocate. We are merely interested in inquiring that granting what they say is really what they wanted to maintain, and granting that they were serious about it; and this is what turns-out to be the case in so-far-as they attempt to defend their theory, whether their theory is satisfactory. If it is not, on what grounds it turns-out to be unsatisfactory? Any reconstruction of either the cultural or psychological-background of the advocacy of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, as a plausible-ground of its defence, is just beyond the scope of the present-study. And it is further doubtful whether such a reconstruction would constitute to be a theoretically and methodologically-tenable mode of justifying the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. Let us leave-aside, therefore, this question.

Reals Correlative with the Context of Discovery

Coming-back to the three-contexts we were talking-about. Let us ask a question pertaining to the context of discovery. What type/s of reals, out of those mentioned-above, that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory admits within its fold would fall within the context of discovery? We are immediately in a position to answer this question: saying that the two-types of reals, at least, fall within the frame of the context of discovery, so-far-as the *Navya-Nyāya* contention is concerned. They are reals amenable to ontological and empirical-reconstructions.

Two Twists

Right in this answer, however, there are two important-

twists that are involved. Each-one of them raises a different-bogie of confusion of a particular-kind and the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, as will become-apparent, is unable to surmount it. First, it involves a confusion-between cognition and projection. Out of these, the former does not involve interpretation; while the latter does. Further, for cognition what matters is 'what is given as a matter of fact'; while for projection 'what is supposed to be given', too, can serve the purpose. Discovery being a passage from fact to information in so-far-as we are prepared as the *Navya-Nyāya* theory unfortunately seems to be, to bring those 'facts that are', and also 'those that are supposed to be' in the frame of the context of discovery; it amounts to be passage from the existent or supposed to be existent-facts to information. But, just because in each-case the passage is from fact to information, we believe that each-one of these passages rightly fall-within the jurisdiction of the context of discovery; and we blur the line of demarcation-between 'what is' and 'what is supposed to be'. Instead of a given fact alone coming to vouchsafe the information, we come to embrace the situation where our belief that the fact is given comes to vouchsafe the information. Although we have covertly made a transition from 'a fact to a belief-in-fact' and from thence again 'to facts', overtly we allow facts-obtained in both the ways to masquerade as existent-facts; and hence falling-within the jurisdiction of the context of discovery. This is the kind of mistake the *Navya-Nyāya* commits, when it tells us that not only we discover that there are such reals as *ghaṭa*, *paṭa* etc. but also such reals as *Paramāṇus* and complexes of them called *Dvyaṇukas*, which in-turn give rise to such complexes as *Tryaṇukas*, which lead to further complexes called *Caturṇukas*. We are also further told that these infra-structures are beneath, so-to-say, empirical-reals like *taṅtus* etc. that give rise to such complexes as *paṭa* etc. First confusion in this entire-endeavor is to confuse-between 'existent-facts', like

taṅtus etc., with 'supposed to be existent-facts', like *Paramāṇus*. But the argument outlined-above also advances another-claim that is questionable. The claim is that unobservables have been detected by the *Navya-Nyāya*. The relation-between infra-structures, like *Dvyaṇukas* etc. that are detected and that are supposed to lie-beneath, as it were, observables, like *taṅtus*, maximally-show that observables are, perhaps, effects of unobservables; but this hardly-proves existence of unobservables. What it proves is that observables are effects of unobservables. But to prove this is not at all tantamount to proving that unobservables too fall within the jurisdiction of the context of discovery. In the endeavour of offering this-kind of explanation, the *Navya-Nyāya* effort is also fraught-with another-confusion – the confusion between 'potentially justificatory-argument' and 'justification', but we hardly need to dwell on this point.

But, this is not all. The moment we maintain that both ontological and empirical-facts fall within the jurisdiction of the context of discovery, we also inadvertently come to usher in another-confusion. That is the confusion-between 'identification' and 'intuition'. Out of these, identification of what is known depends-upon the instrument through which the knowledge is acquired. But such identification, in its turn, depends-upon recognition. Now, identification of 'what' element is always relevant within a (particular) framework, and that framework is the one that theory allows. 'Identification' and 'recognition' of a fact on the one-hand and 'intuition' of a fact on the-other may contingently-coincide. But from this it does not follow that they must necessarily so-coincide. Using a particular-instrument of acquiring knowledge, within the framework of a theory, is one-thing; and saying that such a knowledge is the knowledge about something we intuitively know to be there is, quite-another. Whereas identification is correlated with instrument of acquiring knowledge and also with

recognition; intuition is not. Identification of something is relevant within a framework allowed by a theory, but intuition of something is not so tied-down to a particular-theory. Intuitions do not presuppose a theory, although intuitions can be made use-of in a theory. Intuition as a non-propositional mode of knowing that there are facts can be legitimately-employed. But if the *Navya-Nyāya* is to maintain and this is what it seems to be interested in maintaining that there are reals emendable to ontological-reconstruction, like *Paramāṇus*, is given to us intuitively by the frame of the theory, and it is this very frame of the theory that makes identification and recognition of them possible then it is not; unless it confuses between 'identification' and 'intuition' that it would be in a position to maintain this. If, on the contrary, it is to maintain that there are such reals that are given to us intuitively, independently of the theoretical-frame, although we are in a position to identify and recognise them by the frame allowed by the theory advocated by it, then this is a contingent-state of affair and no-one will be in a position to argue that such must always be the case, come what may. These are the two-issues, we maintain, the *Navya-Nyāya* is unable to draw a line of distinction-between, and to the extent to which it fails to do so it seems to confuse-between them.

Confusion between Contexts of Discovery and that of Explanation

It is not, unfortunately, merely the fact that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is prone to raise a bogie of confusions – between reals prone to ontological and empirical-reconstruction in the context of discovery. Sometimes, at least, it is unable to distinguish-between the context of discovery, and that of explanation. A failure to distinguish-between these two-contexts, lends additional-support to the confusion-between reals correlative with ontological and empirical-reconstructions. We tend to confuse-between discovery and

explanation, because in both the contexts – that is in the context of discovery and that of explanation – facts-figure. But consideration of this smallest-common-denominator that figures in both these contexts blinds us by the distinction that is of fundamental-importance. Whereas discovery of facts just presupposes facts, explanation of the nature of facts presupposes not-only facts but-also our interpretation of their nature. In explanation, starting-from projection and interpretation we may presuppose that there are facts, although they are not given to us in the context of discovery. Very often our explanations rest-upon apparent-plausibility and this makes structures of explanation heavier than the weight of evidence they are designed to bear. Forgetting this, we may tend to argue that evidence on the basis of which explanation is based, is itself given to us in the context of discovery. Or contrary-wise, we may tend to maintain that the facts, the nature of which is attempted to be explained in explanation, are given to us in the context of discovery; just because facts-figure in both the contexts. This is one-ground as to why we tend to confuse-between context of discovery and that of explanation. But this is not the only ground of our coming to confuse-between context of discovery and that of explanation. There are two further considerations. One is that in ordinary-language, we use description and explanation often interchangeably. As a result of this, we tend to confuse context of discovery with that of explanation; for whereas the former is correlative with description, the latter with explanation; which amounts to be description of the nature of a fact on the basis of prior-knowledge. The *Navya-Nyāya* tends to raise a bogie of this kind of confusions, when it treats description of a *ghaṭa* and explanation of a *Dvyaṇukas* on-par. But further still, there is a more sweeping-symmetry between explanation and projective-arguments, such that in order that our explanation may stand we may project-facts and in so-far-as we may presume such facts to

be there, we may say our explanation is an explanation of their nature. Exploiting this sweeping-symmetry, we may come to push the projected-facts into the domain of these facts that fall within the context of discovery. What we conveniently-forget in such endeavors is that valid-projections can be based-upon accidental-generalisations of a limited-scope that have no explanatory-efficacy. In the context of discovery, there is no complete-symmetry between information and facts; while in the context of explanation and projective-arguments, there is such a symmetry. The reason for this difference is that grounds of explanation are not necessarily the grounds of warranted-assertion. Explanation, qua-explanation is not necessarily prone to describe the nature of cognised-facts alone; nature of projected-facts, too, can be attempted successfully to be described in terms of explanation. This is often lost sight of by the *Navya-Nyāya*, for example, seems to contend that whereas the nature of *taṅtus* as well as of *Paramāṇus* is explainable, each-one of them is given to us in the context of discovery. This is a case of sheer confusion-between the context of discovery and that of explanation.

Over-and-above these reasons, there is also an additional-ground of confusing-between the context of discovery and that of explanation. Such a ground is of confusing-between two different-kinds of priorities that figure in these two different-contexts. But we shall undertake a detailed-consideration of them in the next-chapter. For the present, it suffices for us to point-out that the *Navya-Nyāya* tends to confuse-between these two-contexts for an additional-reasons too.

Contexts of Explanation and Justification Contrasted

Explanation, we argued earlier in this chapter, is a description of the nature of a fact on the basis of the organisation of knowledge that a theory allows. It is often

presumed that what we explain is knowledge – both 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' to use Rylean phrase. But this is not necessarily the case. What a theory explains are facts, while what explanation offers is a description of the nature of facts. In seeking to do this it may peripherally touch-upon the problem of explaining 'knowing how', but it need not necessarily concentrate on this issue every-time. We must, however, remember certain important-considerations about explanation. They are: (1) for explanation, internal-consistency or coherence is a necessary-condition; while for justification it is a sufficient-condition. (2)Explanation can precede both in terms of symptomatic as-well-as defining-criteria, while justification can proceed in terms of defining-criterion alone. (3)Explanation can be given both in terms of constitutive as-well-as epistemic-conditions of a fact, while justification demands epistemic-conditions of facts only. (4) Lastly, whereas explanation can be satisfactory, even-if it gives us a redescription of the nature of a fact; for justification such redescription merely does not suffice.

Justification, on the contrary, is a warrant or vindication. When we ask for a justification, therefore, what we demand is warrantability or acceptability of a stand-point. Such a warrant is primarily of knowledge, and secondarily of facts. Asking for such a kind of acceptability or warrantability does not necessarily amount to asking for a justification of justification. To the extent to which one tends to ask such a question, one tends to open the road to the fallacy of infinite-regress. What we are, on the contrary, posing is not this question. We simply shall ask the question: on what grounds do we say or are we in a position to say that a given justification is acceptable?

Justification is the establishment of the warrantability of a particular-standpoint on the basis of a rule. Personal-

context of discovery is superseded by the impersonal-context of justification. Such an impersonal-context is an objective-context; and what is meant by an objective-context is, minimally-speaking, an agreed-context though not necessarily a fixed-one. This does not totally-preclude the possibility of demanding a fixed-context or a frame of reference. We shall, inquire into the considerations that demand such a fixed-justification in the seventh chapter.

Justification is, thus, an objective-establishment of the warrantability of a claim on the basis of a rule. Although every-justification is rule-prone, yet every justification is not necessarily based on the employment of the same-kind of rule. As it was argued earlier, justification can be on the basis of any-one kind of the following three kinds of rules:

(i) ***Constitutive-Rules*** – these are the rules that are prompted either by the constitutive-condition/s of a theory, or by the constitutive-condition/s of a fact. It may be asked, why do we argue that the constitutive-conditions of a theory and that of facts are different? Can constitutive-condition/s of facts themselves not be constitutive-condition/s of a theory? The constitutive-condition/s of a theory and that of facts would be the same, provided (a) every concept that is admitted in a theory is a concept about a cognised-fact, and (b) every concept that is defined amounts to be a concept, descriptive-about cognised-facts. But this unfortunately is not the case at least so-far-as the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is concerned; for it not-only admits cognised-facts but-also those that are not cognised. This being the case, the constitutive-condition of a theory that admits cognised-facts alone and the one that admits cognised as-well-as projected ones will not necessarily be the same. It is for this reason that we have made the above-distinction, although we do not want to consider this point further in this chapter. We may note, however, in passing that everything in the world

has either atomic or molecular-structure. Structure is such a constitutive-consideration available in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. It is further interesting to note that this is considered to be a feature of any entity whatever.

(ii) ***Regulative-Rules*** – These are the rules that are neither backed-by the constitutive-conditions of a theory, nor by the constitutive-conditions of fact/s. They are, on the contrary, the rules that are backed-by the satisfactory-explanation of the nature of facts. What such rules, in other words, enable us to offer is a particular kind of explanation of facts. Consider, for instance, the view of the *Navya-Nyāya* that our perception is always *Savikalpaka*, and that *Nirvikalpaka-Pratyakṣa* is available to us only by abstraction. From this it automatically follows that our perception is always complex and being so many ingredients of it discernible is a permanent-possibility.

(iii) ***Engineered-Rules*** – such rules are those that are created to make certain theoretical-adjustments, which independently of them would be impossible. We can cite two-examples of such engineered-rules from the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. They are: (1) *'Yena indriyeṇa yat gṛhyate tena eva indriyeṇa tadgatā jātiḥ tadabhāvaḥ ca gṛhyate/'* or (2) *'utpannaṁ dravyaṁ kṣaṇaṁ ekaṁ nirguṇaṁ avatiṣṭhate/'*. Any justification is acceptable, provided it establishes warrantability of a claim on the basis of anyone of these kinds of rules. But a theory that accepts all such rules, the *Navya-Nyāya* theory does, creates other tensions in it some of which indeed may remain unsurmountable. We shall notice some such tensions in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory in the chapters to follow in sequel.

Justification demands both constitutive and epistemic-conditions. But whereas in explanation both these conditions are used interchangeably, for describing the nature of a fact; in justification, on the contrary, a distinction between them

is always insisted-upon. Such a distinction is that we always tend to justify constitutive-conditions of a fact on the basis of epistemic ones. Further, justification does demand internal-consistency of a theory, as a sufficient-condition. Whereas just the fact that internal-consistency obtains may warrant explanation, it may not necessarily warrant justification. Lastly, the only kind of questions that can be asked about justification are: whether it is valid, warranted etc., while the question about explanation is whether it is correct.

Possibility of Alternative-Justifications

It may be argued that in ordinary-considerations, we often use explanation and justification interchangeably. This is what happens, for example, when we give reasons. But this is not the ground to maintain that distinction-between explanation and justification should be done away-with. A theory, in principle, should not rule-out such a distinction. Further, we must also make a distinction-between 'justification of explanation' on the one-hand, and 'explanation of justification' on the other. Out of these, the former means defence of explanation, and such a defence should be theory-prone. Asking for an 'explanation of justification', on the contrary, boils-down either to asking 'justification of justification', or asking the grounds of the acceptability of justification. Of these the former, as remarked-earlier, leads to the fallacy of infinite-regress; while the latter amounts to answering the question: what kind of rule has been made use of to establish a particular-claim. Different kinds of rules on the basis of which a justification can be offered have already been considered-above.

Further it may be argued that as alternative-explanations are possible, so too, alternative-justifications should be possible. What this amounts to sayings is that as we cannot apriorily rule-out alternative-explanations; so also we cannot

apriorily rule-out alternative-justifications. But we must remember that reasons due to which alternative-explanation/s and justification/s become possible are different. Alternative-explanations become possible for following reasons–

Explanation is possible either in terms of constitutive or epistemic-conditions of a fact. Explanations are possible either on the basis of symptomatic or defining-criterion. Explanation being description of the nature of a fact, it may be either description of the structural-nature of a fact, or functional-nature of a fact. Lastly, explanation may be of the nature of either a cognised-fact, or a projected-fact.

Alternative-justifications, on the contrary, may become possible for the following reasons – (i) employment of different-kinds of rules, or (ii) different-kinds of categorical-considerations.

The *Navya-Nyāya* Confusion-between Explanation and Justification

There arise two problems: (a) whether the *Navya-Nyāya* confuses-between explanation and justification, and (b) whether it confuses-between alternative-explanations and alternative-justifications. Out of these, we shall first deal with the first-alternative. There are at least some-instances which go to show that the *Navya-Nyāya* does confuse-between explanation and justification. To show this, let us take the example of the *Padārtha* called *Abhāva*. The *Navya-Nyāya* considers, as was argued in the first chapter, both contrary as-well-as contradictory-terms as equally plausible-modes of explaining the import of negative-predicates. It was argued there that it is this point which it seeks to bring-out when it classifies both *Bheda* (*Anyonyābhāva*) and negation (*Atyantābhava*) under *Abhāva*. But it is precisely in this endeavour that it seems to usher-in the confusion we are talking about. For the explanation of difference *Bheda* suffices.

But if negation is to be vindicated or justified, what we require as a necessary-condition is not contrariety but a contradiction. We shall never be in a position to justify negation on the basis of contrariety, unless contextually contraries function as contradictories. But this is sheerly a contingent-state of affair, and we shall not be in a position to maintain that contraries must function as contradictories under any circumstance. Explanation is possible not-only on the basis of the consideration of contrariety, but-also on the basis of the consideration of contradictories. But negation can be justified solely on the basis of contradictories. In so-far-as the *Navya-Nyāya* classifies *Bheda* as well as negation under *Abhāva*, our contention is that it ushers-in a confusion-between explanation and justification.

An Additional-Confusion

We need to sharpen, further, the considerations that we brought-forward with regard to the distinction-between explanation and justification, in order to show that the *Navya-Nyāya* is also prone to give rise to an additional-confusion. That is the confusion-between alternative-explanations and alternative-justifications. *Prima-facie* it is plausible to maintain that there can be alternative-explanations as-well-as alternative-justifications. Such alternative-explanations must be obviously compatible with one-another, if they are to count as alternative-explanations. If somebody is asked, for example, to explain his action/s in a particular-situation, he may say that he did it either because it is customary to do so, or because it was in accordance with the dictates of his conscience, or because he considers it to be an obedience to a divine-command. These are alternative-explanations and all of them are compatible with one-another, in the sense that none of them is inconsistent with one-another. But a question may be raised: as there can be alternative-explanations, so too can there be alternative-justifications?

The answer is in the affirmative. But whereas compatibility-guarantees alternative-explanations, it does not guarantee alternative-justifications. Alternative-justifications are not considered to be alternative, simply because they are compatible with one-another but rather because they are co-tenable. Hence, what determines alternative-justifications to be alternative is that they are co-tenable. So, from the fact that two justifications are compatible with each-other, it does not at all follow that they are co-tenable. Co-tenability does not rule-out compatibility. Yet, compatibility is not a criterion of co-tenability. But what it insists-upon, however, is something over-and-above this. Various arguments for the existence of God – cosmological, teleological etc. – are co-tenable-justifications of our belief in God. But they may also function as alternative-explanations of our belief in God, simply because these arguments are compatible with each-other. Two justifications are co-tenable, provided the categorial-considerations that are involved in each-one of them are the same. To put it differently, two justifications are co-tenable, provided both of them involve the same-scheme of concepts. Different categorial-considerations or different-scheme of concepts may give rise to compatible-justifications, but not necessarily to co-tenable-justifications.

Now, it is the case that to make an allowance for alternative-justifications, at least theoretically, does result into weakening the claim of justification. For, other things remaining the same, we normally-expect that in a given-context one individual should advance one-justification. Hence, if one advances alternative-justifications in a given-context to that extent one weakens his claim, or rather comes practically to give-up his claim for justification. It is for this reason, therefore, to reinforce and fortify the claim that out of the possible alternative-justifications particular one-alone is tenable, one comes to bring-in additional-considerations. We shall consider in the seventh chapter the situations under

which such a claim happens to be made, and what kind of additional-factors happen to be brought-in to make such a claim.

There is an additional-consideration as to why we come to confuse explanation with justification. Since compatibility warrants alternative-justifications, forgetting that what warrants alternativity of alternative-justifications is their co-tenability; we may argue that compatibility also warrants co-tenable-justifications. This kind of mistake the *Navya-Nyāya*, unfortunately, commits in its theory. *Pratyakṣa* as-well-as *Anumāna* are compatible-modes of offering explanation of the nature of reals, and such alternative-modes of explanation are compatible with each-other. But from this the *Navya-Nyāya* often jumps to the conclusion that 'Perception' as-well-as 'Inference' are co-tenable modes of justifying that there are reals, and hence the reals that so come to the foreground, too, are co-tenable. It is not, unless we confuse-between explanation and justification on the one-hand and compatibility and co-tenability on the other-hand that we shall be in a position to maintain this.

Consider another-instance. This is an instance of confusing compatibility with co-tenability on the one-hand, and between alternative-explanations and alternative-justifications on the-other. The problem under-consideration is that of *Prāmāṇya* of *Vedas*, and justifying them. The *Navya-Nyāya* argues that the *Vedas* are *Pramāṇa*, because they are created by *Īśvara*, while according to the *Mīmāṁsā* the *Vedas* are *Pramāṇa*, because they are *Nitya*.

These two-justifications are given in terms of two different-schemas of concepts, or in terms of different categorial-considerations. As we had argued earlier, different-categories lead to compatible-justifications or explanations; but not necessarily to co-tenable-justifications. The *Navya-Nyāya* attack on the *Mīmāṁsā* justification of its

view of the *Prāmāṇya* of the *Vedas* that it is unwarranted is understandable, provided it seeks merely to maintain that both these justifications are not co-tenable. But what in the heart-of-hearts it seeks to impress upon the *Mīmāṁsā* is that *Mīmāṁsā* justification is not-only not-co-tenable with its own, but-also that it is incompatible with its own. Since compatibility is not synonymous with co-tenability, from the fact that two-justifications are not co-tenable it does not at all follow that they, therefore, are not compatible too. Such a consideration springs-from the confusion-between compatibility and co-tenability. Further, from the fact that these two-justifications fail to be alternative-justifications, it does not follow that they cannot even be alternative-explanations.

These various points taken-together bring-out, it is presumed, the fact that the *Navya-Nyāya*, at least sometimes, confuses or tends to confuse-between context of discovery, explanation and that of justification. It also confuses-between compatibility and co-tenability on the one-hand, and between consistency and co-tenability on the-other. Further, the *Navya-Nyāya* also confuses, at least sometimes, between alternative-explanations and alternative-justification. The *Navya-Nyāya* theory, however, also confuses-between different-priorities: ontological, epistemological, logical and chronological. We turn to the consideration of this problem in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. I am extremely grateful to Dr. R. Sunder Rajan and Prof. S. S. Barlingay for their invaluable-suggestions that I received from both of them in developing the line of argument that is presented in this chapter.

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Chapter-6

Priority: Ontological, Epistemological, Logical and Temporal

Introduction

We argued towards the end of the fourth chapter that any theory worth the name must be in a position to institute, stand-by and utilise certain fundamental-distinctions, without-falling into confusions. We showed in the last chapter that out-of the two fundamental-distinctions that a theory could be expected to employ, the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, as it was outlined in the fourth chapter, is unable, without-falling into confusions, always to stand by the distinction-between the context of discovery, explanation and that of justification. In this chapter, in endeavour to show that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is not-only unable always to demarcate various-priorities from one-another, but-also that it positively seems to confuse among them. We shall also argue that this outcome is further strengthened and reinforced not so-much by sheer employment of the *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model at the hands of the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, but rather by an improper-use of it. It will be shown that both these considerations jointly and severally give rise to such confusions that the *Navya-Nyāya* seems just unable to surmount.

In order to be able to deal with this entire complex-issue, we shall break the complete discussion into four main-points. First, we shall consider the issue of different-types and kinds

of priorities. We shall also distinguish one-priority from-another. Secondly, we shall explain the general-format of the *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model that the *Navya-Nyāya* makes use of. Then we shall state, as elaborately as possible, the way in which this model can be put to different-misuses. Thirdly, we shall spell-out the ways in which issues that arise in terms of priorities, and those that arise in terms of *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model could be combined. Lastly, we shall bring-out some of the important-confusions that seem to have been given rise to in the frame of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory.

Aristotelian and the *Navya-Nyāya* Discussion of Priority Contrasted

Both Aristotle and philosophers of the *Navya-Nyāya* school have employed the notions of prior and posterior. But, while the notions of prior and posterior, and the distinction-between them in Aristotelian-form a distinction that is patterned-according to the formal-demands of the principle of contrariety, in the *Navya-Nyāya* it is patterned-according to the formal-demands of the reductive-methodology that it adopts. Further, whereas in Aristotle the notions of prior and posterior constitute such notions as are useful for understanding of the linear-character of various-developments and actions, whether taken either against the background of the locus provided by what may be called subject-in-process, or separately in comparison-between distinct-events; in the *Navya-Nyāya* these notions are employed as instruments of bridging the two-poles of its theory, namely 'ontological-individualism' on the one-hand and 'methodological-holism' on the-other. It is for this reason that whereas in Aristotle, the doctrine of potentiality and actuality gathers so much importance; in the *Navya-Nyāya*, on the contrary, it has practically no role to play. This kind of difference may further be due to the fact that whereas the world Aristotle is dealing with is the dynamic, developing

and changing-world; while the world *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to be concerned-with is essentially, if not solely, the static and discrete-world. Be that as it may. Some of these points will become clear, it is hoped, as we shall proceed. But the reason they are made here is precisely this that it would help us keeping certain comparisons out of our considerations.

Two Modes of Classification of Priority Contrasted

Prior means earlier in some respect or the other; while posterior means later in some or the other respect. As we shall see in the sequel, there are two important-modes of arriving at a classification of different-priorities. But there are two very-fundamental differences-between them and they are:

i. Both these classifications are not-only based on different *fundamentum-divisionis*[1], but also on that whereas one-classification gives us different-'types of priorities'; the other-classification gives us different-'kinds of priorities'[2].

ii. Even though there are some circumstances where both these classifications-overlap, and partially, if not wholly, converge-upon each-other; yet we shall not be in a position to maintain that they must so necessarily overlap and converge.

(I) Contextual/Individualistic Classification of Priors and Posteriors

We argued above that out-of the two-classifications of priorities that can be envisaged, one gives us different-'types' of priors and posteriors. The *fundamentum-divisionis* on which it is based is: what 'type' of individual is considered to be prior to some-other individual? The consideration, namely what 'type' of individual it is, is settled by taking into account the 'type' of context within which it is considered to be prior

or posterior. We do not wish to maintain that wherever any individual is considered to be prior or posterior to some-other individual, it must be so considered in exactly the same-sense. That is why the considerations in terms of priority and posteriority in different-contexts come to gather different-imports. But the point to be remembered, however, is that wherever we consider anything to be prior to something else, it is always in terms of the one or the other-sense of 'earlier-than'. Similar consideration applies to the issue regarding posterior too.

If we pool together different-'types' of considerations in terms of contextual-priority and posteriority then we shall find that they can readily be classified under four main-groups. They are:

(a) ***Ontological-Priority:*** Something is considered to be prior or earlier-than something else, provided it is 'prior in order of being'. Hence, in this consideration those individuals would be considered to be prior, which are first as compared with others in order of being, or coming to be. We shall call this type of priority as 'ontological-priority'. The corresponding-posteriority we shall call 'ontological-posteriority'. The thing or individual that is considered to be prior-ontologically, or in order of being is so related to the individual that is considered to be ontologically-posterior that the former is responsible at least for the emergence of the latter; if not for both emergence as-well-as survival and continuation. This kind of priority is to be distinguished from natural-priority, which we shall consider later.

(b) ***Epistemological-Priority:*** Something may be considered to be prior to something else, provided it is prior in 'order of knowing' or knowledge. But that which is considered to be prior in knowledge, may be prior either in perception, or cognition, or in explanation. That which is prior in perception or cognition need not necessarily be prior

in explanation; or conversely that which is prior in explanation need not necessarily be prior in perception or cognition. We shall call anything that is prior in knowledge in anyone of these two senses as 'epistemologically-prior' in general; while we shall call that which is prior in explanation as 'explanatorily-prior'; and that which is prior in perception or cognition as 'perceptually or cognitively-prior'. The corresponding-posteriors will be named accordingly.

(c) *Logical-Priority:* Something may be considered as prior to something else, provided it is logically or definitionally-prior. We shall call that which is considered to be prior to something else in this sense as 'logically-prior'; and the corresponding-posterior we shall call as 'logically-posterior'. Although everything that is logically-prior is considered to be so for the sake of justification, everything that is considered to be prior for the sake of justification is not necessarily be logically-prior; for very often explanation itself is used as justification. Wherever explanation is used as justification, that which is 'explanatorily-prior' also becomes 'justificatory-prior'; but just for this reason alone it does not become 'logically-prior'. Hence, justificatory-priority is a sufficient-condition for logical-priority. That which is considered to be logically or definitionally-prior must be the one that figures in the definition of the formula or a concept. Whether it is also used to justify a claim or not is an altogether irrelevant-consideration about its being considered to be logically-prior. Lastly,

(d) *Temporal-Priority:* Anything is considered to be prior to something else, provided it is first chronologically or in terms of time. We shall call anything that is considered to be prior in this sense as 'temporally-prior' and we shall call the corresponding-posterior as 'temporally-posterior'. Priors and posteriors of this type are also sometimes taken to be historically or chronologically-priors and posteriors

respectively, since what determines earlier and later in history or chronology is the consideration of time.

(II) Perspectival and Methodological Priors and Posteriors

Another very important-mode of considering the distinction-between prior and posterior is the one that gives us a broad-class, rather 'kind' of those that are considered to be either prior or posterior. Such consideration again may come to the foreground on two different-planes, and accordingly we get two main-classifications. These two different-planes are: (1) that of language, and (2) that of a method.

(1) ***Linguistic Priority and Posteriority:*** On the plane of language, what we get is one-'kind' of priority; while on the plane of a method, the kind of priority that we get is of another-'kind'. We do not wish to maintain that just the fact that there is a language (which) gives rise to an issue in terms of priority and posteriority. What we do wish, to maintain, however, is that a particular-view about language may, nay sometimes does, give rise to an issue in terms of priority of a particular-'kind'. Consider, for example, the view that our language is of 'S-P form'. We had already argued in the second chapter that for the *Navya-Nyāya* language is of 'S-P form'. That is, according to *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers all-statements in our language are of 'S-P form', no matter whether they are stated-explicitly in this form or not. This is how, we argued there, even degenerate-statements fit-into this form; for they can be so redressed that they come to assume this form. We shall consider fuller-implications of the *Navya-Nyāya* views in terms of the issue of priority-later. Suffice it for the present to point-out that there can be a view of language that it is of 'S-P form'. What this view boils-down to is the consideration that every-statement is of 'S-P form'. On this view, every predicate is a predicate of some-subject, and it is the subject that has the property or properties

that a predicate brings or is supposed to bring to the foreground. But if something is said to be having a particular-property, the one that is said to have that property should naturally be there. This is a very simple-consideration, and is summarised in Aristotelian maxim "to be A, presupposes to be". Since we have been talking on the plane of language, the whole issue boils-down to saying that subject possesses a predicate; and in order to be able to say properly that a subject has a predicate, we need to presuppose that there is a subject. Subject possesses a predicate, but there must be subject prior to its coming to possess a predicate. Although our explanation is couched in temporal-terminology, it is not this consideration that is intended to be brought-out. The priority of a subject, understanding it to be that which has a predicate-predicated to it, is what may be called 'priority of possession'; and what is meant by it is that subject should be prior to its coming to have a predicate. The predicate, on the contrary, or that a subject-possesses is considered to be posterior. This classification of priors and posteriors does classify-expressions into subjects and predicates on the one-hand; and if every expression, significant of course, is considered to be a name of some individual, then it gives us a classification of those that are named or individuals on the-other. But equally interestingly, if predicative-expressions are taken as names, as they are taken in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, then it also gives us a classification of names as priors and posteriors. But it is important to remember that what this classification gives us is a very broad-'class' or 'kind' of priors and posteriors. This classification, nevertheless, is not at-all a pointer to the classification of priors or posteriors into 'types'.

(2) ***Methodological Priority and Posteriority:*** Consider another similar-attempt at classifying priors and posteriors. Whereas the attempt that we just considered arises on the plane of language, the one that we intend to now consider

arises on the plane of adopting a particular-method. This classification of priors and posteriors can, therefore, be said to be a 'methodological-one'. In this consideration anything is considered to be prior, provided it is located to be so in any mode that is conceivable. What this consideration gives us is, what may be called, 'priority of locus'; while the corresponding-posteriority may be called 'posteriority of locus'. For instance, in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, the ontological-individuals are prior and methodological-wholes are posterior, in this sense in so-far-as their being taken to be so is prompted by the theory of atomism and the method of construction and reduction. Just as, the earlier considered classification gives us very broadly-considered classes of priors and posteriors, so too this classification; but there is a considerable-difference. Whereas the first is the classification of priors and posteriors on the plane of language; the second is on the plane of a method. In other-words, whereas the first is the linguistic-classification; the second is the methodological-one. As the first-classification of priors and posteriors is not at all a pointer to their 'types', so too is the second-classification. Apart from these differences-between these two-classifications of priors and posteriors, there is one more-difference that is of fundamental-importance. That difference is that whereas the first-classification gives us what may be called 'substantival-priority or posteriority'; the second-classification gives us what may be called 'substantial-priority or posteriority'.

At the same time, we must note one point extremely-carefully. 'Priority of locus' and 'priority of substratum' are not synonymous. We have already argued that what priority of 'substratum' gives us is what may be called 'substantial-priority' or priority in terms of 'substances'. But what priority of 'locus' may give us are the 'reductive-components'. In other-words, it may give us such components into which or to which a complex or a compound could be shown to be

reducible. But such 'reductive-components' may not necessarily be the 'structural-components or substrata'. Since 'substance' and 'locus' are not necessarily identical, the priority that the priority of 'locus' gives us does not necessarily give us 'substantial' priority or posteriority. That is, 'substantival-components' and 'methodological or reductive-components' may be interchangeably-substitutable. For, what 'substantival or substantial-components' give us is 'division or breaking'; while what 'methodological or reductive-components' give us are '*analysens*'. These two are neither the same nor on-par with each-other. This is often lost sight of. But more about it, in connection with the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, later.

Ādhāra-Ādheya Model of the *Navya-Nyāya*

Earlier we dwelled on the consideration of different-modes of accounting-for priorities and posteriorities. Let us now turn to the consideration of the *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model that the *Navya-Nyāya* so favourably-employs. Given any language it can be said, at least *prima-facie*, that it brings to the foreground some consideration in terms of *Ādhāra* and *Ādheya*. This is a correct-insight of philosophers of the *Navya-Nyāya*. This is, of course, not tantamount to maintaining that given any language, the same-kind of consideration in terms of *Ādhāra* and *Ādheya* cannot help coming to the foreground. What we wish to maintain minimally is that given any language, some or the other kind of consideration in terms of *Ādhāra* and *Ādheya* is connected with it. This may be a contingent-feature of a language. That is, *Ādhāra-Adheya* consideration is not a necessary-condition of there being a language at all. But it is a fact, nevertheless, that with any language such consideration is very-closely associated. We may say, using Humian language, that the fact-of such association-between any-language and *Ādhāra-Ādheya* consideration is a matter of constant-contiguity, rather-than of necessity. Be that as it may.

In the *Navya-Nyāya* consideration, the terms *Ādhāra*[3] and *Adhikaraṇa* on the one-hand, and respectively the terms *Ādheya* and *Vṛtti* on the other-hand are used interchangeably. Along with these terms, the terms *Āśraya* and *Āśrita* respectively are also used. Although the terms *Ādhāra, Adhikaraṇa* and *Āśraya* on the one-hand; and the terms *Ādheya, Vṛtti* and *Āśrita* on the other-hand are, thus, used interchangeably, they cannot be taken to be synonymous; unless such an interchangeability is also combined with certain-confusions of very profound-implications. We shall come to deal with some such confusions in the sequel. Suffice it for the present to note that these terms are used by *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers interchangeably. Our hunch, however, is that each-one of these pairs seem to be correlated with a different-consideration. It seems that *Adhikaraṇa-Vṛtti* pair is correlative to the distinction between subject and predicate, as also being the consideration in terms of *Kārakas* on the plane of language; and hence, seems to be pointer to the substantial-priority and posteriority. It is this consideration that seems to give rise to the classification of reals into separable and distinguishable in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. The *Ādhāra-Adheya* pair, on the contrary, it seems, is correlative to the distinction-between contextual-priority and posteriority of any-variety, and is a pointer to the individual-priority. The *Āśraya-Āśrayī,* or what is often called *Āśraya-Āśrita* pair seems to be correlative with the distinction-between priority and posteriority of locus, and is a pointer to the substrata and hence to reductive-priority and posteriority. It appears that it is this consideration that seems to bring-in the classification of reals into ontological-individuals and methodological-wholes, the latter being methodologically-reducible to the former.

Misuses of *Ādhāra-Ādheya* Model

As remarked earlier, neither substantival nor substantial,

nor again substratial-priority or posteriority can be correlated with ontological, epistemological, logical or even temporal-priority or posteriority. For, whereas the priorities of the first-kind are very-broad, ambiguous and inclusive of various-types of priorities, priorities of the latter-variety are more-stringent, precise and exclusive of one-another in a certain sense at least. Ontological, epistemological, logical and temporal-priors may coincide-contingently. But from the fact that either temporal and ontological, or ontological and epistemological, or even epistemological and logical-priors may and do coincide-contingently; it does not necessarily-follow that they must so coincide or that they cannot help so coinciding with each-other in every possible-world and in every possible-consideration. This is often neglected, nay overlooked, and in-turn that gives rise to some of the very-serious philosophical-blunders. We shall meet with some of them, as we proceed, in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory.

However, what is of paramount-importance, for the present, for us to note is that the *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model that the *Navya-Nyāya* employs brings to the foreground three-important, and yet different-considerations. On the plane of language, it brings to the foreground what may be called 'substantival-priority'. On the plane of a context, it brings-forward what may be called 'priority of individuals'; while on the plane of a theory and methodology, it brings to the forefront what may be called 'reductive-priority'. Confusion-between the first-two gives rise to the view that linguistic and contextual-priorities are isomorphic with each-other. The confusion-between second and third, on the contrary, gives rise to the blunder that contextual and reductive-priorities are of the same-sort; while confusion-between first and third engenders the view that linguistic and reductive-priorities are the same. But worse-still, the *Navya-Nyāya* contention that *Ādhāra*, *Adhikaraṇa* and *Āśraya* on the one-hand; and *Ādheya*, *Vṛtti* and *Āśrita* on the other-hand are to be used-

interchangeably, gives rise to a horrible-confusion that linguistic, contextual and reductive-priorities are one and the same. What we are protesting against is not the contingent-fact, where they may coincide. Our protest rather is directed at the contention, which the *Navya-Nyāya* seems unfortunately to uphold that they must so-coincide, come what may. It will be apparent, it is hoped, as we proceed, that this contention which the *Navya-Nyāya* seems to uphold and defend paves-a-way for philosophical-calamities.

Combination of the Model and Priorities

We argued earlier that ontological-priority is that consideration in terms of which it comes to be maintained that something is prior in order of being. Such priority need not necessarily be what may be called 'ultimate-priority'. That is, what is considered to be ontological-prior need not necessarily be 'ultimately-prior', in the sense that it is posterior to nothing. That which is considered to be ontologically-prior may be the one that is prior to some arbitrarily-selected individual. For instance, in the *Navya-Nyāya* consideration, *Dvyaṇuka* is ontologically-prior to *Tryaṇuka*, or *tantus* is ontologically-prior to a *paṭa*. But none of them is ultimately-prior, in the sense that nothing is prior to any-one or both of them. Further, that which is considered to be ontologically-prior, being that which is prior in order of being, may be so as a matter of fact or because it is supposed to be so. Thus, for something being considered as ontologically-prior, it must not necessarily be the case that it is prior as a matter of fact. Hence, ontological-priority, qua-ontological-priority is unable to distinguish-between matter of fact ontological-priority and supposed to be ontological-priority. This is how *Paramāṇus* as-well-as *tantus* are considered to be ontologically-prior. But it can hardly be said that each-one of them is prior as a matter of fact. A failure to make a distinction of the above-kind may lead us to maintain

that both of them are ontologically-prior in exactly the same-sense.

When we come to epistemological-priority, which we argued, may be either a perceptual or explanatory-priority, similar-kind of confusion may prevail. For instance, when we say, and so too the *Navya-Nyāya* argues, that we are really perceiving a *ghaṭa*, a *ghaṭa* is perceptually-prior to our assertion. But when we say that we perceive a *ghaṭa* such that it is a *ghaṭatvāvacchinna* (*vastu*), *ghaṭatva* is prior. But it is not perceptually-prior, rather it is explanatorily-prior. That which is explanatorily-prior need not necessarily be perceptually-prior. Not only this. Even if something is not at all perceptually-given to us, then also it can be said to be explanatorily and hence epistemologically-prior. But the *Navya-Nyāya* does not keep perceptual and explanatory-priority apart or distinct-from each-other. On the contrary it presumes that that which is explanatorily-prior must also be perceptually-prior. It comes to defend this presupposition in terms of an engineered-rule that "*yena indriyeṇa yat gṛhyate tena eva indriyeṇa tadgatā jātiḥ tadabhāvaḥ ca gṛhyate*"[4]. This rule is in a position to justify that when we say that we perceive a *ghaṭa* that is *ghaṭatvāvacchinna (vastu)*, it is not only a *ghaṭa* but also *ghaṭatva* (both) are given to us, perceptually and that both these perceptual-priors explain our statement. This is clearly a mistake. To explain the above-mentioned statement we may be requiring two priors, but for that reason both of them need-not at-all be perceptual-priors. One of them is perceptual-prior, while another is explanatory-prior; although both of them are epistemological-priors. But since the *Navya-Nyāya* confuses-between perceptual and explanatory-priors, it comes to maintain that both of them are epistemological-priors of the same-sort.

The error of the *Navya-Nyāya* regarding ontological-priority is to confuse-between necessary-condition of making

a statement, and necessary-condition of the ascertainability of the truth-value of a statement. For, while ontological-priority of a fact is a necessary-condition of the ascertainability of the truth-value of a statement, it is not a necessary-condition of making a statement at-all. The error of the *Navya-Nyāya* regarding epistemological-priorities of two-sorts is that of confusing-between the necessary-condition of description of an empirical-fact, and explanation of it. For, whereas the necessary-condition of the description of an empirical-fact is that it is perceptually-given to us, while the necessary-condition of explanation is not the consideration that that in terms of which we explain must be given to us perceptually or cognitively; no matter whether prior or posterior.

Turning to logically or definitional-priority. That which is considered to be logically or definitionally-prior is considered to be so, as was argued earlier, provided it is an element of the definition of a concept or a formula. But in our consideration of logically-prior three kinds of errors may creep-in, and each-one of them is dangerous-philosophically. First, we may slip-into saying that that which is logically-prior is also ontologically or epistemologically-prior. Confusion of logical with ontologically-prior is based-upon the mistake of elevating contingent-consideration that what is ontologically-prior may also be logically-prior, to the position of necessary-connection; and this is obviously unwarranted. For, whereas the former obtains in-connection with 'matters of fact', the latter is obtainable solely in the realm of 'relations of ideas'; and confusion-between the two is philosophically-disastrous. Confusion of that which is logically-prior with that which is epistemologically-prior understood of-course as explanatorily-prior, on the contrary, brings in the confusion of explanation with justification. Although it is a fact that occasionally-explanation itself is used as a justification, from this it does not necessarily follow

that they must be always so interchangeably-used. Secondly, we may slip-into the contention that an element of a formula or a concept, and the parts of which something is composed are identical. Elements of definition of a formula are logically-prior; and yet the formula or a concept is not resoluble into them, although definition of a concept or a formula is. For instance, figure which is an element of the definition of a circle is not the part of it into which it is resoluble. On the contrary, the segments of a circle into which it is resoluble, being parts of it, do not at-all occur in the definition of a circle. But this distinction is often lost-sight of. In the *Navya-Nyāya* it is on the basis of such confusion that it sometimes comes to be maintained that 'members of a set' are also 'members of a concept'. A cow (*go*), so is maintained by some *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers[5] at-least, is a 'member of the set of cows', but-certainly-not of cowness (*gotva*). Thirdly, we may confuse-between logical-priority and natural-priority. Anything is naturally-prior to anything else, if that which is prior can exist without that which is posterior to it; but-not *vice-versa*. For instance, points are naturally-prior to lines, or lines are naturally-prior to planes. Similarly *Paramāṇus* are naturally-prior to *tantus*[6]. But this does not mean that they are logically-prior.

Anything is considered to be temporally or chronologically-prior, provided it is 'earlier in time'. Now, anything that is 'temporally-prior' need-not-necessarily be 'ontologically-prior' or 'logically-prior'. But this is often-overlooked. As a result of this kind of overlooking, it comes to be maintained that that which is 'temporally-prior' must also be 'ontologically-prior'. That which is either ontologically or naturally-prior may be temporally-prior. But even this need not necessarily be the case. At least with reference to that which is ontologically-prior, it may be argued, there seems to be no plausible-hitch in accepting that it is also temporally-prior. But this argument is untenable. Afterall

what is meant by saying that something is ontologically-prior, is that it is prior 'in order of being'. This is so. But as it was argued earlier, something that is supposed to be may also be considered to be ontologically-prior. It is quite-obvious that if what is considered to be ontologically-prior is something of this kind, it cannot be temporally-prior. The *Navya-Nyāya* contention that *Paramāṇus* are temporally-prior to *Dvyaṇukas*[7], on this count, therefore, is untenable. If they are so, it must be established to be so independently of this presupposition. Further, that which is naturally-prior, say points to line or planes to solids, too need not be temporally-prior. This is not of-course to say that that which is either naturally or ontologically-prior cannot at-all be temporally-prior. Our only contention is that it is wrong to presume that such must always be the case, nay, it cannot help so being the case. This is the kind of mistake the *Navya-Nyāya* commits, when it maintains that *Sāmānya* called *ghaṭatva* is prior to *ghaṭa*[8]. Some *Navya-Nyāya Paṇdits* stretch the contention to the absurdity saying that we cannot even utter the expression *ghaṭa*, unless *ghaṭatva* is given to us, i.e. *ghaṭatva* is taken to be prior to *ghaṭa*. It is absurd, because *ghaṭatva* need-not be considered to be prior both for cognition of a *ghaṭa* as also for utterance of the expression *ghaṭa*. The priority of *ghaṭatva* is purely explanatory-priority, and has nothing to do with utterance or cognition.

In the same way that which is temporally-prior need not necessarily be logically-prior. But this consideration, too, is often missed. When it is maintained, for instance, that *tantus* are prior to *paṭa;* there are two mistakes involved here. One is the consideration that temporal-priority of *Kāraṇa* is a necessary-condition or defining-characteristic of anything that is considered as *Kārya*[9]. This is, however, not always the case; for constant-conjunction of *Kāraṇa* with *Kārya* also suffices. The *Navya-Nyāya* exhibits this bias, when it maintains that *Kāraṇa* is that which is invariably prior

(*pūrvavarti*) of *Kārya*. But in this, the *Navya-Nyāya* is in company with many others[10]. Let us leave this consideration here without any additional-ado about it. Even if we take into account the contention that that which is temporally-prior must also be logically-prior, we shall come to note that even this is beset with confusion. It is not that which is called *Kāraṇa* that is logically-prior to that which is called *Kārya*. It is *Kāraṇa* that is logically-prior of *Kārya*. Temporal-priority, granting that it is sensible, is the priority of that which is called *Kāraṇa* in a given-context; while logical-priority of *Kāraṇa* is a definitional-priority. And hence a priority is of an element of the definition of a formula or a concept to the definition of a formula or a concept. Something that is called *Kāraṇa* may be temporally-posterior to that which is logically-prior. It is a grave-error to maintain that that which is temporally-prior is also logically-prior. This is not to say that temporal and logical-priorities do not and need-not at-all coincide. Our only contention is that they need not necessarily so coincide.

It is possible to confuse-between different-'types' of priorities on the one-hand, so also it is possible to confuse-between different-'kinds' of priorities. In empirical or ontological-reconstruction, the priority of being that is involved in ontological-priority, the priority of knowledge that is involved in epistemological-priority, and the definitional or of the nature of a stuff-priority that is involved in logical-priority just coincide with the priority of substratum. But empirical-reconstruction does not coincide with ontological-reconstruction. Hence, the substantival-priority that such a reconstruction-demands does not coincide necessarily with the priority of substratum or substance. Further, the substantival-priority that the 'S-P view' of language presupposes does neither necessarily coincide with the substantial nor with the substantival-priority. But this is very often not taken careful note of. Further still, the priority

of knowledge that reconstruction of human-knowledge presupposes, need not necessarily presuppose perceptual or cognitive-priority. Even explanatory-priority suffices for this purpose. This, too, is often-overlooked. Lastly, what logical-priority that is involved in logical-reconstruction demands is that that which is considered to be prior is such that it is an element of a formula or of a concept, in the sense that it figures in the definition of it. Such a priority has neither an aura of ontological, nor of temporal-priority. This, too, unfortunately, is very often lost-sight of.

As a result of this kind of situation that may come to prevail, one not-only comes to confuse different-'kinds' of priorities with one-another on the one-hand, but one also comes to confuse different-'types' of priorities with one-another on the other-hand. But graver still one may come to confuse any-one priority with any-other priority that is conceivable.

Confusions in the *Navya-Nyāya*

It is this kind of situation which comes to the foreground in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. The acceptance of the fact that three pairs of terms viz. *Adhikaraṇa* and *Vṛtti*, *Ādhāra* and *Adheya*, and *Āśraya* and *Āśrayī* are interchangeable respectively, makes *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to commit themselves to the view that linguistic-consideration leading to substantival-priority, contextual-considerations leading to individual-priority, and reductive-considerations leading to substantial-priority, too, are interchangeable. Hence, they arrive at a view that these priorities are just isomorphic with one-another. What they forget in this entire-strategy that they employ is that something that is called a subject-in-process can always become a grammatical-subject, but that which is a grammatical-subject is not necessarily the one that can sensibly be called a subject-in-process. But as they are forced to equate a 'substantive' with a 'substance', they are forced

to resort to the attempts at hypostatization and substantialization of all grammatical-subjects; forgetting that all efforts of this kind lead to philosophical-calamities that are impossible to come-over.

The *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, champions of clarity, advocates of precision and apostles of exactitude, did not, unfortunately, stop only with this. They confused ontological, epistemological, logical and temporal-priorities with one-another as-well. This is a confusion on the level of 'types' of priorities. But they also confused 'kinds of priorities' with 'types of priorities', on the other-hand. It is as a result of this that they not-only confused substantival-priority with substantial-priority, and thereby effaced the condition under which methodologically ultimate-priority should be given to substantival-subjects, but-also overdid their consideration in terms of priorities; saying anything that turns-out to be ultimately-prior in terms of any 'kind' and 'type' of priority is afterall the ultimate; and therefore such a part of this-world that is further irreducible to anything else.This is how they arrive at their 'ontological-individualism' on the one-hand and 'ontological-slum' on the other. This is how, *Paramāṇus* of *Pṛthivī*, *Āp*, *Tejas* and *Vāyu*; *Nitya-Dravyas* like *Dik*, *Kāla*, *Ākāśa*, *Ātmā*, *Sāmānyas*, *Īśvara*, *Abhāva* are taken as ultimate-components of this-world, rubbing-shoulders with one-another to construct the kind of ontological-world *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers envisage. It is by blowing hot-and-cold together of mixing-between various-priorities that sometimes it is maintained that *Kāla* is *Ādhāra* of everything (else) – *sarvādhāraḥ kālaḥ*/[11] or that *Abhāva* is *Ādhāra* of everything[12], or that *Dravya* is *Ādhāra* while everything else is *Ādheya*[13]. All such confusions are attempted to be defended in terms of the employment of the model of *Ādhāra-Ādheya*. It is not the model, but its variegated-misuse at the hands of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers that is the crux of the problem.

In this way our consideration of another fundamental-distinction – distinction-between different-'types' or 'kinds' of priorities – also convinces us, it seems, that the *Navya-Nyāya* very-often confuses or at-least tends to confuse on this count too. Hence, it has now become apparent that it is neither in a position to keep-up with the heat of consistently, standing by one or the other-kind of fundamental-distinctions that any theory worth the name must honour and sustain. Over-and-above these two important-considerations about a theory, there is also a third, equally important-consideration. The consideration we are talking-about raises the problem: is a theory that is worth the name capable of making any response, at-least in-principle, to the changing-categories that the changing intellectual-atmosphere brings to the foreground? In different-words, does a theory, *prima-facie* at-least, make an allowance for the growth and development of knowledge? This issue raises the problem of what is called as the distinction-between transparent and opaque-theories. It is to the consideration of this problem, along with the consideration whether the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is transparent or opaque that we turn in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. *Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp.60-61;221
2. *Symbolic Logic;* Copi; Irving M; Collier Macmillan Publishers; (4th ed.); 1973; Pp.300-301. *Foundations of Mathematics;* Ramsey, F.P.; Pp. 1-61.
3. In the second chapter we have explained elaborately the way in which *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model is employed in the *Navya-Nyāya* in the context of discovery and explanation. We shall avoid repeating those points here. Instead we shall concentrate on some-other important-considerations that employment of the *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model gives rise to.
4. *yena indriyeṇa yat gṛhyate tena eva indriyeṇa tadgatā jātiḥ tadabhāvaḥ ca gṛhyate/ Tattva-cintāmaṇī* of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya; Kāmākhyanātha, Pt. Tarkavāgiśa (ed.); (Part-I&II); Bibliotheca Indica Series; The Asiatic Society of Bengal; Calcutta; 1988.

See also *Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp. 89-93, 221-23.

5. *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi;* translation of relevant topics in *A History of Indian Logic;* Vidyabhushana, Satishacandra; Pp. 407-419.
6. *Nyāya-Sutras;* VI-ii-16-20;
7. *Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp.8-10; 121-126.
8. *Ibid;* p.123.
9. *Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp.25-27; 192-196.
10. Like *Sāṁkhyas.*
11. *Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp.11-12;129-132
12. ibid; Pp.99-103
13. *Sapta-padārthi* of Śivāditya; p.152.

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Chapter-7

Transparency or Opacity of the *Navya-Nyāya* Theory

Preliminary-Remarks

In the fifth chapter we saw that the *Navya-Nyāya* confuses or at least tends to confuse-between context of discovery, explanation and that of justification. The sixth chapter, on the other-hand was directed at pointing-out that the *Navya-Nyāya* not-only often-blurs the distinction-between different 'types' or 'kinds' of priorities; but-also confuses-between 'types' and 'kinds' of priorities. It has, thus, become clear, it is presumed, that it is unable-consistently to stand-by and utilise certain very fundamental-distinctions that any theory worth the name is expected. But, regarding a theory, no matter whether it is scientific or philosophical, another question of an equally profound-importance can be asked is: Is it possible for a given-theory to make a provision, at-least in-principle, to account-for both change and growth of knowledge? It is this question that we want to raise-about the *Navya-Nyāya* theory in this chapter. That is, the question we endeavor to raise in this chapter is: Whether and how-far can the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, in-principle at-least, account-for the growth-of and change-in knowledge. For, to the extent to which it could be said to be making such allowance it could at-least be considered not a closed and opaque; but a transparent-theory. It is, however, important to note in-passing that transparency of a theory is not in-itself a criterion

of the consistency. But transparency, nevertheless, is at-least an important-trait of a good philosophical-theory.

Résumé of Genéral-Nature of a Theory, Explanation and Justification

A theory, we argued earlier, is a conceptual-framework erected to account for the organisation of the available-information that is capable of explaining the nature of facts-known to us. A theory not-only may include different-'types' of concepts, like empirical, analytical, theoretical and even thematic, but-also rules; and it is on the basis of such rules that it is possible to justify or vindicate a knowledge-claim. Theory makes explanation of facts possible, while explanation is a description of the nature of a fact. Every explanation-presupposes organised-knowledge, and organisation of knowledge becomes possible solely due-to a theory. Thus, a theory is a necessary-condition of an organised-knowledge, and further an organised-knowledge is a necessary-condition of an explanation of the nature of a fact.

The points made in the above-paragraph are made-again deliberately, even at the cost of involving ourselves into the risk of repetition. This is done precisely because the additional-considerations that we intend to bring-forward, in what follows, about a theory not-only presuppose them, but cannot also help involving distant or proximate-reference to them.

Theory and an Intellectual Atmosphere

Whenever any theory is presented it is aimed at establishing a rational and reasonable interconnection-among the different-concepts that it allows to fall within its jurisdiction or perview. Such rational-interconnection is established on the basis of rules that the theory adopts, and it is such rules in terms of which any justification or vindication of a knowledge-claim is undertaken. All this is

true. But it is also true that whenever any theory is presented, it is presented on the background of the then-available and prevalent general intellectual-atmosphere. The general intellectual-atmosphere is not a compendium or a treatise. It amounts to be, in a bit-changed Carnapian terminology, 'an agreed-opinion of the *intelligentsia* of an era'. But it is important to remember that it is not the general intellectual-atmosphere or 'an agreed-opinion of the *intelligentsia* of the era' that is enshrined in a theory. Given such a general intellectual-atmosphere itself is such a vast and amorphous-background that any single theory is just unable to contain everything that belongs to the prevalent intellectual-atmosphere with n its fold. Rather, it would be stupid to expect any theory to do this. Such a general intellectual-atmosphere brings to the foreground certain-categories that create a certain categorial-framework. Out of the categories that the general intellectual-atmosphere brings to the surface any theory allows, some of them or as many of them as possible, to be used as its foundational-rock; depending-upon how much comprehensive the theory is. It is such categories that a theory takes as its foundation that determine how many and what kind of concepts would fall-within the fold and compass of a theory. The choice of categories and the concepts they allow would, in its turn, be determined by the consideration: what sort of facts does a theory seek to explain? Thus, whereas any theory is directly-related with the categorial-framework that the given general intellectual-atmosphere makes available, it is indirectly-related with the general intellectual-atmosphere that vouchsafes the categories that the theory accepts as its bed-rock. But a theory also involves, however remotely and indirectly reference to facts it seeks to explain.

Phenomenon of a Change in an Intellectual-Atmosphere

General intellectual-atmosphere is always given in a

particular-culture, and is spread-over a sufficiently-large span of time. Any theory that is argued at the level of such a general intellectual-atmosphere, on the basis of the categorial-framework that such an atmosphere makes available, is the one that is capable of accounting-for the available-knowledge and explaining the facts that are known by the then. But it is all-the-while extremely-important to remember that neither the general intellectual-atmosphere nor the categorial-framework that it brings to the foreground is a static and absolutely-closed; something in the sense that it is a finished-product once-and-for-all. This is not to maintain that the general intellectual-atmosphere and the categorial-framework it brings to the forefront change and must change day-and-night. To maintain this is nothing short of absurdity. What we are trying to maintain is that although the general intellectual-atmosphere does not change, in so-far-as it is spread-over a sufficiently-large span of time without undergoing a radical-change, yet this kind of situation in-itself does-not, should-not and must-not preclude the possibility of its undergoing-change. In different words, a change in the general intellectual-atmosphere should not be considered to be an impossibility. Such a change in the prevalent intellectual-atmosphere is necessitated by variety of reasons. Presently our concern is not with such factors. We want merely to emphasise that a change of this kind, often understood as a 'conceptual-change', is a fact and its possibility being precluded-apriorily is disastrous to any satisfactory-theory – no-matter whether philosophic or scientific.

Corresponding Change in the Categorial-Framework

Granting, then, that the general intellectual-atmosphere can, in-principle, and does change, brings to the foreground one important-corollary of it. Such a corollary is that not-only the general intellectual-atmosphere changes, but-also

the categorial-framework that it brings to the surface of understanding too changes. A change in the general intellectual-atmosphere and the corresponding-change in the categories that it brings to the foreground that we are envisaging may be of either one of the following two-kinds: (a) a radical and (b) a moderate one. A radical-change in the general intellectual-atmosphere demands, as it were, a complete-overhauling of the categorial-framework that was given rise to by the former/earlier-prevalent general intellectual-atmosphere. If we screen the history of human-thought, then we shall notice that such occasions have been comparatively less-frequent as compared with those that demand a moderate-shift in the categorial-framework; because the general intellectual-atmosphere has undergone a sufficient-change to prompt and demand corresponding-change in the categories. Nevertheless, mere preponderance of the second-kind of changes over the former is not in-itself a guarantee that the former-kind of changes are impossible.

Corresponding Change in a Theory: a Tension

A change in the general intellectual-atmosphere, however, not-only demands a change in the categorial-framework, but it also demands a change in the theory that is presented on the basis of the categories that are brought to the focus by the general intellectual-atmosphere. Thus, both a change in the general intellectual-atmosphere on the one-hand, and the corresponding-change in the categories that it makes available on the-other create a tension and a strain on the theory. The tension and the strain we are talking-about is such that the theory is either to keep on sticking to the old-categories that it is based-on and turns a deaf-ear both to the changed-categories and also to the changed intellectual-atmosphere; or allows such modifications in it as are consistent with the newer-categories. The tension, thus, is to tilt its balance respectively in the direction

of either one of the following two-alternatives – a) to undergo such modifications, as are consistent with the changed-categories and the changed general intellectual-atmosphere, and to reject the older-categories that are inconsistent with the changed general intellectual-atmosphere; or (b) to stick to the old-categories and the general intellectual-atmosphere that prompted them without undergoing any shift, and to reject the new-categories as being inconsistent with the older general intellectual-atmosphere. If the theory takes the former-course, then it, in-principle at-least, makes an allowance for growth and development of knowledge; while if the theory takes the latter-course, it at-once becomes a closed-theory and thereby refrains-from making an allowance for the growth and development of knowledge. We shall consider fuller-implications of such a dilemma later.

Another Mode of Effecting a Tension

There is another way, however, through which a tension and a strain may be effected on a theory. History of human-thought shows that we have not-only made advancement in the direction of devising newer-and-newer techniques of acquiring additional-information about facts-known to us, howsoever vaguely and incompletely they may be known to us; but-also in the direction of coming to know additional-facts. The additional-information that in this way keeps on constantly-pouring, too, creates a tension and a strain on a theory. Here also a theory comes to face a dilemmatic-situation that is as follows: either the theory is in a position to accommodate such additional-information in consistency with the framework of it, and is capable of offering more-and-more refined-explanation of facts or that it shuns all the temptations of allowing additional-information being allowed in its frame. For its being perhaps inconsistent with the frame that it already-accepts and sticks steadfastly to that mode of explaining facts alone which it is accustomed with.

Out of these two-alternatives, the former goes in the direction of making an allowance-for the growth and development of knowledge; while the latter-alternative proceeds in the direction of abhorrence, nay, often phobia of change in and growth of knowledge. We shall consider fuller-implications of this dilemmatic-situation, too, later.

Situation of a Double-Tension

We maintained earlier that any explanation is a description of the nature of facts on the basis of an organised-knowledge or information. Such an organisation of knowledge or information becomes possible through concepts. That is, what is established-order and organisation as also interconnection/s between and among them are concepts. Such a situation creates what may be called 'conceptual-framework'. Such a conceptual-frame is supported-by and is based-upon the frame of categories that a theory allows to fall within its fold. But such a conceptual-frame accommodates and encompasses the required and even, perhaps, the then available-information in the intellectual-climate, when such a frame was erected. Yet allowing for the fact of newer and additional-information as-also for changed-information necessitate a corresponding-change not-only in the conceptual-frame that the theory presupposes and supports, in terms of the categories it allows and vindicates to fall within its range; but-also in the number of concepts that are allowed to form-part of the furniture of the conceptual-frame. But as on the plane of categories there mounts a tension with the incoming of additional, newer or changed-information about facts already-known as also with the discovery of new-facts, similarly on the plane of the frame of concepts. Here also there develops a tension that leads to a kind of dilemmatic-situation: either the fact of additional, new, changed-information as also the discovery of additional-facts is explainable on the basis of the concepts

that the conceptual-frame allows to fall within its fold; or it demands a corresponding-change in them. Even if such a change in the frame of concepts is allowed, we are not free in entirety from the dilemmatic-situation; for there may come to the forefront another-dilemma: either the changed-frame of concepts, or even the addition, change or modification in the concepts is consistent with the categorial-frame of the theory or not.

The changes, thus, may be necessitated on two-planes – the frame of concepts and the frame of categories. But such changes may be effected either at one-level, or at another-level, or at both-levels, or at no-level at all. Out of the four possible-situations, which so arise the first-two make a partial-allowance for conceptual-change; and yet the tension does not leave us completely. The third kind of situation, which is fully-alive to the problem of growth and development of knowledge; while the fourth one is totally-antagonistic and is align to it. While first-two kinds of situations may be described as 'partial-opacity', the fourth is 'total-opacity' of a theory. But on, the contrary, while first-two are 'partial-transparency' of a theory, the third is the 'complete-transparency' of a theory. We need not consider these points in a great-detail here, although in what follows we shall be touching on them.

Transparent and Opaque Theories

There are, thus, two principal-modes through which a shift in a theory may be demanded. First, it may be demanded-by the changing general intellectual-atmosphere, and the changing categorial-framework. Secondly, it may be demanded by the additional-information about already known-facts as-well-as by the discovery of additional-facts, which demand corresponding-change at-least in concepts, if-necessary. As it is mistaken to believe that the general intellectual-atmosphere as-well-as the categorial-framework

that it foreshadows is a fixed, static and finished-product; similarly it is preposterous to argue that a theory that is bought-forward to offer a satisfactory-explanation of facts is a finished-product such that no alteration in it is conceivable, feasible, viable as-well-as necessary.

Any view that takes such a stringent-perspective about a theory elevates it to the level of a closed and rigid-frame enclosed in infallibility. But to the extent to which any view about any theory advocates or tends to advocate such diction, it makes the theory or tends to advocate such diction that makes the theory to that extent free-from being exposed to falsification. The finality of a theory that we are talking-about not-only makes a theory rigid, but-also opaque. It appears as it is not-at-all concerned, as it were, either with the additional-information and the newer-facts; or with the changing general intellectual-atmosphere and the changed categorial-considerations, or with both of them. But, again, to the extent to which any theory embarks-upon this procedure, to that extent it at-once refracts-from exposing it to falsification on the one-hand, and refrains-from making an allowance for the change, growth and development of human-knowledge on the other. But to the extent to which any theory does or seems to do this or something of this kind to that extent it throttles, the very purpose of its being a theory much-less a satisfactory-theory. A theory, on the contrary, that is neither fearful of the exposure to falsification, nor rigid or closed in making change, growth and development of knowledge impossible even-theoretically and in-principle can be said to be an open, plastic or transparent-theory. It is held to be transparent both to the changing general intellectual-atmosphere and to the changed-categories that it brings to the foreground as-well-as to the additional-information and the discovery of newer-and-newer facts. When we are talking in terms of transparency of a theory, what we have in mind is not fragility of a theory,

however. Certain rigidity a theory should have; but a theory, qua-theory should not be so rigid that it is such a rigidity-incarnate that it is inimical to any change in it.

Change 'of a Theory' and Change 'within a Theory'

Regarding a theory, therefore, there are two-alternatives: (a) either that it is transparent, or (b) that it is opaque. In other words, it is open to modification, change and even falsification or that it is closed once-and-for-all and inculcates-abhorrence for change-in and growth-of knowledge. A theory that is amenable to change and modification may either be prepared to accept even 'structural-changes' in it, or just the 'functional-changes'. When a theory comes to confront itself with the additional-information and the newer-data discovered, it may make certain-adjustments such-that such additional-information and newer-data that are discovered are shown somehow to be consistent with and hence explainable in terms of the structural-frame it has already-accepted. Wherever such functional-changes alone do not suffice either the newer-facts are reinterpreted so-as-to fit them into the older-frame, or their accommodation is defended on the basis of some additional-considerations; some of which, sometimes at least, amount to be tantamount to hysteric-rationalizations. Such makeshifts create a semblance of change. But even where a theory is prepared to make an allowance for genuine functional-changes, there are serious-limitations on its being prepared to make an allowance for change in and growth of knowledge. Such functional-changes, in-principle, cannot allow structural-changes; but-only those changes which are within the framework of the system. Such an insider-approach to change has, however, very serious-limitations. In the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's endeavour of reducing *Dik, Kāla, Ākāśa* and *Ātmā* to *Īśvara* is an approach of this kind[1]. But in so-far-as the basic-frame is

not altered, the changes that remain allowable hardly make an allowance for the change in and development of knowledge in the genuine sense of the term.

As compared with the functional-changes in a theory, structural-changes in it are radical. It is not necessarily the case that structural-changes in a theory are demanded by the changed general intellectual-atmosphere, and the changed-categories alone. A discovery of a crucial recalcitrant-instance may also necessitate such a structural-change in a theory. Neither structural nor functional-change in a theory is necessarily correlated with either one of the two important-modes through which a strain may be caused in a theory. But it is important to understand that as on the count of functional-change in the theory, the instituted-change may not be both necessary and sufficient to show that a theory does make an allowance for change in and growth of knowledge. Similarly an attempted structural-change may turn-out to be just a make-shift. For example, Veṇidatta's proposal that there are only five-*Padārthas*, four *Bhāva-Padārthas* such as *Dravya, Guṇa, Karma* and *Dharma*; and *Abhāva*, makes such a mockery of the structural-change in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory[2]. This being the case, our contention is that the *Navya-Nyāya*, unfortunately, did not at-all proceed by the way in terms of which such a structural-change in the theory is brought-about that would demand on its part to embrace the new or at-least changed categorial-framework.

Structural-change that happens to be demanded of a theory does not necessarily happen to be demanded, when onslaughts are made on it by the other theories presented in different domains for the explanation of different-facts and on the basis of different categorial-frames. Any theory that is presented, on the basis of the categories brought-forward by the general intellectual-atmosphere prevalent at the time

when theory was presented and which keeps on sustaining it in so-far-as it has not undergone any change, does not necessarily require all categories so brought-forward for its foundation. A change in the structural-pattern of a theory happens to be brought-about through its being alive to the changing-categories and to the discovery of recalcitrant-instances. Where a theory allows a structural-change in it in face of such a kind of situation, it turns-out to be a transparent-theory. We may say that the occasion and spirit of the advocacy of the *Navya-Nyāya* in place of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* marks transparency of the *Nyāya* theory in general. But the moment the *Navya-Nyāya* came in it also marked the end of such transparency. As we shall see, the impetus and the impulse were not hereditarily-transmitted to the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition. But upholders of a particular-theory may refuse to make an allowance to the transparency of a theory. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers are not an exception to this. They show such a tendency especially when they make a strenuous-effort to show that the conceptual and categorial-considerations brought-forward by the advocates of the other Schools of Indian Philosophical Thought are such that either they are somehow-reducible to the categories, which their own theory accepts or else are redundant. We shall cite two-examples of this kind. They are: (i) A view is maintained by some *Mīmāṁsā* thinker[3] that our analysis of *Kāraṇa-Kārya* relation must also include consideration of such non-congenial-conditions (*Pratibandhaka*) that prevent-occurrence of *Kārya*, over-and-above the consideration of those conditions that lead to the occurrence of *Kārya*. For, the absence of such a non-congenial-factor is as much a condition of the emergence of a *Kārya* as the other conditions are. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers entirely-twist this suggestion, saying that since whenever *Kārya* does occur such non-congenial-condition/s must be absent; and so such non-congenial-conditions must be treated to be of the nature of *Abhāva* and

so understood their *Padārtha* called *Abhāva* takes care of them. Actually what *Mīmāṁsakas* are talking-about is an absence of negative-conditions, while what the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers interpret them to be is absence /negation of conditions. (ii) Another suggestion from the *Mīmāṁsā* is that denotative-power, i.e. power to denote (*Śakti*), should be considered to be an additional-*Padārtha*[4]. The *Mīmāṁsā* suggestion seems to be relevant, so-far-as at-least linguistic-reconstruction is concerned. For, even if it is granted that every significant-expression in language is to be understood denotatively and even if it is conceded that what an expression denotes can be classified under any-one of the seven-*Padārthas* acknowledged by the *Navya-Nyāya*; yet it must be accepted that an expression-denotes, because it has a power or capacity to denote. Such a capacity to denote, not being classifiable under any-one of the seven-*Padārthas*, must be considered to be an independent-*Padārtha*. Some *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers argue that the *Mīmāṁsā* contention is untenable, because such denotative-power arises out of linguistic-convention[5]. But this reply hardly refutes the point that *Mīmāṁsā* philosophers are making. The question they are posing is not how do expressions that denote acquire the denotative-power? The *Navya-Nyāya* answer to this question is correct, namely that denotative-power is bestowed-on them by convention. The second argument of the *Navya-Nyāya* that it is redundant to accept *Śakti*[6], as an independent-*Padārtha* too, is equally-untenable. Just because the *Navya-Nyāya* does not ask the kind of question the *Mīmāṁsā* asks and if asking such a question demands acknowledgement of an additional-*Padārtha* saying that acknowledgement of it is redundant, it is not a step in the direction of transparency at-all; nor does it make an allowance for growth in and development of knowledge. This is not to deny that some *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers did not acknowledge, *Śakti*; but even that did not bring-in

structural-change. It may be argued on-behalf-of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, however, that considerations of such type do-not necessarily make their theory opaque, as we want to hold. Such considerations are prompted by the acceptance of the Principle of Parsimony or Economy – *Kalpanā-Lāghava* as the *Naiyāyikas* would prefer to call it. But even such *prima-facie* attractive-argument does not seem to stand-on a closer-scrutiny. Consider for instance, the *Mīmāṁsā* contention that we need not accept both *Anvayī* as-well-as *Vyatirekī-Vyāpti*, provided *Tarka*, as a 'Rule of Transposition', is allowed. Their suggestion seems to be something like saying that both 'Modus Ponens' as-well-as 'Modus Tollens' need not be presumed to be primitive, if the 'Rule of 'Transposition' too is accepted. We are not saying that *Anvayī* and *Vyatirekī-Vyāptis* are tantamount to 'Modus Ponens' and 'Modus Tollens'. We are using these rules to make our point clear. That is all. But this suggestion of the *Mīmāṁsā*, which is in accordance with the 'Principle of Economy', is not acceptable to the *Navya-Nyāya*. This stance is not defensible on the basis of the acceptance of the principle. Rather, it bespeaks of its adamancy and an uncompromising-character. This is what seems to be the case and it is this feature of it that we intend to point out.

The Tradition of *Vāda-granthas* and its Consequences

Our considerations so-far seem to show that the *Navya-Nyāya* does not professedly turns-out to be a transparent theory; rather what it turns-out to be is an opaque, closed and rigid theory. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers presume that certain conditions are normally-necessary, if one is to say that one has a certain-form of understanding. This may be the case as they say it to be. But from this, it does not follow that such must always be the case. The *Navya-Nyāya* tradition all-along progressed through a particular-channel. That channel is the one, in their terminology, of writing what are

called *Vāda-granthas*. The consideration that is predominant in writing such treatises is that of bringing-about more-and-more refinement within the frame of the theory, keeping the frame in-tact. Once it is undertaken to write treatises with such commitment, structural-changes in the theory are just out-of consideration. But even the functional-changes that can be introduced have a very serious-limitation. It is due to such stringent-limitations that, often-than-not, important-considerations are either summarily-dismissed; or they are so-twisted that the important-point itself is lost. On the basis of the theory that one accepts, for example, one would not be in a position to settle the issue as to what is important and what is redundant for accounting human-knowledge as such. When we say that the *Navya-Nyāya* proceeded by the road of writing what are called *Vāda-granthas*, we do not wish to maintain that in the tradition of the *Navya-Nyāya* what are called *Prakaraṇa-granthas* or independent-treatises were not written at-all. But at the same-time we do want to maintain that even where such independent-treatises were written, they did not transgress the limits and the frame that *Vāda-granthas* had given. To this contention of ours neither *Prakaraṇa-granthas*, like *Tarka-Saṁgraha* of Annaṁbhaṭṭa or *Nyāya-Siddhānta-Muktāvali* of Viśvanātha Pañcānana nor *Prakaraṇa-granthas*, like *Vyutpatti-vāda* of Gadādhara or *Tarkāmṛta* of Jagadiśa are exception. The entire-tradition from *Tattva-Cintāmaṇī* to *Jāgadiśī* the whole range of *Vāda-granthas* is directed at the defence, elaboration and explication of a particular-theory. This tradition does bring-in further-and-further refinements. But these refinements are neither directed at self-criticism, nor at conceptual-development. We say that the tradition was not directed at self-criticism, not-because these thinkers did not criticise one-another; but-because it did not bring-in any revision in the theory itself. But more-still, we say that it did not bring-in conceptual-development; not-because already-accepted concepts were

not more-and-more elaborately-explained, but-because it mistook such conceptual-development with the matter of progressive-steps towards the goal that they had taken-for-granted. That is because it was the accepted-goal, when the theory was first-announced by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. The goal was of the explanation of the nature of facts, on the basis of accepted-forms of understanding and the rules that their theory allows.

Thus, even-where and to the extent to which an allowance-for a conceptual-change is made, at-least in-principle, the limit of it is already-set apriorily in terms of the frame of the theory itself. This being the case, such an allowance for change in and growth of knowledge hardly means change in and growth of knowledge in the genuine-sense of the term. Questions about 'nature of a theory' are often confused with the 'status of a theory', and the status of a theory is often-defended in such a manner that summarily-dismisses the point attempted to be brought-forward by an adherent of another-school. We do not wish to argue that such tactics are not at-all resorted to by the adherents of other-schools. They often are. But what we do want to stress is that this in-itself does not justify the *Navya-Nyāya* to resort to such tactics. The insiders-approach that the *Navya-Nyāya* adopted can profitably be used to elaborate and defend the prevalent social-systems, too. This was often done by the other-writers. But refusal to make an allowance-for change-in a theory, or rather insulating the theory from any conceivable radical-change but those that are allowable within the frame of the theory makes the theory at-once opaque and windowless, like Leibnizian-Monad. But the moment it comes to be maintained that anything that is explainable must be and cannot help being explained in-terms of the theory that one accepts, it raises the theory to such a high-status that it comes to embrace all facts that could be explained. On this count, the theory becomes almost the

'Substance' of Spinoza. The former-approach makes the theory so-secluded that when somebody points-out the newer-understanding of a fact that is allowed within the fold of the theory, a retort is often made-by the upholder of it that the facts their theory talks-about are of quite different-kind; and hence such a newer-understanding of a fact does not make any difference to their theory. By the method of such a kind of isolation that almost every-statement happens to be considered analytic, so-far-as the defence of the theory is concerned; but when it comes to explain facts it is maintained that the explanation-offered is the only-one that can be offered. This kind of stance forgets that if statements are analytic, they cannot explain the nature of matters-of-fact at-all. What they explain, if at-all they do, are concepts and relations-of-ideas. But a theory that takes everything conceivable to be a part of the furniture of this world has to take it to be real as a matter-of-fact. But the moment a theory takes everything conceivable to be matter-of-fact, it cannot accept nominalism; and to the extent to which it cannot accept nominalism it is unable to draw a line of demarcation-between 'matters-of-fact' and 'relations-of-ideas'. This consideration brings to the foreground a very fundamental-issue regarding the relation-between reconstruction and realism. We shall deal with this problem in the ninth chapter, i.e. the last in this series. Suffice it for the present to note that the *Navya-Nyāya* is often led in this direction. Consider, for instance, the *Navya-Nyāya* consideration that any *Utpanna-Dravya* exists without any *Guṇa* for one moment[7]. Why should it? If every *Dravya* is *Guṇī*, can it be without a *Guṇa*? And if so, can it be a *Guṇī* at all? But if it is not a *Guṇī*, can it be a *Dravya*, and if-so what is the propriety in saying that the two terms *Dravya* and *Guṇī* are synonymous? If, on the contrary, it is an analytic-rule, leaving-aside whether it is, can it explain the nature of any *Utpanna-Dravya* at-all? Perhaps, what was in the mind of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers

seems to be the contention that components of the complex-entity should be correlative with different-moments of time, and in so-far-as moments of time are given in sequence the components of the complex-entity must also be so-given. This may be the case. But what is the ontological-warrant to say this? Is it assumption or discovery of such a nature of fact? If the former, what we get are relations-of-ideas, mere conceptual-connections; but nothing in terms of facts. If the latter, such evidence should forth-come; but it is precisely this that seems not to be forthcoming. That is our complaint.

If, on the other-hand, the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is elevated to the position of the 'substance' of Spinoza, it thereby seals the fate of any conceptual-change whatsoever. But this is precisely the aura that the *Navya-Nyāya* attempts to give to the theory; it advocates making the claim that no-one except the *Navya-Nyāya* can give us the satisfactory-analysis of the relation-between expressions (*Pada*), and either their significance or the objects they denote (*Padārtha*). And the mode of doing this is settled once-and-for-all. No change in it is conceivable, nor is it feasible or desirable.

An Argument in Defence of the *Navya-Nyāya* and its Rebuttal

It may be maintained, the fact that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is opaque in the sense of not making an allowance for a conceptual-change, and growth of human-knowledge is not peculiar only to it. The very notion of a conceptual-change is a 20th Century notion. This being so, it is a folly to expect the *Navya-Nyāya* theory amenable to and accommodative of it. This is certainly the case, as-far-as the things go. Our complaint is not that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory alone is opaque, and that other theories are not so. The *Navya-Nyāya* theory may and indeed is in a great company in exhibiting this feature. But this kind of situation does not absolve it totally or even-partially from the guilt. If this alone was the

case, we might not have pressed our point so-hard. What we are trying, however, to place our figure on is not just this. Its self-complescence, some kind of completeness and the spirit of infallibility coupled-with this feature close the doors of conceptual-change and growth of human-knowledge. One can only attain an insider-perfection, but not inculcate the spirit of cross-questioning the hallmark of conceptual-change. That is our complaint. It seems it is reasonable to expect from any theory worth the name. But its reasonableness itself makes us say what we have been trying to say. It is very difficult to say that during the entire-tenure of the tradition no change in the intellectual-atmosphere might have occurred, no change in the categorial-frame might have been expected, or no additional-information or new-fact was ever chanced-upon. Did any-one of these bring-in any change in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory? No. The theory that was once developed and accepted was elaborated, defended and justified, even suppressing or at-least ignoring any suggestion in the direction of either structural-change or modification. To the extent to which this or something of this kind happened – happened not-automatically and unwillingly, but deliberately and passionately – that there seems to be enough ground to call the *Navya-Nyāya* theory an opaque, or a closed theory.

Thus, our analysis convinces or tends to convince us, it is hoped, that not-only from the point of view of an insider, but-also from the point of view of an outsiders'-perspective, the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is opaque; and to the extent to which it is opaque it does not, it seems, make an allowance-for change-in and growth and development of human-knowledge. It turns-out to be detrimental, in-principle at-least, to making an allowance-for conceptual-change. But to the extent to which it follows this path, it turns-out to be rigid, closed and hence sterile. The plastic-scheme of

Padārthas from-which it opens, defeats the very purpose for which it should have been employed.

A Leap Ahead

Having answered the question whether the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is transparent or opaque; saying that it is opaque such that it does not make an allowance-for conceptual-change, there remains one important-question to be considered so-far-as the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is concerned. We had already pointed-out that the *Navya-Nyāya* is at-once realistic and reconstructionistic. The problem that arises in this connection is: is the *Navya-Nyāya* faithful both to reconstruction and realism, in such a way that it honours the fundamental-distinction that every reconstruction worth the name must honour; and if it does not why it does not? We shall take-up this problem for-consideration in the ninth chapter. But prior to that, we intend to probe-into another question. Such a question is: granting that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is both realistic as-well-as reconstructionistic in character, is it both complete as-well-as consistent; or is it the case that although it can be said to be complete, it is so at the cost of consistency? If, on the contrary, it is consistent, can it be complete at the same-time. Thus, the issue that is expected to be discussed is: is the *Navya-Nyāya* contention that it is both a complete and consistent theory tenable, even-though it may be closed? If this contention is not tenable, why is it not tenable? It is to probing into this question that the next chapter is addressed. After dealing with this issue in the next chapter, we shall return to inquire into the issue of reconstruction and realism, the main-shaft around which the *Navya-Nyāya* theory spins, in the last chapter.

NOTES

1. Śivāditya in his *Sapta-Padārthi* controverts the views of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. *Sapta-Padārthi* of Śivāditya; Gurumurti, D. (ed.); Theosophical Publishing House; Adyar; 1932.

2. *Sarva-Darśana-Saṁgraha* of Mādhavācārya; Apte, Hari Nārāyaṇa (ed.); Anadāśrama Sanskrit Series; Anadāśrama Printing Press; Pune; 1951.
3. *Tarka-Saṁgraha*; Pp. 25- 29; 186-91.
4. *Ibid;* Pp.329-339.
5. *A History of Indian Philosophy*; Vol.-I; Dasgupta, Surendranath; Pp. 395-96.
6. *Tarka-Saṃgraha*; Pp.76-80; 369. *Nyāya-Mañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (Part-I); Śukla, Surya Nārāyaṇa Shastri (ed.); Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series; Varanasi; (2nd ed.); 1971; Ch.7; Pp. 402-03.
7. *Nyāya-Darśanam* entitled as *Caturgranthikā* (*Nyāya-Sūtras* of Gautama with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, Uddyakara's *Vārtika*, Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā* and Udayana's *Pariśuddhi*); Thakur Anantalal, (ed.); Vol.-I, Ch.-I; Mithila Institute; Darbhanga; 1967.

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Chapter-8

Consistency and/or Completeness of the *Navya-Nyāya* Theory

Introduction

After considering the arguments in the foregoing chapters directed-at bringing-out one or the other weakness in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, one may be convinced, we hope, that at-least something is wrong in that theory. But, in-spite-of this, it may be maintained, on-behalf of and in-defence-of that theory, that after-all what the *Navya-Nyāya* theory intends to present is a kind of materialistic theory of reference.[1] In accordance with such a theory, it may be added, and on the basis of an intuitively-grasped *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model the *Navya-Nyāya* intends to put-forward an ontological-frame that is in-tune to commonsensical-consideration. Unless this kind of allowance is made, it may be further argued, we shall miss the intension as-well-as the very spirit of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. Along-with this we are likely, the argument-continues, to misjudge its failures and shortcomings, if-any.

In this apparently plausible-contention, there are two main-threads: (i) the materialistic theory of reference, and (ii) the intuitively-gasped certain model, on which the whole-edifice of the *Navya-Nyāya* ontological theory is expected to be erected; and it's relation, close and intimate, perhaps, with commonsense. Both these issues are important, and we want to examine them in this chapter in the same-order in which

we have presented them here. These issues are envisaged to be examined with a view to find-out whether and to what extent the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is consistent and/or complete.

The Materialistic Theory of Reference

Before we proceed to outline the materialistic theory of reference and analyse whether and how-far and to what extent the *Navya-Nyāya* theory has accepted it, and whether and how-far it is consistent with it; some preliminary remarks seem to be in order. First, even-if it may not be said that the *Navya-Nyāya* has totally and exclusively-accepted the materialistic theory of reference, it can at-least be said to have utilized and exploited some of its clues. To this extent at-least it can be said to uphold the cause of the materialistic theory of reference. Secondly, as we go along in our statement of the materialistic theory of reference, we shall indicate where and possibly why the *Navya-Nyāya* theory differs from it. Thirdly, in such an inquiry we shall also consider, however passingly and sketchily, to what extent, if at-all, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers may be right in introducing such modifications in the materialistic theory of reference on the one-hand, and yet keep on subscribing to it on the other-hand as a weapon and device of the defence of the ontology they seem to adhere to.

It may be urged that a materialistic theory of reference can be constructed that will accommodate not-only universal or formal, but-also existential or particular-propositions. It may be further maintained that propositions of all these types are equally-material in their import. Such a theory of propositions of-course involves consideration of meaning of truth, in terms of reference. On the material theory of reference, the elements of propositions are names. Thus, the materialistic theory of reference subscribes to the name theory of meaning, and in this respect, too, it has a very close-affinity with a theory, like that of the *Navya-Nyāya*. The whole

theory and the enterprise embraces three main-components: (a) a materialistic theory of names, (b) a materialistic theory of propositions, and (c) an account of truths of fact and those of logic. We proceed to consider them in the same-order in which they are mentioned.

(a) ***Materialistic Theory of Names:*** It may be argued that every significant-word is a name, and corresponding to every name there is a thing that is named by it. The kinds of things that are so named may be material-things, their properties, classes of material things, and classes of classes of material things. This theory obviously assumes ontological-priority of things, as compared to names which name them. As material-things are named, so-too, their parts can be named; and parts of material-things are as much material as material-things themselves.

This theory does not presuppose material-things to be simple, as once it was supposed to be the case. It also holds, perhaps, that no material-thing is unique. It rather advocates that every material-thing is similar to some other material-things. Such similarity may be either of property, or of a class. The properties of properties of material-things need not be separately-acknowledged, for they are 'kinds' of classes. This being the case, propositions to the tune of property-of-properties are analysable into propositions about the classes of material-things. Perhaps similar-consideration might have led *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to do-away with the notion of property of property, and declare: *'Guṇe guṇān anaṅgīkārāt'*[2]. But the classes of classes of material-things have to be acknowledged as an independent-category, for they are more-general. Yet at-least some *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers[3] did attempt to do-away with one such class of classes of material-things, viz. *Sāmānya* or *Jāti* called *Sattā*. But our hunch is that this is not done very-explicitly, and in the most thoroughgoing-way. For, in-spite-of their doing-

away-with the *Jāti* called *Sattā* they still take and cite such examples in their explanation and defence of their contention, which directly or indirectly bear-upon their acceptance of *Sattā* as a *Jāti*. Without disputing this point further, even-if it is presumed that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, at-least some of them, seek to do-away-with *Sattā* as a *Jāti* of *Dravya*, *Guṇa* and *Karma*, it seems that two-considerations might have prompted them to do so: (i) since they implicitly-accept the contention that *Padārtha* is a *Vastu*[4], they might have thought that to say that only *Dravya*, *Guṇa* and *Karma* are existent or real is quite-arbitrary as also indefensible. (ii) Secondly, if all *Padārthas* are indicative of different-kinds of existent or real objects, a sub-class of them need not separately be taken to be existent. For, such a kind of contention is arbitrary and redundant. But to accept something as redundant is not necessarily to accept it also to be self-contradictory or inconsistent; and if acceptance of *Sattā* as a *Jāti* is not inconsistent with taking *Padārtha* as *Vastu* and taking each-one of them as real, there is no harm in citing examples that bear-upon *Sattā* as a *Jāti*. This seems to be the general-basis of their doing-away with *Sattā* as a *Jāti* on the one-hand, and yet continue to cite examples that bear-on its acceptance on the-other. If, on the contrary, acceptance of *Sattā* as a *Jāti* amounts to the claim that *Dravya*, *Guṇa* and *Karma* alone are existent; while the-other *Padārthas*, although called *Vastu*, are not existent or real, then this is not-only arbitrary but-also inconsistent. For, although to say that something is not a *Vastu* is not contradictory, to say that something is a *Vastu* but it does not exist or is not real certainly is. If doing-away of *Sattā* as a *Jāti* is a measure of the removal of such an inconsistency, then to continue to cite examples which bear on its acceptance itself is inconsistent; and to bring-out and restore complete-consistency such examples too should have been banished from the theory.

Be that as it may. It may, therefore, be argued that there are no material-things which do not belong to classes, and so classes of material-things are as fundamental as the material-things themselves. On the material theory of reference, therefore, names or words name material-things or their parts, properties of material-things, classes of material-things, or classes of classes of material-things. Out of which, material-things and their parts are concrete; while the rest three are abstract. There is nothing-else to name than these. The *Navya-Nyāya* will certainly not accept this kind of classification of things that are named by names, although something of the kind seems to be somehow under headway in terms of its classification of reals into separables and distinguishables. Regarding classes of material-things, classes of classes of material-things and also kinds of things, names-name. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers have exceptions, which make them shift-from materialistic-theory of reference to a realistic-theory of reference; but this also creates troubles for it as will be evident from what follows. They extended the notion of a class only to the first-three kinds of *Padārthas*, that of class of classes, strictly-speaking, to the first-three *Padārthas* alone in terms of the *Jāti* called *Sattā;* while to all *Padārthas* through the acceptance of *Padārtha* to be a *Vastu*. Instead of, further, taking the four-kinds of things to be named by names, they held that the seven-kinds of things are named. We need not enter into the deep-waters of these considerations here.

Names are said to be related with each-other without any intermediary-reference to what they name, and this will pave-a-way for consideration of propositions. But on the same-lines, propositions can be related with one-another in the same abstract-way, which leads us to consider truth. The two theses, namely 'all words are names'[5], and 'there are four-kinds of things named' (on the *Navya-Nyāya* view seven-

kinds)[6], are such that the first is independent of the other and yet they are related.

The *Navya-Nyāya* will, perhaps, say that they very intimately-bear on each-other. On the first of these theses what names-name are actual and possible things, and not merely possible things; although the latter-alternative cannot be completely ruled-out. As against this, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to hold that names-name actual-things alone[7]. Although everything that is-actual is-possible; the converse of this does not hold. Moreover, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, to be fair to them, are talking all-along about this-world; and hence bare-concern with possible-world however theoretically and methodologically-sound will displease them. This connection of theirs seems to be in accordance with the non-empty-world to which alone they subscribe. There is no question whether there are things, or even whether things are named; but perhaps what kind of things and how many. On the latter count in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* tradition in general and in the tradition of *Navya-Nyāya* in particular, there did arise a considerable-difference of opinion, although in-spite-of such difference the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition flourished by the line of the seven *Padārthas* as the official and generally accepted view.

Whatever that may be. The purpose of our-inquiry is to consider whether materialistic theory of reference might have effected the necessary-incentive to the *Navya-Nyāya* theory and has it been faithful to it. When one is talking-about material-things, one is not necessarily saying that matter cannot be variously-organised. What one is holding is that matter itself has its parts, properties and classes, which can also be named. Material-level is lower than that of physical. That which belongs to matter is true only to the material, but-not for the physical, chemical or biological-matter. What is meant by matter is a static-substance, and substance is an

irrational-ground of individual-reaction. Although there is no formless-matter, matter always exists with some set of formal-properties. This is how there are physical, chemical, biological-materials. The notion of static-substance as matter is tied-down with spatial-occupancy, in which individual-reactions can occur. Our conception of matter as static or dynamic is intimately-connected with the notion of spatial-occupancy. It is this consideration which seems to weigh with *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers at-least so-far-as *Dravyas* are concerned, if-not with regard to *Dravyas*, *Guṇas* and *Karmas* too.

Properties of material-things are their recurrent-forms and qualities. But they have both concrete and abstract-aspects. Thus, they are qualitative, affective and formal respectively. Properties of properties are relations, some of which are more obvious as compared with others. Material-things may have internal-relations, though all relations between-or-among material-things need not be and are not internal. The *Navya-Nyāya*, over-and-above bringing-out the contrast-between separable and distinguishable-entities, intends, perhaps, also to bring-out this contrast through its basic-relations, namely, *Saṁyoga* and *Samavāya* along-with one of their classification of relations into *Sākṣāt* and *Paraṁparā*. Thus, at least some relations are properties of material-things. Relations that hold between properties are formal. This of-course the *Navya-Nyāya* will not subscribe to.

Some abstract-things are only-one of a kind, while of concrete-things there are classes. Most words are for classes-of material-things. To say that there are classes-of abstract-things is confusing. But the *Navya-Nyāya* seems to be unmindful of it. The reason why there are no classes of abstract-things is that there are not many 'blues', although there may be many cats. An abstract-thing is that each

appearance of which has all the properties of it. This feature abstract-things share with unique concrete-objects, too; and this, perhaps, might have led *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to bundle them together for being spoken-of as *Viśeṣa* (peculiarity or uniqueness) with reference to each-one of them. In the case of concrete-things, each appearance has only some properties in common, but-not every. There are only three classes: certain properties of material-things – having forms but not qualities – classes of material-things and classes of classes of material-things. The *Navya-Nyāya* would add to this a class of movements and actions too, where they are to be understood as a kind of form and not quality. Even classes of classes of things are classes, and respond to the same-treatment. Other considerations about classes, like finite and infinite-classes are irrelevant for our present-purpose. The classes of classes of classes of material-things and so on, are included in the classes of classes of material-things. The *Navya-Nyāya* does not make such distinctions and seems to delimit its consideration that classes and classes of classes respond to the same-treatment. This contention is in a sense economical and akin to commonsense; but at the same-time does violence to the 'theory of types' and 'the doctrine of the strata of language', which it seems to presuppose. Normally properties of material-things, classes of material-things, and classes of classes of material-things are considered to be abstract. But the *Navya-Nyāya* theory in terms of its realistic-overtones and extreme ontological-bias does not lend credence to this view. As facts, both material-things and the above three-candidates are on-par, but not as things; even-if they are considered to be material. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers receiving incentive and impulse from material theory of reference, in terms of their realistic-bias, turn it into a factual theory of reference. In the domain of facts, there is, perhaps, no distinction-between concrete and abstract-fact; in the domain of objects,

things, entities there is. As the material theory, so too the *Navya-Nyāya* theory holds that to use language properly it is necessary to think through language to the objects named; and the business of the *Nyāya* is to make us aware of such objects. When reference of a word is correctly carried-out, it is a case of naming; when (it is) not, it is a misuse of a name.

(b) ***Materialistic Theory of Propositions:*** Propositions connect names. Proportions themselves are names, although with difference-from the way in which words are names. For, here consideration of quantities and domain come in. Further, propositions can be true or false; names, on the contrary, (are) correct or incorrect. Moreover, what propositions refer-to is somewhat different-from what words-name. In this respect, the *Navya-Nyāya* theory differs-from the tenable-consideration. What, perhaps, leads it to advocate is that even propositions-name in the same-way as names do, is two-fold: name theory as-well-as the reconstruction-issue, in which it seems to confuse-between 'ontological-reduction' and 'ontological-commitment'. This point will become clear, we hope, in the next chapter. Material things are concrete. Propositions directly-referring to material-things may be of two-kinds: singular-material and universal-material propositions. Propositions, which indirectly refer to material-things through abstract-things, are universal-formal-propositions. The *Navya-Nyāya*, obviously, does not embrace the distinction, for it does not make a distinction-between facts and things; and treats all facts as things. There is no singular-formal-proposition; for on the material theory of reference, there is nothing like completely-localized or limited-spatial reference. This seems to be the additional-reason why the *Navya-Nyāya* does not acknowledge 'unit-sets'. From singular-material-propositions to universal-formal-propositions, there is advancement in the direction of generality. This contention the *Navya-Nyāya* will not accept in accordance with its commitment to

non-empty universe on the one-hand, and it's ruling-out purely formal-propositions on the other. A singular-material-proposition refers to one material-thing; while a universal-material-proposition refers to all the material-things of a given-class throughout the cosmos. The *Navya-Nyāya* will have no objection to this, except using the nomenclature of material-things it will use that of things. Universal-material-proportion, it is important to remember, refers to all the things of the class, and not to the class (only). But propositions of both these kinds refer to concrete-things; for with reference to concreteness, there is no difference-between one-and-all. What is at-stake is the question merely of quantity. The *Navya-Nyāya* would extend this consideration to all things, and would not delimit the issue to concreteness. In this, it seems, certainly, however, (it has) mistaken.

The individual-material-thing to which the singular-material-proposition refers, always occupies a limited-portion of space and in our attempt to bring-out or refer to a unique-material-thing our language becomes extremely-cramped; for language is, by its very nature, general. It fits abstract-things better-than concrete-things. The *Navya-Nyāya* would accept the first-part, but-not the second. In modification it would say language fits classes, rather-than individuals. Hence, to refer to individual additional-qualifications will have to be attached to the expressions-suitable to refer to classes, in order to delimit their extension. We need not debate all these issues here. They are well-familiar to any student of the *Navya-Nyāya*. "Except for the attribution of properties or classes, both of which are abstract, language as-such was not designed to refer to individuals beyond their naming and locating them in space-and-time, which is a kind of pointing in absentia and may be called 'absentee ostensive-reference'. It is employed so seldom after the initial-identification as to constitute a trivial-reference. The moment we wish to add anything to a name or to qualify

it in any-way we perforce resort to the use of the names of abstract-things, which we then proceed to put in some equally abstract-relation to each-other"[8]. The *Navya-Nyāya* will certainly favour the spirit of this contention, but will hold that abstract-concrete distinction is misplaced with reference to facts, or is inapplicable to its language of things which it treats on-par with one-another.

Although universal-material-propositions refer to all the material-things of a given-class throughout the cosmos, no-matter when-and-where they are; yet this does not accomplish reference to the whole space, or time, or both. It rather refers to those points of space and moments of time, which are occupied by individuals of that-kind. Such propositions, therefore, refer only to a particular-kind of spatio-temporal occupancy; and since material-things alone occupy space, reference to spatial-occupancy or material-things does not differ materially. The *Navya-Nyāya* does not delimit itself to material-things, but rather holds that all things occupy space. It would, perhaps, be better to say that all things which do and are supposed to occupy space are treated as material-things by the *Navya-Nyāya*. But we need hardly to deal with and take account of the problems here, which this view would create. Some of them, at least, have been considered in the previous chapters.

A universal-formal-proposition is one which refers indirectly to all material-things, without restriction as to class by referring-directly to abstract-things. They are, therefore, abstract-logical-propositions. They hold throughout the cosmos, for they refer to all of it and to no particular-portion more-than any-other. Such propositions are those, in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, which are stated on the plane of variables. Examples of propositions of this kind are ample to find especially in the *Navya-Nyāya*, discussions of various-definitions of *Vyāpti*. Whereas universal-material-

propositions refer to actual-objects, universal-formal-propositions refer to actual as-well-as possible-objects of a particular-sort in a single-sweep. The *Navya-Nyāya*, unfortunately, does not seem to have an apparatus through which such a distinction could be made, except the employment of the language of constants and variables. Universal-formal-propositions, thus, are used; but they are not acknowledged to be so. Hence, the *Navya-Nyāya*, it can be said, either does away altogether with universal-formal-propositions, or treats them on-par with universal-material-propositions; so-far-as its bias of non-empty-universe is concerned. Perhaps, it is misled on this count by the referential-role of nouns and pronouns. Whatever that may be. Universal-formal-propositions or propositions of logic and mathematics are omni-spatial; for they refer not to the occupancy of any space in particular, but to the formal-condition under which space can be occupied by matter. The *Navya-Nyāya* has no vocabulary of this kind, nor-even need for it perhaps. Formal-propositions refer to all material-things of all classes with respect to given-property, and hence to whole space which they might occupy. Hence, correspondence of universal-formal-propositions cannot be checked. This is, perhaps, the additional-reason why the *Navya-Nyāya* does not treat them specially. Instead, what we do is to try to deduce them from other propositions suspected to be true in a logical or mathematical-system. Perhaps what they can be said to correspond-with are totality of all possible-objects with respect to their possible-occupancy. But, whereas universal-material-propositions refer to occupancy directly, universal-formal-propositions do so indirectly. Unfortunately, the *Navya-Nyāya* has not made these distinctions.

All propositions, no-matter universal or otherwise, belong to the abstract-world governed by logic. The material-things and the spaces they occupy belong to the concrete-world of substantial-reaction. But this does not mean that

space itself is concrete, where it is to be understood as a frame of spatial-occupancy. This the *Navya-Nyāya* does not accept, and the reason seems to be that it treats place and space on-par. Abstract-world is a kind of second-story of a two-storied-world of concrete and abstract-world. The *Navya-Nyāya* of course does not acknowledge such two-storied-world, simply because the kind of world *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers envisage is filled-with concrete and abstract-entities called 'things' with reference to which abstract-concrete distinction no longer holds. It is simply because although the world of the *Navya-Nyāya* is two-storied, on each-story there are concrete-and-abstract things-or-objects rubbing-shoulders with one-another being equally-legitimate parts of the furniture of the world. It is for this reason, perhaps, as we shall see, the *Navya-Nyāya* seems unable to make a distinction-between 'truths of fact' (understood as 'matters of fact') and 'truths of logic'.

(c) ***Truths of Fact and Truths of Logic:*** While truth is a product of correct-reference, falsity of incorrect-reference. The proper use of language is intended to put us in touch with material-things, their properties and classes in an intimate-way without substituting them by something-else. If it is a matter of truth, this is done correctly; if of falsity, incorrectly. That is why, as we shall see in the next chapter, the question of ontological-commitment on the *Navya-Nyāya* does not remain resolvable in terms of value of a bound-variable; but in finding and locating. The question of truth will certainly bear on all the three-types of propositions. Truth of a proposition on the material-theory involves-reference of a proposition to the occupancy of space, which in-turn not-only presupposes uniformity throughout the cosmos; but-also acknowledgement of the fact that taking into account the enormous-size of the cosmos we always speak more of absent material-things than present-ones even when we are employing universal-propositions. It is under

the first-half of this contention that perhaps the *Navya-Nyāya* theory holds that ascription of the same-property or class to various-objects of a certain-kind holds and turns-out to be acceptable; while on the second-half, it seems, it accepts the contention in its declaration that *Abhāva* is, as it were, the background on which our statements – either existential or universal – need to be understood. The *Navya-Nyāya* will of course not have a room for universal-formal-propositions strictly-speaking.

For singular-material-propositions we need to know properties of the individual-material-thing, through the method of analysis and division. But singular-material-propositions, as compared with universal-material-propositions, have a point of advantage as-well-as of limitation. The advantage is that it is in-vain to look-for more instances, for in each-case of the occurrence of an individual-thing it will have the same-properties. The limitation, however, is that it is impossible to discover all the properties of even-one individual-material-thing. The number of statements we can make about an individual-material-thing is not possible to fix, for on various-levels statements can be made about it – analytical, microcosmic, sub-atomic etc. Hence, no number of descriptions can exhaust properties of an individual-material-thing, although each such description can be a 'truth of fact'. The truth of material-propositions is tested with the help of samples, however typical they may be; and both with respect to existential as-well-as universal-material-propositions, we can do nothing with regard to completeness. This point the *Navya-Nyāya* does not, unfortunately, seem to realise.

With regard to universal-formal-propositions the question is not so-much of their 'truth', but of their 'validity', which can be ascertained through deduction. Thus, the propositions of this kind turn-out to be 'truths of logic'.

Whether axioms or theorems they are universal-formal-propositions, and with regard to them it is the question of validity that is in-order, not so-much of truth. But even universal-formal-propositions, too, have their material-truth, it may be said, however remote it is. For, one way of bringing their truth-out is to treat them on-par with universal-material-propositions. It is this, perhaps, which might have led *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to acknowledge only two-sorts of propositions – existential-material and universal-material – treating the formal-universal just on-par with the latter and nothing else.

All true-propositions refer to material-things in-space; but what about false-propositions? False-propositions, too, are functions of space in the same-way; because falsehood means illogical-reference to spatial-occupancy. False universal-formal-propositions are false throughout the cosmos without exception, being based-upon conceptual-inconsistency. The *Navya-Nyāya* does not treat such propositions in this way at-all, its interest with regard to truth being always governed-by and limited-to non-empty-universe alone. False universal-material-propositions are so with regard to spatial-occupancy by material-things of a given-class. The false singular-material-propositions, on the contrary, are false with regard to the localized-spatial-occupancy of unique-individual material-things. There can be no totality of truth, which would include both material and formal-truths; for 'completeness of factual-truths' and 'consistency of logical-truths' are incompatible. But this *Navya-Nyāya* does not, unfortunately, seem to realise. The entire actual-world of matter and energy cannot be reduced to logic and mathematics. The element of chance-and-disorder precludes such a move. If we are to insist-upon the formal-aspect of the world, it would give us consistency at the cost of completeness. If, on the contrary, we insist-on completeness, as the *Navya-Nyāya* theory seems to insist, we

will mar consistency at the cost of completeness. The consistency that happens to be effected in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is of treating logical and extra-logical, or of treating facts and things on-par, and to maintain that as on the plane of facts distinction-between abstract and concrete is a fiction; similarly on the plane of things, too, such a distinction must be a fiction.

Even if, therefore, it is maintained that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers wanted to apply and employ some kind of material theory of reference, this it does not do faithfully in so-far-as there is no apparatus in it through which irreconcilable-Platonism it gave-way to can be shown to be irreconcilable. That is why its accomplishment of the so-called completeness threatens it with absence of consistency, although *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers wrongly-plead for both consistency-and-completeness. What they can be said to have achieved is completeness – however crude and unsatisfactory it may be – but-not both completeness as-well-as consistency. This, too, they seem to have done on the plane of facts and not on the plane of things or objects; being faithful to their commitment to talk-about things or facts. But, it seems, wrong on their part, however, to treat facts, objects and things as things. To hold and to be able to defend that which achieves both completeness-and-consistency, we have first to establish that the level of facts is analytically a step lower-than that of things or objects. Even-if this is done, we need also to establish that accomplishment of completeness and consistency, which is impossible on the plane of things or objects, on the plane of facts is tantamount to accomplishment of them on the plane of things. Only then we have the methodological-right and logical-justifiability to hold that facts and things are the same. In the absence of such a move, treating them on-par is confusing and misleading to say the least.

Consideration of the Model as the Basis of Defence

It may, however, be contended that the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is not amenable to this criticism. It is true that in so-far-as the theory is argued on the plane of facts and not on the plane of things, it does embrace some defect; and although equation of facts with things is unfortunate, if that is done-away with the theory becomes immune to *ad-rem* criticism. But a theory that is immune to '*ad-rem* criticism' is also immune to 'logical-criticism'. This being so, our effort all-along to criticise the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is unwarranted and misplaced. It may be further contended that such a system – i.e. ontological-system – entails its model. The *Navya-Nyāya* obviously has such a model, and that it has such a model is sufficient to show that it is consistent. So, neither factual nor even logical criticism-and-objection can be raised-against the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. Maximally, therefore, in such a situation what is warranted is '*ad-hominem*-criticism', showing that what the system is guilty is of 'pragmatic-inconsistency'; and to the extent to which the philosophers who advocate such a system are guilty, they are required to modify it.

As against this, we want to hold that logical-criticism of ontology is not always necessarily unwarranted; and although '*ad-rem* criticism' is, perhaps, admittedly *petitio* and hence never valid, at-least under certain-conditions may be legitimate-and-proper. One may escape '*ad-hominem*-criticism', by suitable-adjustments and modifications in a theory. But in such an attempt one may be required to pay a high-price. It is true, further, that every ontological-system prescribes what its model is to be and it has such a model; and in so-for-as everything it accepts is in consistency with the model, such a system is consistent. But in so-far-as it is consistent, logical-criticism of an ontological-system is pointless. However, it is not so. Although it is true that every

system with a model is consistent relative to that model, from this it does not follow that it must have a model. It also does not follow that the model it adopts, is the only-model one can adopt. For, 'model-prescription' is generated by stipulation of what kind of things are going to be taken as real. As in the *Navya-Nyāya* it may be said that anything is real, if it is either *Ādhāra,* or *Ādheya,* or both. Now such a stipulation is about a 'relations of ideas', and does not necessarily-commit one existentially. Moreover, even-if a philosopher subscribes to a certain-conception of real he does not necessarily contradict himself, if he asserts that the conception lacks an object. The *Nyāya* devises its conception of real strictly with reference to things or objects, but not necessarily with regard to facts. But one may escape this criticism, saying that the reality-criterion is satisfied. This is the tactic, which the *Navya-Nyāya* seems to employ. But such a claim is either analytic or synthetic. If the former, it would amount to be a verbal-formulation of a reality-criterion; and as a matter of fact it may be empty. If, on the contrary, the latter, it may be conceivably-false within the system and could not provide the conceptual-assurance of consistency. We shall argue that something of this kind seems to have happened in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory.

It is true that ontologies are normally-constructed in the light of intuitive-grasp of a model. In a sense the model prescribes to the system, and regulates also its development. It also controls such fundamental-matters as the selection of 'reality-criterion' and 'assignment of meanings' to such crucial-concepts as 'some', 'all', 'not' etc. If a philosopher fails to construct a system consistent with the model and consistent relative of the model that itself is a matter of great-surprise. However, connection-between an ontological-system and its model is contingent, and hence it does not follow that every-ontology has or has to have a model. Further, even-if it has a model and even-if the system is

consistent with the model, this kind of consistency is not both necessary and sufficient-condition to show that the system is consistent. Nonetheless, it may be argued that normally ontology has a model and in so-far-as it is consistent with the model, it is immune-from logical-criticism of it. Moreover, even this contention, too, is fallacious. For, to be able to show that an ontological-system is immune to logical-criticism, it will not suffice to show that it is consistent-with and relative-to the respective model. Rather, it will have to be shown that it is absolutely-consistent. But, unfortunately, this is precisely what the *Navya-Nyāya* does not seem to be doing. Under the assumption that facts, things and objects mean the same-thing, the model of things – the *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model or rather the misuse of the model – does remain applicable to facts also. But what if this is denied? Can there be facts which are neither *Ādhāra* nor *Ādheya*, but just facts – pure and simple? If so, what about consistency of the so-called ontological-system of facts with *Ādhāra-Ādheya* model? If, moreover, facts and things are not the same; and if the system is envisaged to be presented on the plane of facts, it turns-out to be formal and ontologically-barren. But if it is presented on the plane of things, abstract and concrete-things will have to be distinguished from each-other. In the same-way, they cannot any more be said to be amenable to the same-model. That is 'truths of logic' and 'truths of matters of fact' have to be distinguished; and separate-criteria for the two-kinds of truths will have to be formulated. But once this is done, they cannot be said to have been presented on the plane of facts, and once this is given-up Platonism, too, will have to be given-up. If, however, Platonism is to be given-up, the very backbone being stripped-off, the *Navya-Nyāya* will neither have its so-called completeness nor the platform left from-which it can hope to combat and oppose Buddhism – its principal-opponent.

It may, nevertheless, be further argued that the model that *Navya-Nyāya* selects in particular and the whole programme of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers in general is not-only in accordance with the model but-also with commonsense. We have already shown that neither its consistency with the respective-model nor completeness in terms of it, amounts to be consistency or completeness absolutely. The reinforcement of the argument on the basis of the proximity and allegiance of the system to commonsense, too, is equally-weak. For, although what philosophers say must-not depart totally-from commonsense, yet philosophical-contention and its warrantability cannot be justified and defended on the basis of the fact that it is akin to commonsensical-view. Moreover, even commonsense does not make a mistake of supposing that one can consistently hold objects amenable to empirical, ontological, epistemic and logical-reconstructions to be inhabiting the same-world; as-also that the only-way to make sense of universal-formal-propositions is to interprete them in terms of universal-material-propositions. This being the case, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers even on this count, cannot be said to have achieved completeness-and-consistency together.

The Confused-Completeness and Lack of Consistency in the *Navya-Nyāya*

Thus, even-if it is said that the *Navya-Nyāya* receiving clues-from material theory of reference and adopting a particular-model, developed an ontological-system that is both complete-and-consistent, the contention remains-unacceptable. It is unacceptable both with regard to consistency as-well-as completeness. Its consistency-claim is unacceptable, not because it does not amount to be consistent but rather because the consistency it gives rise to is relative to the model it accepts; and it is not at all obligatory to accept that (particular) model, as-also because such a

consistency logically does not amount to absolute-consistency. But it is not complete, too, not because it is not applicable to any fact/s, but rather to those and only-those which fit into the model; as also because it does not necessarily follow that every fact whatever fits into the model it accepts. But even-if it is said to be limited only to that sort of facts, then also the *Navya-Nyāya* theory seems to be unsatisfactory; because it has not independently-established that the model of things fits the model of facts, as-also that as on the plane of facts abstract-concrete distinction is pointless, so too, on the plane of things or objects too it is meaningless. It will not do merely to assume this. If it is accepted merely on an assumptive-level, then the system turns-out to be ontologically-barren and empty. Even-if contingently it may bear on ontology, it would lack the necessary-force, as a formidable and tenable-alternative to that posed by Buddhism especially *Mahāyāna* Buddhism. This is precisely what does not seem to happen in-spite-of the *Navya-Nyāya* claim to that effect. The entire programme-undertaken by *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers appears to be an alternative-game. But if so, one-game does not refute-another, and players of one-game do not defeat the players of another-game. If this is accepted then, in-spite-of the tall-claim on the part of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers that they have refuted Buddhism does not stand, for the simple-reason that they are not playing the same-game and with the same-rules. Even this one may not mind and one may not pay serious-attention to such a claim. But even their second-claim does not seem to stand – namely that they have evolved and developed such a system of ontological-reduction, reconstruction and of the relation-between significant-expressions and what they signify in such a way that anybody interested in this problem and anybody resorting to meaningful or significant-language as a powerful, and, perhaps, the only means of communication must study the

kind of relationship that obtains between significant-expressions and what they signify along with the kind of information we get and the kind of entities we are likely to know to be there. Further, according to *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, for this the road is the only-one which they point-out and lay; and hence, the significance and importance of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. This claim of theirs does not seem to stand, because the system they have constructed does not seem to be complete-and-consistent. Even-this one may not mind, provided it is at-least consistent in the strict-sense of the term. We found reasons to hold that it is consistent, provided we understand consistency the way they understand; but it is also complete, provided we understand completeness the way they want it to understand. But we also noted on plausible-grounds that this does not seem to amount either to completeness or to consistency, as they should be understood, irrespective of how *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers want them to understand.

Even-if one ignores such stringent-considerations of consistency and completeness, which any philosophical theory worth the name is expected to satisfy, and take the *Navya-Nyāya* theory at its face-value the trouble does not seem to be over. The *Navya-Nyāya* theory might be expected to be talking-about a possible-world and reconstructing it. It could be expected to be spelling-out the mode of world-word relationship in such a possible-world. It might be advocating a thesis that in such a world that is the kind of word-world relationship that is expected to be operative. All this might be true. But from this, it does not follow that the possible-world *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers envision is the only possible-world. Nor does it follow that it is nothing-else-but the actual-world. It does not indicate the consistency and/or completeness of such a world either. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers could be said to be considering one of the

possible-worlds at the most. This raises number of problems. Some of them we hope to deal with in the next chapter.

Conclusion

Our investigation, thus, shows that the above-mentioned claim of *Navya-Nyāya* philosopher's stands, provided one subscribes to the kind of world to be there to which they subscribe; and the kind of relation-between expressions and what they signify is accepted, which they accept. Such acceptance is contingent and arbitrary. Yet, at the same time, in so-far-as our language reveals at-least some of the nature of the world, and of some of the things that are the part of its furniture, at-least some of the points which they have made about word-world or language-world-relation are important. They are, and are likely to be the guide in our search for such a relation. It is in this where the value of the *Navya-Nyāya* lies, and it is only to this extent that it could be said to have influenced the other trends of Indian Philosophical Thought. Moreover, the techniques it developed, technical-terms it introduced and their meanings decided considerably had the influence on the other Indian Philosophical trends. But all of this, perhaps, was not their own. They borrowed many-considerations from others; but the general-mould that they erected was their own. It is this mould that has certain troubles, and it was our humble-intention to point-out in this chapter that it has weakness both – on the count of completeness as-well-as consistency. Hence, the *Navya-Nyāya* claim to the effect of both completeness-and-consistency of the theory seems to fail for one-reason or the other There is, however, one point that is remaining to be considered and that is the issue of reduction and reconstruction along with realism of the *Navya-Nyāya* – the very backbone of the *Navya-Nyāya*. It is to the consideration of that issue that we turn in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. We were working independently on the ideas as a kind of defence of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. After we formulated a rough-outline of our argument, we came across an article entitled "A material theory of reference" by James K. Feibleman, available in *Philosophical Logic,* Taulane University, New Orleans, 1967. We have profited from it, and it also helped a sort of reinforcement of our ideas. We are grateful to the author and the publisher.
2. *Tarka-Saṁgraha;* Pp. 80-86
3. *Ibid;* Pp. 86-95.
4. *Ibid;* Pp. 73-76.
5. *Ibid;* Pp. 73-76.
6. *Ibid;* Pp. 75-81.
7. *Lakṣaṇāvalī;* Udayana; Pp. 1-3
8. Feibleman, J.K.; please see note no1 mentioned above, p. 65.

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Chapter-9

Reconstruction and Realism

Recapitulation and Statement of the Problem

Let us recapitulate the points that have so-far emerged through our investigation of the *Navya-Nyāya*. They are:

i. it seems to resort-to the fallacy of what is called an 'ontological-slum' or 'ontological-fertility',

ii. it's methodology, that supports it's 'ontological-slum', seems mistaken, because it predominantly and excessively appears to dwell-on some of the illicit formal-considerations at the cost of neglecting some of the important-consequences,

iii. both its methodology and the 'ontological-slum' seem to be rooted-in the wrong-clues that it receives from an ordinary-language, and which it makes the stepping-stone of both of them,

iv. the reductive *Navya-Nyāya* theory amounts to be an 'ontological-individualism' on the one-hand, and 'methodological-holism' on the other,

v. it seems unable consistently to sustain the distinction-between context of discovery, explanation and that of justification,

vi. it appears also unable consistently to stand-by the distinction-between different 'kinds' and 'types' of priorities, that

vii. it is a closed and an opaque-theory; and lastly

viii.its completeness and consistency seem to be founded on error and confusion.

We had argued in the first-two chapters (of this part-two) that the *Navya-Nyāya* is not-only realistic in its approach, but is also interested in undertaking four-different 'types' of reconstructions, viz. ontological, empirical, epistemic and logical. But, in its approach, which is at-once re-constructionistic and realistic, there develops a certain-tension, and it is towards the consideration of it to-which this last chapter is directed.

Nature of Reconstruction in Philosophy

It is not merely *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, who are interested in the problem of reconstruction; where reconstruction is, of-course, to be understood in its philosophic-significance. There are indeed many philosophers, who have paid attention-to and dived-deep into the problem of reconstruction; whatever might have been the initial-impetus that might have promoted them to embark-upon the investigation of the problem. It is quite obvious that philosophic-reconstruction, meaning thereby reconstruction-undertaken by philosophers for philosophic-purpose/s, has to be considered from a philosophic-perspective in terms of which the proper-significance and import of it could be brought-out. In order to be able to grasp and explain the nature of philosophic-reconstruction or reconstruction in philosophy – better-still reconstruction undertaken for philosophic-purpose, and from a philosophic-perspective – it would be better, we presume to distinguish reconstruction in philosophy from either construction or reduction in philosophy. But, we shall have also to bring-out, however, briefly the nature of reconstruction in philosophy. This kind of investigation, we think, is necessary to be able to explain and assess the *Nyāya* interest-in philosophic-reconstruction in-general and the interest of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers in-particular.

It is obvious that scientific and philosophic-investigations open-up, at-least to start-with, from two-different but basic-considerations. We may put these considerations roughly saying that whereas a scientist arrives at the problem of relation-between language and facts from the side of facts, having started with them; a philosopher, on the contrary, arrives at facts as the culmination-point of his investigation. That is, whereas scientific-consideration opens-up in the 'realm of facts'; philosophic-considerations open-up and have their starting-point in the 'realm of language'. These two-types of considerations may meet and even converge-upon each-other, but this is a contingent-phenomenon. There is nothing scientifically-wrong, if this does not happen; nor it is philosophically-absurd, if such convergence does not come-about. But it is not so-much phenomenon of the convergence of these two-types of considerations that is either scientifically or philosophically-troublesome and methodologically-enigmatic, but-rather deviation and departure-from it. For, in the situation of deviation and departure various-issues are brought to-stake from both the sides; the chief being that while the world-view that a scientist presents is too-restrictive and narrow, so a scientist accuses a philosopher; the one a philosopher presents or tends to present turns-out to be too-proliferative, unrealistic and problematic according to a scientist. This kind of controversy does not, however, suggest that either one or the other member of the pair is dishonest; and deliberately attempts to undertake a methodological-fraud. But, philosophic-considerations, if they are not enchained by proper-perspective, are likely to pose number of problems in its haste to attempt to solve or even dissolve some others,

Let us try to put our point bit differently. Both scientists and philosophers believe and up-to a certain point are right in believing so, that language when used successfully and significantly, as an instrument and means of meaningful-

communication, enables us to be-speak and communicate about facts. In-fact, this is why we are in a position to use language for our meaningful-communication. Now the job that remains is that given significant-expressions we are either in a position to point-out the kind of fact, no-matter whether primitive or otherwise, that it signifies or not. Scientists, approaching the problem from the side of facts and being faithful to their empirical and scientific-approach, contend that some expressions, *prima-facie* taken to be significant, do not actually mean anything other-than fictions or myths; simply because there is no fact that is capable of being correlated with them. That is, they are factually-empty and scientifically-vaporous. The endeavor of a scientist is always to tailor language to facts; and take that language alone to be significant which can be so tailored to facts, which are either given actually, experientially or could at-least in-principle be said to be given-experientially. In other-words, the import of any significant-expression must be capable of being brought-out, a scientist holds, either analytically or experientially, or both. In the former-sense, what we get are structures; in the latter-case, on the contrary, what we get are facts – simple or compound. In such an attempt, he may and often does succeed in bringing to our attention some-expressions, which are bogus and empty in either one of the two-senses; and hence the only fate they deserve is their being got-rid-off at our hands in the area of significant-discourse. For, through their employment, he rightly holds, insurmountable-bewitchments and horrifying-puzzlements would alone be our fate.

Even-if philosophers delimit their considerations to the domain of significant-discourse and meaningful-language, starting from language primarily as they do, they do not necessarily come to chance-upon the same-kind of realm of facts; although some or the other realm of facts they do arrive at. Moreover, they also do not hold, other things remaining

the same, that each-one of the facts they so arrive at are either equally-simple or equally-compound. It is of-course true that presuming that every significant-expression designates a fact, and all such facts so-designated are members of the same or different-realms of facts, one does come to pose problems, which lead to consequences that are neither happy nor congenial, whether philosophically or scientifically. But more of this consideration bit-later in our inquiry. Suffice it for the present to observe that the realm of facts both philosophers and scientists talk-of are arrived-at from two different-perspectives; and it is a matter of share-contingency that they may come to meet and converge. But unless philosophic-considerations are channelized through methodological and other-considerations, there is nothing in philosophic-qua-philosophic consideration that it shall converge-upon the same-realm of facts that a scientist starts or is supposed to start-from.

One thing, however, is certain and that is: any consideration, no matter whether scientific or philosophic, that is pluralistic and realistic, if not pluralist, realistic as-well-as empirical, goes, happens to go or has always gone by the road of some or the other kind of atomism. But subscription to atomism and pluralism opens-up two considerations depending-upon at which level atomistic-considerations are envisaged to be brought-in. One may either be puzzled-about the compounds and molecules, and starting-from them one's problem would be: how to break, divide or analyse the compounds. One may, on the contrary, be puzzled with compounds or molecules. But here the puzzlement is of a different-kind. One may approach the problem in a different-way. One may ask: what primitives, building-blocks, should be there in order that the kind of compounds or molecules we encounter shall come to be constructed out-of them. He also has to evolve the technique and methodology with the help of which such compounds

could not-only be constructed, but can be shown to be constructed. Be he a scientist or a philosopher, he need not necessarily be interested in both these issues, although there is nothing prohibitive that debars him from getting so interested. When one gets so interested in both the problems, it goes without saying that such a kind of interest ushers-in many-problems; one may not already be aware of when one decides to undertake such a project. We shall probe-into some of these problems later, when we shall come to investigate the programme *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers intend to undertake. It is sufficient presently, however, to note that one need not necessarily be interested in both these issues, either simultaneously or even in succession. For, one may delimit one's considerations either to the problem of breaking, dividing or analysing the compounds into, or of constructing them out-of simples, whatever one may mean and understand by the expression.

The two projects, nevertheless, viz. of construction and division, breaking or analysing are interesting. The former out-of these starts-from simples and arrives at compounds. The latter, on the contrary, starts-from the compounds or complexes and arrives at the simples. Each-one of them has its own technique, and the techniques involved in both these projects need not be so-asunder and diametrically-opposed to each-other. Often, it is contended, they are similar if not the same, although the latter-alternative is not ruled-out completely. The second of these projects is known as 'reduction', not only being in the other-direction of that of 'construction'; but-also it being the case that which is the starting-point of the first is the culmination-point of the second. In one, it may be argued, what we get are ascending-series; while in the second descending-series. The series so-got need not be similar or even the same. But sometimes a very powerful-plea is made that not-only the two-series are similar but-also the same; only in reverse-order. Not only

this. It is also argued that the techniques involved in both the projects are not-only similar, but are also isomorphic with each-other. This need not, however, be the case necessarily. For, as it is not incumbent-upon us to descend by the same stair-case by which we have ascended the floor, similarly it is not necessary to presuppose that techniques-involved in construction and reduction are isomorphic with each-other. Both philosophers as-well-as scientists can commit such a mistake of presupposing that it is so. It is, nevertheless, important to understand that one may slip-into troublesome-waters, if one does not properly-formulate one's thesis – scientific or philosophic. Other things remaining the same, it is also true that philosophers are more-likely to slip-into this kind of trap; since they come to operate, to start-with at-least, if-not principally and exclusively, on the plane of language. Further, the issue becomes or tends to become complicated, because whereas philosophers are prepared to accept both discovered and invented-facts as facts; scientists accept discovered or discoverable-facts alone as facts. But more of this consideration later.

Construction, therefore, is the issue of the explanation of emergence of complex-acts out-of the simple-ones; while reduction is the issue of boiling-down the compound-facts to their components – simple or compound. The former of these may start-from the presupposition that there are only those simple-facts, which have been discovered and those which could be taken and shown to be discoverable. It may, nevertheless, start-from the simple-facts, which are presumed to be there; no-matter whether they are discovered or are even shown to be discoverable. In the former-case, the starting-point is restrictive; while in the latter-case it turns-out to be proliferative and entertaining, if-not altogether-misleading, systematically or otherwise. The latter-consideration, too, may be advanced in terms of two principal-perspectives. It may be maintained, on the one-

hand, that the simples to which the compounds are reduced or said to be reducible must be those and those alone which are discovered or are experientially-discoverable. It may, on the contrary, be argued that such simples may be taken to be those which we do accept to be there actually. Even in this case also these two-considerations turn-out to be restrictive and proliferative respectively. One need-not necessarily, therefore, presuppose that whereas construction is non-proliferative, reduction may tend to be and *vice-versa*. There is no rule about slip-and-error.

Although reduction has fascinated many philosophers, yet sometimes what goes-on under the name of the programme of reduction has been attempted not because it was thought that it-itself, in its success or failure, had some ontological-import, but rather to provide a linguistic-reflection of a previously accepted-ontology. When this is done more-conditions are laid-down or sought-for language, so that the accepted-language shows more-illuminatingly and strikingly the structure of accepted-ontology. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers do not create a new-language capable of showing the structure of accepted-ontology. It, rather, interprets ordinary-language in such a way that it reveals the ontology it has accepted. Perhaps, its claim is that ordinary-language reveals the kind of ontology it accepts, and anybody accepting such a kind of language cannot help accepting the kind of ontology it does accept. This point will become clear as we proceed.

Regarding both construction and reduction we offered the explanation previously on the plane of ontology. Understood this way, that would amount to ontological-construction or reduction. A project of this kind can be undertaken not-only with regard to ontological-world, but-also with regard to human-knowledge; where complex-bits of human-knowledge could be structured out-of simples and such complexes can also be shown to be reducible to simple

ones. The project could also be extended to human-language – i.e. language of human significant-communication. On the plane of language, construction and reduction amount respectively to be objects of showing how expressions indicative of complex-entities could be systematically-constructed out-of expressions indicative of simple-entities; and conversely, how expressions indicative of complex-entities could be analysed into those indicative of simple-ones. The projects also raise a question: should we have a specially constructed-language for it, or would an ordinary-language itself serves the purpose? But we need hardly to consider these problems in details here.

Construction and reduction are not, however, the only-two problems and issues in which philosophers and scientists may get-involved. There is a third-problem that may engage their attention. That is the problem of reconstruction. Reconstruction, as compared with that of construction or reduction is a complex-issue. This is for two-reasons. First, it combines both construction and reduction, structuring and dismantling. It combines, as the hemispheres, the issues of construction and reduction to be able to present them as hemispheres of the same-globe. Secondly, it envisages not-only combination of these two-issues, but it also expects, normally, that having started-from a particular launching-pad and having taken a take-off in the direction of construction, we must be in a position to land-on the same launching-pad through the maneuver of reduction. Thus, it envisages to develop such a technique and methodology, which will allow us to arrive at the same-simples through our resorting to reduction from which we started or are expected to start-on our constructional-voyage. Reconstruction, thus, so connects or comes to connect construction and reduction with each-other that they appear to be organic-components of the same-larger and more overwhelming-issue – viz. reconstruction. Thus, in reconstruction-issue not-

only issues of construction and reduction are involved, but-also much-more complicated methodological and technical-considerations. Anyone interested in the issue of reconstruction will not be able to shelve the issue either of construction or of reduction. But one will not also be in a position to make any move and advancement on the line of reconstruction, independently of methodology and technique. Technique and methodology are allowed here not as a matter of concession and tolerance, but as a matter of necessity and inevitability. For, independently of such a methodology and technique, there would be nothing, except arbitrary-contention, which can show that construction and reduction are the two-phases of the same-coin; and one returns to the starting-point after circumnavigating the circumference of two-hemispheres of construction and reduction. There, indeed, are many interesting and complicated-issues, which are involved in the entire-programme that is envisaged to be worked-out as-well-as in the manner in which it is supposed to be work-out. About some of these issues bit-later.

Reconstruction, moreover, no matter whether undertaken by scientists or philosophers – that is, whether it is scientific or philosophical – embraces another-consideration too. It makes introduction of new-entities at an appropriate-stage possible. It is not necessarily the case, however, that the entities that so newly come to be introduced must form either the starting-points of the programme or the intermediate-links in the entire-explanation that reconstruction brings to the focus. But one thing is clear, irrespective of the stage where the new-entity is introduced it must fulfill one of the two-purposes: (i) it should help to bridge-up the gap and establish-connection in explanation, or (ii) introduction of such a new-entity should simplify-explanation. Introduction of new-entities, which reconstruction makes possible, is not governed and

controlled by the similar or the same-restrains in scientific as-well as philosophical-reconstruction. For, in scientific-reconstruction the new-entities that are so introduced, no matter whether theoretical or otherwise, must in-principle be capable of being given to us experientially. In philosophical-reconstruction, on the contrary, there is no restriction of this kind. What suffices is consistency in the latter and hence discoverable as-well-as invented-entities masquerade or can masquerade as equally-genuine new-entities in it. On closer scrutiny, this no-doubt creates problems, but we need not bother-about them here, although of some of them we shall take a critical-notice, as they have been posed by the *Navya-Nyāya* attempt at reconstruction.

Principal Kinds of Reconstructions in Philosophy

Let us delimit ourselves to the question of reconstruction in philosophy. We are leaving-out the issue of scientific-reconstruction, not-because it is unimportant; but, first, because this investigation is beside the point so-far-as our present-engagement is concerned and secondly because such a kind of investigation would carry us too-far from the fundamental-point under-consideration. Even-if we delimit ourselves to reconstruction in philosophy or philosophic-reconstruction, there are at-least three different-kinds of reconstructions in which philosophers may get-interested:

(A) ***Ontological-Reconstruction:*** First, a philosopher may be interested in what is called 'ontological-reconstruction'. In such an attempt, he not-only explains how the ontological-compounds are or happen to be constructed; but he may also explain how the ontological-complexes or compounds are to be reduced. This is the methodological-part of his programme. But, equally-important is that part too wherein he not-only explains what kind of compounds are or happen to be constructed given their component-simples or building-blocks, but he may also seek to show to

what kind of different-simples are the compounds to be reducible. Here again, there may arise two-questions: First, a philosopher may presuppose that the primitives or the building-blocks he presumes to be there, are presumed to be there without any commitment of their actually being there as parts of the furniture of the world. But, secondly, on the contrary, he may hold that the primitives are not-only supposed to be there, but they actually are. Thus, whereas the former-consideration is neutral with regard to the question of ontological-commitment; the latter is not. This further raises, nevertheless, the question as to how are we going to specify and make sense-of our ontological-commitment on the plane of language. It is obvious that these two-contentions are different, and they need not be necessarily taken to be either convergent or the same. But sometimes philosophers lose-sight of this and as a result of this involve themselves into difficulties, which neither their perspective nor their methodology are able to help them to surmount. The fundamental-problem in ontological-reconstruction is the problem of the reconstruction of the world, which is either supposed to be there or is there as a matter of fact. These alternatives, as we shall see later, themselves pose certain problems; but more of them later.

(B) ***Reconstruction of Human-Knowledge:*** Philosophers, however, may be interested in another-kind of reconstruction. That reconstruction is the reconstruction of human-knowledge, without raising the issue of the distinction-between either 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge by description', or knowledge that is 'analytic' or 'synthetic'. What is attempted to be maintained is that as all confinements of the world are not of the same-kind, being classifiable into simple and compound at-least, similarly all bits of human-knowledge are not of the same-kind; since they seem to fall-into two-classes – simple and compound. The notions of simplicity and compoundness of bits are

attempted to be understood on the lines parallel to those on which simple and compound-components of the world are understood in undertaking ontological-reconstruction of the world. Thus, what is intended to be put-forward is the plea that every bit of human-knowledge is not equally-simple and primitive. Rather, some bits are simple, not being made-up of knowledge, although it is analysable into relations and *relata* of relations. This is, perhaps, intended to be said when a *Nyāya* philosopher tells us that any bit of knowledge is *Viśiṣṭa-Viśeṣyaka, Viśiṣṭa-Prakāraka* and *Viśiṣṭa-Saṁsargaka*[1]. It is also true that this way of putting the matter intends to bring-out the general-form of any-knowledge too, no-matter whether it is simple or compound. It remains, nevertheless, that as a philosopher may attempt to reconstruct an ontological-world, so too he may attempt to reconstruct human-knowledge. Further, as he may undertake a reconstruction of ontological-world in terms of facts which are either there or are supposed to be there; similarly he may also undertake a reconstruction of human-knowledge in-terms of the knowledge which we either have or are supposed to have or can be said to be having. Such a programme of 'epistemological-reconstruction', too, raises its own-problems; and if additional-considerations are brought to bear-upon them, then the issue turns-out to be much-more complicated than one may even suspect it to be *prima-facie*. The principal-motif that may prompt a philosopher to undertake-reconstruction of human-knowledge is to attempt to explain the entire-edifice of human-knowledge, showing that the different-bits of which it can be said to be composed are not equally-primitive.

(C) ***Reconstruction of Human-Language:*** Philosophers may get interested, however, in a third-kind of reconstruction. That amounts to be 'reconstruction of human-language' or the language of successful and significant-communication. Language is a very powerful and important-

tool of communication, and it is no-wonder that philosophers have come to pay a considerable-attention to the phenomenon of language. As a philosopher interested in the problem of ontological-reconstruction may argue that various-components of the world are not equally-primitive and that some of them at-least are not-only constructed-out of the simples but are also reducible to them; similarly a philosopher interested in the problem of reconstruction of human-language or the language of systematic and significant-communication, too, may maintain that it is composed of bits, each-one of which is significant. But, in-spite-of the fact that every bit is significant, it is not equally-primitive. There are some bits of language which are simple, while others are complex in such a way that they not only can be constructed-out of simple-linguistic-components but are also reducible to them. Thus, the plausibility with which the reconstruction-issue may be raised with regard to ontological-world or human-knowledge is also available-for the question of reconstruction of human-language, undertaken with the intention of showing that all bits of human-language are not equally-primitive or equally-compound. Rather, some bits are primitive, while others are not-only constructed-out them but are also reducible to them. Thus, even with regard to language of sensible and significant-communication, too, the programme of reconstruction is hopefully envisaged to be undertaken; the programme which embraces both construction and reduction as it's two-important and significant-facets.

Possibility of Simultaneously Undertaking More-Than-One Reconstructions

A philosopher may not-only be interested in undertaking any-one of the above-mentioned three reconstructions, but-even more than one. He may even be interested in undertaking all of the three reconstructions. Each-one of

these reconstructions is important philosophically, and there is nothing unnatural and un-philosophical in a philosopher's being interested in undertaking any-two or all these reconstructions. But one thing is important to remember. Any-one of these reconstructions, not even ontological-reconstruction, is tantamount to any commitment. The issue of commitment is an independent-issue, and one who raises a reconstruction-issue need not necessarily be raising the issue of commitment. Secondly, just because a philosopher is interested in more-than-one reconstruction or even all of them, this in-itself does not necessitate any particular-kind of relation between-or-among them, no matter it is considered to be of partial or spiral, or even of total-convergence. It also does not follow that the reconstructions under-consideration must be isomorphic with one-another. Nor is it entailed that the techniques and methodology involved in one, must be the same as involved in the other. There can and indeed are some arguments, which are marshaled in support of such contention. But, it seems, what they stem-from are heuristic and pragmatic-considerations, along-with clues for reconstruction gathered either from linguistic or extra-linguistic-considerations. The only plea presently we are interested in putting-forward is that neither interest in the programme of reconstruction, nor being interested in more-than-one reconstructions – simultaneously or in succession – necessitates subscription to anyone of these views, however-dear and *prima-facie* plausible they may seem to be. We shall discuss the issue of commitment in reconstruction at a bit later-stage in our inquiry.

Chief Domains of Reconstructions in Philosophy

As there are these three principal-kinds of reconstructions, similarly there are indeed three main-kinds of domains within which reconstruction-programme can be undertaken. First, a reconstruction-programme can be

deemed and envisaged to be undertaken within a 'realistic-frame of reference'. It may be held that not-only facts, no-matter whether simple or compound, positive or negative, atomic, sub-atomic or molecular, are real; but-also their properties, as also relations between-or-among them they stand along with their concepts or universals. In the programme of ontological-reconstruction, in this domain of consideration, what is expected to be done is to explain not-only emergence of complexes and compounds, but-also their reduction to the components.

In the epistemological-reconstruction, correspondingly, every piece or bit of human-knowledge, which amounts to be knowledge of some or the other real which can be accepted to be so without either involving ourselves into a down-right contradiction or endangering the whole-programme to utter-redundancy and non-sense, is either elementary or compound. If the latter, it can be shown how it can be constructed and can also be shown to be reducible to the component simple-bits of human-knowledge. Hence, as ontological-reconstruction can be undertaken in a realistic-frame, so too, a reconstruction of human-knowledge can be.

Correspondingly a realistic-frame can also be extended to enable to undertake reconstruction of the language of human significant-communications. Here what is presupposed is that as the entire-range of the language of significant-communication is significant, so too, every bit of it; the only difference being such a bit may either be primarily-significant or derivatively. Thus, the significance of an expression can be explained either independently of other significant-expression/s, or in-and-through them. It can, thus, not only be shown that compound significant-expression can be constructed out-of simple significant-expressions; but their significance can also be shown to be reducible to the significance of the component simple-

expressions. From the point of view of the fact that every significant-expression, no-matter whether simple or compound, is beset with some or the other significance, all expressions are taken to be equally-genuine so-far-as significance is concerned; although not equally-primitive. In this way realistic-frame offers or is envisaged to offer a fair and promising-prospects of various-kinds of reconstructions – whether undertaken simultaneously or in succession.

As an alternative to the 'realistic-programme of undertaking reconstruction', whether ontological, epistemological or linguistic; 'nominalism' offers such a reconstruction-programme within its frame. The alternative-posed and presented by it indeed turns-out to be a formidable as-well-as parsimonistic one. It holds, against the contention of a realist, in the domain of ontological-reconstruction, that at-least some of the constructions are spurious and fictitious; in the sense that they cannot be said to be composed of such elements as are constituents which either are genuine-components of the world, or can at-least be taken to be the genuine-components of the world without involving ourselves either in inconsistency or contradiction, or even mythology or superstition. From the side of reduction, on the contrary, it holds that out-of the so-called compounds or complexes at-least some are just linguistic, fictitious and of the nature of logical-constructions; and being so are incapable of being reduced to the genuine-components of the world. Thus, whereas it maintains that every construct does not necessarily embrace genuine-components; every construct, just because it is a construct, is not necessarily reducible to the components of the world which are given. As compared with the realistic-reconstruction-programme, nominalistic-reconstruction-programme has exceptions; not-only on the count of construction, but-also on that of reduction.

With regard to epistemological-reconstruction a nominalist holds that every bit of human-knowledge is not genuine and veridical, because at-least some of the so-called pieces of human-knowledge are spurious; in the sense that they are given in-and-through no genuine-mode of cognition. Conversely, there are some epistemic-complexes or molecules, which are reducible to no genuine-cognitions; and hence should be counted just to be epistemological-constructions. Similar would be the considerations which a nominalist would put-forward with regard to the issue of linguistic-reconstruction. Thus, with regard to any-reconstruction a nominalist-reconstruction intends to take-exception to the realist-reconstruction and pose formidable-issues. It is on the count of these issues that there comes to the foreground a very-genuine and profound controversy-between 'realism' and 'nominalism'.

There is a third frame, however, within which reconstruction-programme can be meaningfully-envisaged to be carried-out. Such a frame is that of 'phenomenalism'. In the domain of ontological-reconstruction, it holds that theoretical-entities as-well-as normal-objects of our cognition are constructs; out-of such phenomenological-objects, like *sensa* or sense-data. It also holds that each-one of such construct need not necessarily be a genuine one, as it can be a spurious-construct. If it is of the latter-kind, the issue of construction simply does not arise with regard to it. But the issue of reduction, too, is equally fictitious-issue to be raised with reference to it.

In the sphere of epistemological-reconstruction, it holds, that our cognitions of *sensa* or sense-data are the bed-rocks on which other cognitions are founded and out of which they are constructed, if genuine ones and being-so to them alone they remain reducible. Similar kind of contention it would put-forward with regard to linguistic-reconstruction.

The reason why we have dealt-with in such a sketchy and summary-way the issue of phenomenalistic-programme of reconstruction is not because no attempt of this kind has ever been made, but-rather because a detailed-account of it is beside the point so-far-as our present-inquiry is concerned. Our investigation is going to be tied-down mainly and, perhaps, solely to the 'realist-nominalist-controversy'. The reason of this will become apparent as we proceed. One point, nevertheless, that needs carefully to be borne in mind is that the 'phenomenalistic-reconstruction-programme' does not necessarily converge-upon either realistic or nominalistic-programme, although it need not necessarily be averse to some of the considerations, at least, propounded by realists or nominalists.

Reconstruction and Commitment

We have argued above that a reconstruction-programme may raise principally two-issues: (i) reconstruction of what – ontological-world, human-knowledge, or language of communication along with its syntactical and semantical apparatus; (ii) in which sphere is reconstruction-envisaged to be undertaken – realist, nominalist, or phenomenalist? These are not, however, the only issues that are important with regard to reconstruction. There is a third-issue. That is the issue of commitment. Such commitment, further, may be chiefly of two-kinds: (a) commitment to technique and/or methodology, and (b) commitment to facts. We shall consider these issues in the same-order in which we have posed them.

(a) ***Commitment to Technique or Methodology:*** We have already-argued that construction and reduction are involved as two important-factors of it in any reconstruction-programme. It is also important to understand at this juncture that whether one is interested in construction alone, reduction alone, or in the reconstruction-programme at large,

subscription to some or the other-kind of 'pluralism' and 'atomism', therefore, is pre-methodological and prior to the selection of techniques. It is nevertheless true that the methodology to be adopted and techniques-employed must not make travesty of pluralism and undermine-atomism. Yet, none of these-options are dictated by methodology or techniques, which reconstructionist adopts, develops and matures. The methodology so-developed and the techniques-employed must obviously-facilitate not-only construction but-also reduction, the two main-pillars of the reconstruction-programme. Any reconstructionist has to develop a methodology and adopt techniques, which facilitate both construction as-well-as reduction. To the extent to which none of these can be undertaken independently of either methodology, or techniques, or even-both, it is inevitable for a reconstructionist to subscribe to some-methodology and some-technique/s. But, subscription to such methodology and technique/s does not, in-itself and necessarily bring-in a commitment to a particular-kind of facts. Nor does it also seem to bring-in the commitment that the kind of methodology and technique/s that are employed are the only-ones one can and need employ, if one's interest in reconstruction is to persist. This is not to convey that the reconstructionist-programme can arbitrarily be combined and connected with any methodology and technique/s. Reconstructionist-programmer has to employ a methodology and technique/s, which are minimally-consistent with pluralism on the one-hand and some kind of atomism on the other-hand. What is intended to be conveyed is that reconstruction-programme, independently of adopting any methodology whatever and without developing any technique, is impossible to carry-out, no-matter whether it is envisaged to be carried-out in the frame of realist, nominalist, or even of a phenomenalist. To say this, however, is one thing. But when with the consideration of reduction

the issue of commitment is mingled, it is attempted to put-forward that reconstruction not-only involves reduction but-also a commitment. What this contention conveys or rather intends to convey is that reconstructionist is inevitably tied-down to the methodology and techniques he adopts and develops. This view seems to be stemming-from two-important and, perhaps, related-considerations: (i) First, once a particular-methodology is developed and certain-techniques are adopted, a reconstructionist does not give them up, or even change to some other methodology; nor does he come to adopt newer-techniques; (ii) secondly, in so-far-as neither construction nor reduction are capable of being carried-out devoid of the adopted or requisite-methodology and required-techniques, reconstruction-programme and such methodology and techniques are so tied-down with each-other that they stand-or-fall together. Hence, if a reconstructionist is to hold steadfastly to the reconstruction-programme, he must remain committed to the methodology and techniques which facilitate it; and independently of which such a programme does not seem even to be plausible to be carried-out.

Let us examine these arguments bit more-closely. The first argument is based-upon the fact that normally a reconstructionist does not change the methodology and the techniques, which are found to be suitable to the programme he envisages to undertake; provided there are no contrary-reasons and recalcitrant-considerations which necessitate such a change. The evidence, on which the argument is attempted to be based, are certainly true as-far-as things go. But, unfortunately, the conclusion that the evidence is supposed to entail does not happen to be entailed. The argument is slippery. Normally reconstructionist does not change his methodology and adopt new-techniques. But this does not mean that he is forbidden to do so. Similarly, his persistence with the methodology and techniques is not to

be interpreted as signifying that he would never give them up, come what may. What is important to grasp is that every reconstructionist-programme is inevitably-connected with this or that methodology and with those or other techniques. But, it is certainly not connected with the methodology and these techniques alone, in the sense that adoption of alternative-methodology and substitute-techniques is just forbidden and is also impossible. There may be various-reasons for such a shift, and in our present context we may single-out at-least one, viz. widening of the reconstructionist-programme and sharpening of the issues, as happened at the hands of *Navya-Naiyāyikas*. In-spite-of the fact that both factions of the *Nyāya* are realistic as-well-as reconstructionistic, at the hands of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers not-only methodology is changed, but-even techniques are altered and changed. A reconstructionist will certainly uphold, propagate and champion a particular-methodology and certain-techniques, in so-far-as they are helpful-devices in the reconstructionist-progromme. But this does not mean that he is so committed to them, as not being prepared to allow any change or modification in them. A reconstructionist-programme and interest will certainly indicate, adopt and acknowledge a preference of certain-methodology and techniques over-others. But, such preferences are understandable only heuristically, or even pragmatically. It is also true that such preferences are often settled in terms of the intentions, which prompt reconstruction to be undertaken; but they are also settled by the consideration of the kind of frame within which reconstruction is to be undertaken, and of that which is to be reconstructed. We shall return to this point at a bit later-stage.

The second argument, too, lacks the required-cogency and necessary-plausibility. It is obviously the case that no reconstruction-programme would be carried-out without proper-methodology and pertinent-techniques. It is also true

that such methodology and techniques facilitate not-only construction, but-also reduction involved in reconstruction. To this extent reconstruction on the one-hand and methodology as-well-as techniques on the other-hand seem to go hand-in-hand with each-other such that continued-interest in the reconstructionist-programme appears to entail consequent-commitment to methodology and techniques which facilitate it. But even here there is a slip in the argument. By saying that the argument sketched-above is slippery what is meant is not that to hold that there is not-only contiguity, but-even constant-conjunction between reconstruction-programme and subscription to a particular-kind of methodology and adoption of certain-techniques is misplaced and unjustifiable. Far from it. The intention, that is, is not to convey absence of such relation. Rather, what is sought to be maintained is that decision to involve oneself in a reconstructionist-programme in-itself and by-itself does-not and need-not make us tie ourselves with a particular-methodology and certain-techniques, as the methodology and the only techniques. Reconstructionist interest can be matched-with alternative-methodologies and variant-techniques without any-loss, no-matter methodological or otherwise. It is this that is often lost-sight-of. But it is precisely this which engenders argument to the effect that a reconstructionist-programme is so-tied with particular-methodology and certain-techniques that they are not-only the life-saving-jackets of such a programme, but that a reconstructionist has to be committed to them come what may and with as much zeal and uncompromisingness as he can command. It is this which we are trying to point-out to be a mistaken-view. Even-if the envisaged reconstructionist-programme is to be carried-out within the limits of a certain-frame, say of a realist, there are alternative-methodologies and techniques, which can be relied-upon. If this is not to be made allowance-for, there seems to be no way of

understanding the fact that an empiricist as-well-as a Platonist-realist may be equally genuinely-interested in a reconstructionist-program. Similarly, it is otherwise-hard to understand the interest of *Cārvāka, Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* philosophers in the reconstructionist-programme, or even-if only the part of ontological-reconstruction alone is taken-up for consideration. For, within realistic-frame itself, whereas the *Cārvāka* subscribes to physicalistic-empiricist reconstructionist-programme, the *Vaiśeṣika* to moderate-realistic; while the *Nyāya* to Platonist-realistic reconstructionist-programme. The difference among them is not capable of being explained solely in terms of the consideration different reconstructionist-programs envisaged to be carried-out. Rather, what we need to take account of is also the methodology and techniques adopted by each-one of them. Thus, commitment to methodology and/or technique in a reconstruction-programme is not to be understood as commitment to the methodology and/or the technique/s, but-rather as commitment to a variable-methodology and variant-technique/s in so-far-as they are and can be profitably-used as tools of bringing-about and working-out the envisaged-programme. But understood in this way, it hardly amounts to a commitment. For, in so-far-as subscription to them is adhered to and fostered as-well-as defended with open-mind and possible allowance for-change, shift and variability the dogma in commitment evaporates; and heuristic and pragmatic-considerations get preponderance. This is not of course to say that heuristic and pragmatic-considerations themselves may not come to be immunized, exalted and dogmatized. But such a disease and the commitment-temperature it causes, is easy to diagnose; and its symptoms are obviously locatable and eradicatable. Such a kind of commitment is no commitment at-all, and even-if it is called commitment as a matter of allowance, considerateness and tolerance is not so-fatal and

dangerous as the other-one is. Such other commitment springs-from confusing three prominent issues – 'reduction', ontological-reduction' and 'ontological-commit-ment'. It is this commitment, which we had termed-above as 'commitment to reconstruction' or better-still 'commit-ment to facts'; and it is to the consideration of it that we now turn.

(b) *Commitment to Facts:* Let us delimit ourselves to the issue of 'ontological-reconstruction'. For, it is in this domain that the problem of 'ontological-commitment' and the like figure. The question of 'ontological-reduction', too, has its significance in this domain alone. Let us not, however, raise the question in which frame the reconstruction is envisaged to be carried-out. We shall consider some of the issues, which this question leads to at a later-stage. Even-if we limit our inquiry to ontology, it will turn-out that issues of 'construction' and 'reduction' are two different-kinds of issues. For, in-order-to undertake construction, it is not-at-all necessary that those bits over which something is constructed are there as a matter of fact. Thus, they can as-well be fictitious. Further, construction in itself does not necessitate that the construct must be reducible to its component-elements. That is why there could be logical-constructions or fictitious-structures, which are neither real nor are reducible to their so-called components. Reduction, on the contrary, starts from complexes or compounds; and envisages that such compounds could be dismantled into the objects, which are supposed to be components of such compounds. As any reduction demands objects, so too, does ontological-reduction, with the difference that ontological-reduction will demand ontological-objects, presuming that we are talking-about same-level or new-level reduction. Ontological-reduction is, no doubt, an issue of specific-ontology, but what it demands are objects; and not necessarily required-number and kinds of objects. In ontological-reduction, we are dealing with established-

ontologies with existing-object, and not with required-objects. Ontological-reduction, further, no-doubt involves a kind of circularity; in the sense that the existence of compound-entities to be reduced must be first assumed, in order to carry-out their reduction. But at the same-time the entities to which the compound-entities are envisaged to be reduced, have also to be presupposed as at-least possible, if-not actual, entities. What is, nevertheless, important to remember is that the programme of ontological-reduction prescribes neither the number of entities, nor their kinds.

We must sound a note of caution and warning at this juncture. Conceptual-reduction must not be confused with ontological-reduction. Conceptual-reduction amounts to conceptual-interpretation and it is neither reduction, concepts not being capable of classified into simple and compound, nor is it conceptual in the sense that it need not necessarily preserve-intensions. Further, there is also nothing ontological about it, unless we are maintaining that concepts, no matter of what kind, are some kind of ontological-entities. Similarly, meaning-preserving inter-theoretic-correspondences or syntactical-interpretations as they are called are more-efficient here as they can do without ontology. But just on that count itself they are unsuitable as modes of ontological-reduction. Hence, it is always better that the question of ontological-reduction is treated and handled independently of such considerations. It is methodologically-tempting and technically-efficient to try to bring ontological-reduction in-line-with other-reduction; but such a programme is semantically-dangerous and pragmatically-unrewarding.

The issue of ontological-commitment, on the other-hand, is much-more complicated than that of ontological-reduction. For, whereas ontological-reduction is an issue of specific-ontology, ontological-commitment is an issue of first-order-

syntax. In different-words, ontological-commitment demands required-objects – both with reference to their number and kinds, while ontological-reduction demands objects. It is not fully-correct to separate these two-issues as many philosophers are tempted to hold. At the same time, what one would expect is that ontological-reduction and ontological-commitment dovetail and reinforce each-other as meanings, and meaning-reductions do and are required to. But, nevertheless, it is not better to consider objects involved in ontological-reduction in terms of ontological-commitment; for this is pragmatically-unsuitable. It is pragmatically-unsuitable, not because there can be no methodology and technique in terms of which it could be explained and justified; but because such a move encroaches-upon the flexibility and tolerance of ontological-reduction. The move of tailoring ontological-reduction after ontological-commitment is unnecessarily-stringent, and mars the expediency and serviceability of the programme of ontological-reduction.

Tailoring ontological-reduction after ontological-commitment, we argued, is a dangerous-move. But, this is not the only move philosophers are tempted to make. Some of them, on the contrary, try to tailor ontological-commitment to ontological-reduction. Such a move is more-dangerous as compared with the first. Let us consider the issues in bit more details. The philosophers who make the first-kind of move seem to hold that since ontological-reduction and ontological-commitment not-only should dovetail and reinforce each-other, but-also that they do so dovetail. The phenomenon of their contingent-convergence is attempted to be used as a rule. Hence, it is expected to be argued that entities to which we should be able to reduce compound-entities must be those and only those which are, or rather our theory is, committed to take them to be existent or as parts of the furniture of the world. We can develop adequate

and suitable syntactical-tool, in terms of which what we are talking-about are such entities that could always be tested and ensured. All this is good and expedient as-far-as it goes. But the entire-move seems to be founded-on a confusion and misunderstanding. The necessary-condition of ontological-reduction is that the demand of object is satisfied. With reference to ontological-commitment, on the contrary, what is necessary is that the demand of required-number and kinds of object is met-with. In other words, ontological-reduction can go-on, even-if the object to be reduced and object to which they are expected to be reduced are possible-ontological-objects. They need-not fulfill also the condition that they are parts of the furniture of the (actual-) world. But, ontological-commitment, on the contrary, demands not-only that our theory enables us to uphold only those objects which are or can be shown to be the parts of the furniture of the world, but-also that there is an adequate-linguistic and methodological-tool at our disposal with the help of which we not-only are in a position to ensure that we are talking only-about such entities, but-also weed-out any talk-about entities, which turn-out to be of different-kinds than those which our ontological-commitment allows. Now, ontological-reduction, qua-ontological-reduction does not demand this. It does not impose any restriction of the kind, either. Ontological-commitment is a fortificatory-programme and requires an adequate-tool in terms of which such fortification, consequent-banishment, and excommunication of entities and talk-about them which do not fit into such fortification. All this is indeed important, but certainly un-required and uncalled-for, if what one is interested-in is ontological-reconstruction and not ontological-commitment. Thus, one need not necessarily say that ontological-reconstruction could be undertaken only in terms of those entities, which one is committed to accept as parts of the furniture of the world – no matter whether such components

are elemental or constructed, simple or compound, atomic or molecular. As it is mistaken to completely sever the issues of ontological-reduction and that of ontological-commitment, it is also wrong to tailor ontological-reduction to ontological-commitment.

This is not, however, the only error and confusion in which we are likely to fall. There are some ambitious, considerate, tolerant and entertaining philosophers, who put-forward another plea. They are convinced, it seems, of the propriety of questions of ontological-reconstruction and ontological-commitment. But this kind of conviction leads them to propagate and advocate the thesis that the field of ontological-reconstruction or ontological-reduction, and that of ontological-commitment are co-extensive with each-other. They hold, that is, that the entities with the help of which ontological-reduction would be carried-out are not-only the entities which are part of the furniture of the world, but-also we are committed to take them to be so. They so come to widen the field of ontological-commitment that it turns-out to be as extensive as that of ontological-reduction. Whereas the first-kind of attempt, considered in the preceding-paragraph, rejects some objects which would legitimately-figure in the domain of ontological-reduction. Since some objects do not figure in the domain of ontological-commitment, and since it expects and labours to shrink the expanse of ontological-reduction; and this attempt expects to enlarge the limits and boundaries of ontological-commitment. It attempts in such a way that in it the very distinction-between objects and required-objects, between objects, which are taken to be existent and objects, which as a matter of fact are existent, evaporates or vanishes. But, as a result of doing-away with this distinction, it comes to be held that all those objects which ontological-reduction necessitates us to posit are the objects which are existent and are parts of the furniture of the world. Whereas consideration of objects

involved in ontological-reduction in terms of objects that ontological-commitment brings-in, is pragmatically-unserviceable and restrictive; (against this) a view that all these objects which ontological-reduction brings-in, we are committed to take them as parts of the furniture of the world, is proliferative and over-inclusive; in so-far-as it extends the limits of ontological-commitment beyond unwarranted-boundaries. Thus, tailoring ontological-commitment to the size and expanse of ontological-reduction, is equally-dangerous and confusing a move. Perhaps, it is more-dangerous, because it paves-way for horrible Platonism; and makes us embrace ontological-slum. It is this which happens, when *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers try to bring to bear their realistic and reductionistic-interests upon each-other.

It is perfectly alright for *Nyāya* philosophers to maintain that they intend to undertake ontological-reduction, in the frame of a realist. This in itself is a question that is independent of the question of ontological-commitment. The question of ontological-commitment, on the contrary, is a different-issue; and that need not necessarily bear-upon the question of ontological-reduction. But the view of *Nyāya* philosophers does not lend-support to this contention. They not-only hold that the domains of the reals on which these two-questions bear are co-extensive, but they also hold that any real that figures on the plane of ontological-reduction is such that it must be taken to be part of the furniture of the world. A reductionist need not be a Platonist; but a realist, too, need not necessarily be a Platonist. But anybody who mixes-between ontological-reduction and ontological-commitment, and anybody who widens the limits of the latter to make it co-extensive with the former cannot help turning to be a Platonists. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers turn Platonists, because according to them there is a certain community of existence between abstract-objects, such as relations, qualities, numbers etc. and real-objects, like pots,

apples etc. It refuses to make an allowance to the view that there is no-type of being that is common to objects of different-categories. Such objects may exist in a related or analogous-ways. But there is no-kind of existence that serves as a kind of common-denominator for all kinds of objects. The consistency-criterion, on the basis of which Platonism takes all objects to be existent, dangerously-misleads or is at-least likely to mislead us; in so-far-as it ascribes extra-linguistic sense to all objects without distinction. This consideration is further complicated by saying that we are committed to hold that each-one of such an object is equally-tenably the part of the furniture of the world, no-matter whether simple or compound. As against this, it may be maintained that existence is an essential-attribute of existent-things. But, even on this view the relation-between consistency of a set of predicates and the existence of objects satisfying the predicates, is commonly-considered to warrant deducing-consistency of the predicates from the non-emptiness of the inter-section of their extension, or deducing the emptiness of this inter-section from the demonstrated-inconsistency of predicates. What is important, however, to understand is that both these deductions are in the same-direction – from existence to consistency, with the difference that in the second-consistency is considered to be necessary to existence. Although it would be legitimate to argue that we cannot talk consistently without talking-about something, yet from the fact that we are talking-about something it does not follow that either we are talking consistently or what we are talking about are or must be there. We also are not committed to hold that such things, as a matter of fact, are there either. It also equally does not follow that if we fail to subscribe to such a view, our theory would have no basis. It is quite alright to hold that certain ontological-beliefs are mirrored in language, and they can, at-least, be partially-comprehended by studying linguistic-forms. Such beliefs can

also, perhaps, be vindicated in terms of, what Carnap called, 'internal-questions'. But it would be a travesty of confusion to hold that those alone are the ontological-beliefs which language mirrors; and that there are no questions external to language. It is also equally-untenable to hold that any ontological-belief, for which we get sound linguistic-clue, alone, is tenable. At the hands of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, these and similar-considerations seem to have been employed. In our present investigation, however, we need not concentrate on each-and-every of them. In the context of reconstruction and realism particularly, they not-only believe that ontological, epistemological and logical-reconstructions have very close-correspondence among them; but they seem also to hold that reconstruction and commitment in-general, and ontological-reconstruction and ontological-commitment in-particular are equally-extensive. Especially for the latter of these views, there might have been certain-reasons which might have led *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to subscribe to such a kind of view. It would be worthwhile to investigate-into this problem, however conjectural and tentative such investigation turns-out to be, with a view to locate some of the possible-clues, which might have exercised an influence on them. It is to probe into this problem that we now turn.

Some Clues to Co-extensivisation of Ontological-Reduction and Ontological-Commitment

We argued earlier that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem interested in undertaking three-reconstructions almost-simultaneously. It was also pointed-out that according to them these reconstructions are isomorphic with one-another. Accordingly, on the *Navya-Nyāya* view, the sets of objects which each-one of these reconstructions would presuppose are co-extensive with one-another. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, perhaps, would seem to hold that any reconstruction of these would presuppose some kind of items or entities,

and every-entity that is congenial with any-reconstruction is there as a part of the furniture of the world. It was maintained previously that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to hold that all significant-expressions are of 'S-P form' and that, according to them, every significant-expression, as a degenerate-statement, too, fits into this mould. Their concentration on ordinary-language and 'S-P form' of statements, nevertheless, would not be sufficient; we hold, to account for the co-extensivisation of ontolog1cal-reconstruction and ontological-commitment. In other words, some additional-considerations might have prompted them to enlarge the sphere not-only of ontological-reconstruction but-also that of ontological-commitment. This, it seems, appeared plausible to them principally for five-reasons.

1. First, they seem to hold that structure of predicable-exemplification holds for all reality whatever and that such a structure holds necessarily. Thus, everything is either a predictable, or an exemplification of a predicable. Predicables, according to them, stand-for entities that can be predicated and predicables not-only include universals, which are predicable to many truly, but-also states, properties, actions, assertibles and relations. Nothing, according to them, does or even can fall-outside this general-mould of reality. In accordance with this, reality for them being structure of predicables and exemplifications, they are led to posit entities of these sorts along with relations in which they stand. But, relations themselves being predicables they fit-into the general-structure of reality. Taking predicables as-well-as their exemplifications as equally genuine-entities is one possible-reason that seems to have enlarged their ontological-commitment.
2. Secondly, they seem to uphold what may be called the 'principle of predicative-entailment'. This principle can

be stated as: necessarily if something has a property, then there is such a thing as that property. In-fact the principle of predicative-entailment is the axis around which resemblance-argument, according to which all things resemble one-another in certain respect, revolves and spins; and hence the resemblance-argument seems to presuppose the principle of predicative-entailment. But the principle of predicative-entailment in-turn presupposes two-steps:

(i) ***Exemplification*** – necessarily for anything at-all, if it has a property then that is an exemplification of it; and if anything exemplifies a property, then there is such a property. From this, it would be a short-step to understand that it is predication and not generality that-is pivotal and essential in arguments from resemblance. We need not probe deeper in this problem here. It suffices to remark in-passing, however, that Nāgārjuna in his *Madhyamakaśāstra*[2] spares no-effort to make this point as elaborately as possible;

(ii) ***Multiple-Affirmability*** – if a term can be truly affirmed with the same-import of various distinct-things, then those things must share certain predicable in-common. Multiple-affirmability limits the applicability of a term and the exemplification of a predicate to those cases in which the terms in questions are general-terms. This attempt forgets, however, that generality of term is irrelevant to multiple-affirmability. From the fact that *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers subscribe to the principle of predicative-entailment, it does not necessarily follow that they also hold that predicables and/or their exemplification/s are ontological-reals. For, it is possible to subscribe to the principle; and yet deny that there are such entities as numbers, existence. But, unfortunately, this, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers do not seem to be accepting. Moreover, it does not seem to occur to them that exemplification of a predicable

is a contingent-matter and predicable, qua-predicable does not in any way presuppose it being exemplified or otherwise. But even the force of 'there is' both in the context of a predictable and its exemplification, is ambiguous; from the point of view of ontological-commitment. This point, however, does not seem to have struck *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers.

3. Thirdly, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, it seems, have correctly-seen that predicables are kinds and understanding of 'this-kind' gives rise to another-structure of reality into 'kinds' and 'cases' or 'examples'. They seem to hold this structure, too, holds necessarily with reference to reality. On this consideration, therefore, reality twins-out to be a structure of 'kinds' and 'examples'. But *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to be wrongly-equating 'kinds' with 'sets'. Equation of this kind fails, principally for two-reasons: (a) any 'set' has the same-members, which does have and not others; but this does not necessarily hold for 'kinds' and their 'examples'. (b) Sets are identical, if their members are the same; but this does not necessarily hold for 'kinds' – e.g. square-circles and circular-squares. *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, however, seem also further to miss the point that predicables as well as 'kinds' are existentially equally-ambiguous. For, they seem to hold that 'principle of predicative-entailment' gives the requisite-existential-support not-only to the predicable-exemplification-structure of reality, but-also to the 'kind' – 'example' structure of reality. This presupposition of theirs, however, seems to be unfounded.
4. Fourthly, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem also to subscribe to what may be called 'referential-principle', according to which one cannot talk-about anything unless that thing exists, and hence it is not irrelevant to

argue that a fact, like red is a colour, can be asserted only-by referring to it. On such a view, therefore, every statement or assertion being essentially-referential, it is absolutely-irrelevant to consider whether or not one can state or assert without-referring. Even various-attempts to establish non-reducibility of predicables to anything else, on the part of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, we hold, cannot establish this contention. Maximally what such attempts can do is to persuade-opponents that predicables can be referred-to. Yet, even here, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem not to realise that reference necessarily does not presuppose existence of an object referred to or attempted to be referred to.

5. Fifthly, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to have confused-between physical-objects and predicables, and this seems to have proliferated their ontological-commitment. Physical-objects and predicables have a certain similarity – namely both of them have multiple-positions in-time. They also, likewise, seem to confuse-between divided-location in-space – a thing having different-parts having different spatial-locations – and divided-position in-time – a thing having different-parts having different temporal-locations; but on this point we need not linger over here. Once physical-objects and predicables are equated in this way with one-another, it is a short-step to apply similar existential-argument to both of them. This is what *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers seem to do.

These and perhaps some more-grounds, although mistaken, seem to have led *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers to put-forward their claim of an enlarged-ontological-commitment. Our fundamental-concern in this chapter, however, has been to maintain that ontological-commitment may or may-not necessitate ontological-reduction; and that ontological-

commitment need-not necessarily presuppose ontological-reduction. But with equal-emphasis we want to plead that ontological-reduction need-not necessarily presuppose ontological-commitment, and that it is dangerous to base ontological-commitment on the foundation of consistency of existence. We also tried to argue that although some of our ontological-beliefs, language, no-doubt, mirrors; but every-belief that linguistic-structure mirrors is not ontological. Nor is it necessary to hold that to such beliefs we are ontologically-committed.

Conclusion

Thus, at the hands of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, not-only a line of demarcation between-or-among different-issues is not drawn; but by taking ontological, epistemic and logical-reconstructions to be co-extensive with one-another they also seem to have blurred the boundaries-between these reconstructions. These reconstructions they intend to carry-out simultaneously, on the ground that these domains of reconstructions are co-extensive. These reconstructions are envisaged to be carried-out in a realistic-frame. But what gravely-complicates the matter is not so-much the fact that they retain reductionistic as-well-as realistic tenets; but-rather the fact that the issues of ontological-reduction and that of ontological-commitment are confused with each-other. It is this that is not inevitable. But, unfortunately, for whatever reasons, this was not clearly-seen. Thus, *Navya-Nyāya* theory on the count of reconstruction and realism, too, does-not seem to be free-from error and confusion.

NOTES

1. *Nyāya-Kośa;* Jhalkikar, Bhimacarya; The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute; Poona; (1st ed.); 1893; Pp.557-58.
2. *Madhyamakaśāstra* of Nāgārjuna; with *Prasannapadā* of Cadrakīrti and Appended with *Vigrahavyāvartanī* with *Sva-vṛtti* of Nāgārjuna and his *Ratnāvalī;* Vaidya, P.L. (ed.); Buddhist Text SeriesNo.-10; Mithila Institute; Darbhanga; 1960.

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Chapter-10
Epilogue

Introduction

We inquired, starting from the transition to the *Navya-Nyāya,* into some of the prominent-problems connected with the *Navya-Nyāya* theory. It is not at-all the intention of the present-study to critically-consider every-issue the *Navya-Nyāya* theory seems to give rise to. The attempt was not envisaged to be encyclopedic. The intention, rather, was to focus-attention on some important-problems. In what follows we shall attempt to state some of the problems that led to the present-critique. What we want here to do is to hint-at some of them. The inquiry that we undertook in the preceding chapters has already focused-attention on some of them at-least in some detail.

Critique of the *Navya-Nyāya*

The *Navya-Nyāya* theory in-particular and the *Nyāya* theory in-general are important enough to engage-attention of an honest-inquirer. In this study, we have all-along been presuming that general-structure, texture and frame of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, at-least in its-elementary and general-outline, is known to the readers. To compress attempts both of undertaking a critical-examination as-well-as of presenting a detailed-outline of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory in a single-volume, we think it to be too-ambitious and comprehensive a plan. Instead of doing this, we delimited our inquiry only to the first-question. Generally there should be no objection

to this. Even in our critique, we do not claim to have been exhaustive.

So-called Fertility of the *Navya-Nyāya*

Many-times it is said that importance of the *Navya-Nyāya* lies in its fertility – fertility of the number of problems it has anticipated, and to which it has responded. In a sense this is true. But what is important to understand is that fertility is not a result of exactness and precision, but-rather of seeing new-problems and seeing new-ways of solving them. Starting from the initial engagement with and involvement in exactitude at the hands of the writers and thinkers in the tradition of *Navya-Nyāya*, it got wrapped-up in it to such an extent that precision it-self came to be considered as the sign of fertility. Within a certain frame it did achieve the goal of precision, and indeed there is very-little one can do in that direction and in that domain. This is undisputed as-far-as it goes. But over and perhaps exclusive-emphasis on precision made the *Navya-Nyāya* almost obsessed with the problem Such obsession, too, perhaps, one can understand in so-far-as it is attempted to be developed; as a reaction to looseness and ambiguity. But under no circumstances can precision be taken to be the sign of fertility and creativeness. That, all roads to creativeness and fertility pass-through precision and exactitude was the supposition, it seems, that was fatal. For, on the count of creating 'logic of one possible-world', however confused, the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers succeeded to a great-extent. Their fault, perhaps, was that they held, incorrectly. Such a logic is the 'logic of any-world' and hence, in the main, the 'logic of this-world'. But thereby they erected a system that is closed.

Commonsensism and Realism of the *Navya-Nyāya*

One may also contend that its subscription to commonsense and realism was untenable. Both commonsense and realism are good. But, though commonsense is usually-right,

it is not always-right. Moreover, when it is right, it is not always necessarily-right. The places where it goes wrong are places which signal enlightenment and warning. For, there are places which show that ordinary-language and philosophical-considerations modeled-after it will not do. They will not do, not-simply-because something-else is intended to be done, not-because another-game is envisaged to be played. Rather, they will not do, because ordinary-language and the philosophy modeled-after it, are conservative. But, in matters of intellect, nothing is less-creative and more-commonplace than conservatism. *Navya-Nyāya*, which started on the road to innovation and change, creativeness and fertility, entered-into the jungle of conservatism; with the help of the vehicle of ordinary-language and philosophy modeled-after it. But, once it entered-into it that marked the end of fertility, and exactitude came to be substituted for fertility.

As there is nothing wrong, *prima-facie*, at-least, with commonsense, so-too there is nothing wrong, to begin with, with realism. We did not embark-upon criticism of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory, just because it is realistic. Far from it. It is not realism of it that is repulsive and invites-criticism and critical-examination. Rather, particular-brand of realism – viz. Platonist-realism. One may not even have an objection to Platonistic-realism, in-spite-of its absolutist-stand, provided 'truths of facts' and 'truths of logic', abstract and concrete-entities are not mixed-up. Apart-from not leaving-room for this-kind of distinctions, *Navya-Nyāya* undertakes justification of its frame and theory. With reference to a theory fundamental-question is not justification of it but its criticism; and a theory must leave-room for criticism. Instead of this, the justificatory-moves and tactics that the *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers employed with regard to their theory seem to have resulted, unfortunately, into rationalisation and immunisation of their theory from criticism. It is this situation

that is alarming and attention-inviting. What is important to understand is that we cannot justify a theory, although we can, sometimes at-least, justify our-preference for a theory on the basis that it stands better to a criticism. For, even a dogmatised-theory can and often does serve as a platform for criticism of rival-theories. It is openness for requisite-modification that matters. It is this, unfortunately, that was not done. But in so-far-as this was not done, any road to innovation and change, modification and alteration was not-only blocked, but very-judiciously set-aside. It should not be a matter of surprise that such a situation does pave-way for its criticism, and indeed demands its critical-examination.

One can quite understand if someone points-out that changes in our conceptual-model of the world are brought-about piecemeal by the advancement of knowledge, particularly advancement in natural-sciences. But, a prudent and rational-man is likely to be aware of the gaps and inaccuracies in the conceptual-map, which ordinary-language presents him with. The fact that no change worth the name was introduced and accepted in the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is difficult to be accounted-for by utter-absence of the advancement of natural-sciences in India in-particular and in the world in-general, during the entire-tenure of the tradition. Rather, *Navya-Nyāya* thinkers might have not, perhaps, paid-attention to it. To the extent to which they seem to have immunized their theory and with-held its contact with advancement in the natural-sciences, they seem to have with-held conceptual-change too. Something of this kind seems to have happened with a theory, is enough impetus to undertake a critique of it.

Presupposition and Commitment

Moreover it is very-significant to understand that presuppositions cannot function as steps in demonstrative-arguments. What they rather express is a commitment. The

commitment-aspect of the presupposition is neither brought-about by formal-proof, nor by cognitive-proof; but by its force. And what force commands is not persuasion and conviction, but-rather an emotive-response. The two are not synonymous. Presuppositions function on two-levels: cognitive and ontic. As cognitive-presuppositions function as directives in outlining the pattern of analysis, the layout of the problem, they shape formation of a theory. In its impersonal-aspect, on the contrary, commitment claims to be true of extra-conceptual-reality; and hence, amounts to be ontic-commitment. Although personal or cognitive, and impersonal or ontic-aspects of commitment can be distinguished, they cannot be separated. They, nevertheless, make certain disclosures, and such disclosures are borne-out by personal-dimensions in three main-ways: (i) presuppositions or commitments make one sensitive to new-harmonies, new-possibilities of experience, (ii) by acceptance of commitments and trying to satisfy directives they imply, one is led to shape one's conceptual-system in a particular-way – a matter of dynamic-simplicity, in the sense that one may find one's talk-about the world gaining certain-success of accent, significance, suggestive of fertility and point. In this way, one finds one's theory to be zeroing-towards reality; (iii) thirdly, sometimes cognitive-passions are taken as indicative of ontic-truth. Thus, presuppositions in the mode of ontic-commitments authenticate themselves in-terms-of cognitive-passions, dynamic-simplicity etc. But, what is most-significant to understand is that all these are signs of truth, and not truth themselves. It is unfortunately this again which did not seem to have dawned on the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers.

Presupposition of the relation of isomorphism-between ontological and epistemological-reconstructions is one-thing and to obtain such isomorphism as a matter of fact is quite another; similarly to hold that the sets of existents and

knowables are co-extensive is one-thing and to discover and prove the case to be so, is quite another and arduous for that matter. This slip, too, it seems, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers were unable to overcome.

The Fallacy of Perfect-Dictionary

The philosophical-terminology, which a philosopher employs, is generally gathered-from the standard-usage of ordinary-discourse. This is not to say that philosophers, occasionally at-least, do not resort to coining new-terms, or to giving new-meanings to the terms already in use. At any rate, however, such technical-vocabulary, for philosophy has never been as wide-spread and penetrating as the technical-vocabularies for physics or mathematics. A philosopher, thus, is normally bound to ordinary-language, but-not necessarily to the implicit-metaphysics of ordinary-language; there, perhaps, not being a single implicit-metaphysics tied-down with it. This was, perhaps, not clearly-seen by the *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers, in so-far-as they kept-on presuming that the kind of ontology and metaphysics they intended to propound and as a matter of fact did propound was the only-one that ordinary-language suggests. This is not, however, the point we wish to emphasis here; although we think that the point is of considerable-importance so-far-as the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is concerned. But, actual-usefulness of a term for philosophy is controlled obviously by two-factors. First, the importance of a term in non-philosophical contexts to which a philosopher addresses himself, and the possibility of its fruitful-employment in philosophizing-about that context at his hands are directly in-proportion to each-other. Secondly, the test of philosophical-utility of the employment of a term is the actual-success in using the term in the expression of a philosophical-theory. Yet, philosophical-tools are subject to the same-principles, which govern change in the means and materials of every other cultural-activity. The linguistic-

context affords fairly stable-criteria for separation of nonsense from significant-speech in philosophy as-well-as in other-discourses. But changing cultural-contexts not-only necessitate change in peripheral-terms, but-also in basic-terms. For, if the terms and concepts are unable to cope-up with changed-data and cultural-facts, they become obsolete and are required to be changed; if they are to be used as proper-instruments of communication even in such changed-contexts. Philosophy peculiarly-combines and should combine, to be worth the name, a combination of self-critical-character and its temporality. Such a philosophy is necessarily-involved in its interpretation and assessment of its own histor cal-development. Hence, no term or set of terms can be perfectly-precise, nor is the set of all philosophical-terms possible to be complete in a finite-time. This is so because a philosophical-theory at any-time along-with the entire-milieu of contemporary-fact becomes a *datum* of philosophical-inquiry at another-time, and any theory for which it is a *datum* must add new-terms, change old-ones and keep itself abreast with the changing intellectual-context. Such a kind of peculiarity-guarantees any philosophical-theory from the fallacy of what Whitehead called the 'fallacy of perfect dictionary'. It is this, unfortunately, by-and-large, did not happen with reference to the *Navya-Nyāya* theory; although prominently or otherwise it flourished for about eight hundred years. It is hard to imagine, much-less to persuade oneself that in such a large-compass of time intellectual-context and the cultural-milieu must not have changed. Yet, the fact is that, in-spite-of some stray-suggestions pleading for a change and shift, though not as radical and sweeping as one might otherwise expect, the general-frame as-well-as the spinal-cord of the *Navya-Nyāya* theory did not change. But to the extent to which this happens the *Navya-Nyāya* cannot afford to boast to be the truly, if-not the only, philosophical theory worth the name.

Relation between 'Form' and 'Fact'

There is, moreover, a problem that arises with reference to the establishment of a satisfactory relation-between actual-experience, and the formal-possibility. The problem becomes explicitly-obvious, when we try to locate and discover the relation-between linguistic-expressions on the one-hand and what they signify on the-other. The problem, however, becomes complicated, because there occurs what may be called 'letting'; because it occurs at both the ends of an application of logic to experience. Such a kind of 'letting' consists-in bringing the whole of scheme of pure-possibilities to bear-upon that part of experience whose texture is under-investigation. More generally, however, the problem focuses on the relation-between 'form' and 'fact'. In the consideration of this relation, we let in all three-considerations: (i) first, 'letting' such-and-such a 'form' signify such-and-such a 'fact', (ii) secondly, 'letting' such-and-such a 'fact' being signified by such-and-such a 'form', and (iii) mergence of 'signifying and signified-fact' on the one-hand and mergence of 'signified and signifying-form' on the-other. But in such a move, what we forget is that signifying, representing or standing-for is a mono-directional, and hence, an asymmetrical-relation. This being the case, the question of order in each-case cannot be overlooked.

Further, with-regard-to the envisaged-mergence, there are peculiar-troubles. First, purely formal-relations fit so-loose to actual-experience that they do not have legitimate-jurisdiction over it. At-times, there might be *de-facto* jurisdiction; but this phenomenon in no-way guarantees *de-jure* jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction may be rooted-in the psychological-conditions of persuasiveness; but this is no full-proof procedure to establish that such a cap of a 'form' fits the 'fact'. Moreover, richness and vitality of facts go contrary to this move. Secondly, where terminal-regions

are not known to be the same, structural-mappings brought-from the sphere of 'form' to 'fact' may wrongly-prompt, or even may be wrongly taken-for the actual-relation in experience. The error or the tendency of error involved in both the cases of 'forms' signifying 'facts' and 'facts' signifying 'forms' is not the same. For, whereas formal-reference is subservient to the power of persuasiveness in the first, in the second formal-structure is taken 'simpliciter' for actual-structure. Once this is accepted, logical-arrogance can work unchecked; for tables happen to be turned-on experience or fact. The third kind of 'letting', on the contrary, is partly-negative and partly-positive. Its negative-side restrains the strong-sides of each-one of the first-two lettings. But positively, it seeks to establish a natural-commerce between 'form' and 'fact' that was breached in the first-two lettings. This it can do by showing some-kind of merging-between initial-phase of the first-letting and the final-phase of the second. Yet, such merging has to be established, not just assumed. This is precisely, it seems, *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers did not do. They have presumed a certain relation-between ontology and experience, experience and expression, and expression and facts. On the assumption of the presumed-relation everything works-smooth. But the relation that is assumed should not be left as a matter of presupposition, rather it must be shown to be the fact. Unfortunately this does not seem to have been done. But to the extent to which this has not been done, or rather seems not to have been done, the *Navya-Nyāya* theory remains-open for criticism.

Correspondence Theory and the *Navya-Nyāya*

The *Navya-Nyāya* seems to accept correspondence theory of truth, a systematic-account of commonsensical-way of understanding truth. But if truth as correspondence with fact cannot be developed-systematically, without-embracing

inconsistencies, this will evidence that our commonsensical-ideas on the subject of truth and its allied-notions, for all their surface-acceptability, are covertly-incoherent; and need reformation in the interest of intellectual-hygiene. Commonsense and Platonism, perhaps, go-together. We are not so-much against either Platonism or realism. For, doubtless there is no reason to suppose that the universe is composed according to the 'law of parsimony'. But, the consequences to which Platonism leads or is likely to lead make one uneasy, if logic does not compel us to accept them. Generally-speaking things, qualities, events are immersed-in spatio-temporal-world, while facts or states of affairs are somehow frozen and abstracted-from the spatio-temporal-continuum. The continuum consists of a web of events, which in-turn consists of individual-things, changing their properties and their relations to other-things. Things exist in-space, endure in-time; qualities are instantiated at different-points of space and at different-times; events occur at particular-places and times. But facts are not located in-space, nor do they endure through time. There is, nevertheless, a close connection-between facts and events; for they are the same-objects considered-from two different-points of view. When we talk of objects immersed in space-and-time as we ourselves are, we think and talk of events. Here our approach seems animal-like. But we are also semi-rational, if-not wholly-rational, creatures, having perhaps an innate-interest in sorting-out our-world in regular-patterns of recurrence and co-existence. We want to be able to predict, and have control of nature through our knowledge. This requires isolating ourselves from the flux of events, and regarding the world as a static-pattern viewed, perhaps as sub-specie-*aeternitatis*. From this perspective, we look at events as fixed in their spatio-temporal position – that is, we interpret the world as world of facts. Now, facts are donors of truth, but falsity being connected with truth we also start presupposing that there

must be facts which donate falsity – such facts being negative-facts – and generality – such facts being general-facts as contrasted with particular-facts. In this we lose sight of the fact that we are fast, making a head-way for metaphysical-extravagance. What this endeavour is backed-by is the consideration that facts as objective-features of the world contribute truth-values. In talking or thinking-about features of the world, we are compelled to use language; and in using-language about any-feature of the world, we have to conceptualize what we talk-about. Negation, for example, is a linguistic-device, which we use for conceptual-convenience. There is nothing in the world that corresponds to negation. Some facts exclude others. There are present and absent-things – rather there are presences and absences of things. It is to designate such exclusions and absences that we use negation. But exclusion, absence etc. themselves are not features of the world – not-even components of features. There are no negative-facts as-also there are no general-facts. To hold that facts are features of the world as-much-as things and events are, is a logically-fundamental type-mistake. Facts rather are what statements state, but they are not what statements are about. What statements are about are things or events in the world, and their properties and relations. Even-if it is granted that indicative-statements simultaneously designate and describe those features of the world which they describe complexes, such complexes of individual-cum-properties are not facts. A statement does not have a semantic-relation with anything that is not in the world. Facts are on the side of language, if a dividing-line between linguistic-expressions and features of the world is drawn. Since statements do not have semantic-relation with facts, there is no question of statements corresponding-with facts. The facts are on the wrong-side of the semantic-force. Facts are the cognitive-content of the true-statements, and there would be no facts if there were no language. To hold

that the entities to which the statement corresponds includes not-only the objects the statement is about, but-also whatever the sentence says-about them is to cast the net of ontology too-large. The *Navya-Nyāya* seems to do something of this kind in-spite-of its accepting 'correspondence theory of truth'. But in so-far-as the *Navya-Nyāya* seems to mix-up between facts and things, it seems to mix-up between linguistic and extra-linguistic – the two-sides of the semantic-divide. This situation itself is a matter of sufficient-concern and alarm.

Motif of the Study

These and many-other considerations gave the impetus to the present writer to pose and attempt to answer certain-questions about the theory of *Nyāya* in-general and that of *Navya-Nyāya* in-particular. It is investigation of this sort that has taken shape of the present study. The study is undertaken neither to downgrade the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition, nor to malign the work of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers. But honest intellectual-inquiry should not be obstructed by the considerations of reverence-and-regard both for the tradition as-well-as for philosophers who flourished therein. We are aware of the stupendous-works produced by *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers as-also of the zeal and dedication with which they not-only pioneered one important-tradition of Indian logic, but-also the devotion and commitment with which they kept the flame of the tradition burning. This is indeed praiseworthy, and at-once commands respect. Yet we very-honestly believe that this should not stand in way of its critical-examination.

In-spite-of such endeavour, however, on the part of *Navya-Nyāya* philosophers the present study seems to indicate that there are some prominent-weaknesses in the theory. It also seems to point-out that the theory appears to give-rise to some problems, which turn damaging to the

theory; if they are not paid serious-attention to which they so earnestly-deserve. It is to indicate that some-such situation prevailed with reference to the *Navya-Nyāya* theory is the object of this study.

We are also aware of the fact that there are indeed many-great *Paṇḍits* and renowned-scholars of the tradition who would have been in a position to produce a work of such a kind on much-larger compass and with greater-profundity, were they to muster the necessary-courage and gather the required-zeal. But this very fact of the absence of such a kind of work, perhaps, made us enthusiastic to embark-upon it. We shall indeed be grateful to all those who would spare enough-time and energy, and grace this study with suggestions, corrections and modifications; whatever their number and wherever they may be in-order. We would like to assure them in-advance that due-consideration will be given to them.

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Hence, the entire attempt of searching the Navya-Nyāya as a continuation of the Prācīna-Nyāya turns-out to be misleading, unjust and unwarranted. With this perspective the entire project is undertaken and it attempts to establish the claim.

Nonetheless it becomes interesting to know why did the Nyāya-tradition gave-up its own original-scheme of Padārthas, and came to take-over the scheme of Padārthas-advocated and championed by the Vaiśeṣikas; though with some modifications? Why could they not either form a philosophical-alliance with any other school, or imbibe and absorb the philosophical-frame presented by the upholders of any other school? Discussion of this issue will engage our attention in the first part of the present investigation.

After that in the second-part a critical-examination of the theory of Navya-Nyāya is undertaken. It is an attempt to expose some of the critical-considerations that need to be given a serious-attention to, provided we are not to look-at the Navya-Nyāya theory. It is meant to foster an attitude of critical-consideration, and critical-examination. It is an investigation undertaken with an attitude of a dispassionate-seeker of the truth and honest critical-inquirer, with a view to assess and judge the real-worth of the entire Navya-Nyāya endeavor; to get a clearer-perspective of its aims and achievements.

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New Delhi - 110002 (India)
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ISBN 81-8315-30
9 788183 153096
KQ-502-805
₹ 1000/-